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INTRODUCTION
“Fake news” has become the central inflammatory
charge in media discourse in the United States since the 2016
presidential contest.1 The phrase has numerous meanings, and
the phenomenon presents a spectrum of dangers.2 In the
political realm, both intentionally fabricated information3 and
1

A search of the New York Times database on September 26, 2017, showed almost
1500 articles mentioning “fake news.” See N.Y. Times: Search,
https://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/?action=click&contentCollection&reg
ion=TopBar&WT.nav=searchWidget&module=SearchSubmit&pgtype=Homepage
#/%22fake%20news%22 (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
In keeping with the centrality of “fake news,” the Oxford English
Dictionaries dubbed “post-truth” the word of the year for 2016. See Word of the Year
of 2016 is . . . , https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year2016 (last visited Mar. 14, 2018) (defining post-truth as “an adjective defined as
‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in
shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’’”).
2
See infra Section I. The distinction between “real” fake news and “fake” fake news
in the title of this piece is a crude attempt to capture the spectrum of what is meant
by the various uses of the term. At one end of the spectrum is “real” fake news—
meaning intentionally fabricated misinformation. This kind of “fake news” consists
of the dissemination of falsity, in whole or in part—whether for economic or political
reasons. (This Article distinguishes this kind of intentionally fabricated falsity from
mainstream press errors, inaccuracies, incompleteness and even slanted presentation
of news and information.) At the other end of the spectrum is the use of the “fake
news” phrase as a strategic tool to cast doubt on the truthfulness and credibility of
standard mainstream news reporting organizations. Of course, the deployment of
each type of “fake news” can undermine public trust in the truth of what is reported.
3
The 2016 election season saw the viral distribution of numerous factually
inaccurate claims regarding political figures or events. For example, false reports
circulated that Pope Francis endorsed the candidacy of Donald Trump, see Sydney
Schaedel, Did the Pope Endorse Trump?, FACTCHECK.ORG (Oct. 24, 2016),
http://www.factcheck.org/2016/10/did-the-pope-endorse-trump/; that Hillary
Clinton was involved in a child trafficking ring operating out of a popular DC pizza
parlor, see, e.g., Cecilia Kang & Adam Goldman, In Washington Pizzeria Attack, Fake
News Brought Real Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 5, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/business/media/comet-ping-pong-pizzashooting-fake-news-consequences.html; that Russian operatives had hacked the US
power grid, see Kalev Leetaru, 'Fake News' And How The Washington Post Rewrote Its
Story On Russian Hacking Of The Power Grid, FORBES (Jan. 1, 2017, 2:31 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/01/01/fake-news-and-how-thewashington-post-rewrote-its-story-on-russian-hacking-of-the-powergrid/#f1d38377ad51; and that Democrats had killed a DNC staffer in order to
prevent him from testifying against Hillary Clinton in an FBI investigation into her
use of a private email server, see Kim LaCapria, Seth Rich Homicide: A Conspiracy Site
Latched Onto the Tragic Murder of Young DNC Staffer Seth Rich to Spread False
Information About His Killing, SNOPES, http://www.snopes.com/seth-conrad-rich (last
updated Aug. 10, 2016). Some of the fabricated news was motivated by the
economic desire to generate income from clickbait, see Samantha Subramanian,
Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/, while some was
generated to advance ideological and/or political aims, see, e.g., Scott Shane, The
Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017),
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the “fake news” defense by politicians confronted with negative
press reports4 can potentially influence public beliefs and
possibly even skew electoral results.5 Perhaps even more
insidiously, the “fake news” accusation can serve as a powershifting governance mechanism to delegitimize the institutional
press as a whole.6 In that spirit, President Trump has deployed
the “fake news” trope to demonize and dismiss the traditional
press as the “enemy of the American people.”7 Both these
strategic uses of “fake news”—to achieve specific political
results8 and to destabilize the press as an institution—are selfhttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitterelection.html).
4
For example, both during the electoral campaign and after his election, Donald
Trump consistently responded to negative press coverage by characterizing
unfavorable reports as “fake news.” See. e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter (Oct. 4, 2017, 7:47 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/915589297096536065?lang=en;
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 24, 2017, 5:48 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/952301373479104512?lang=en;
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 13, 2018, 2:08 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/952301373479104512?lang=en.
This emboldened other public figures to do the same. See, e.g., Brian Resnick,
Exclusive: Roy Moore Campaign Distributes “Primer” On How To Discredit Accusers, “Fake
News”, VOX (Dec. 11, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/12/8/16754470/roy-moore-campaign-talking-points-debunk-sexualallegations (discussing the campaign position of controversial Senate candidate Roy
Moore with respect to news reports of sexual molestation of teenage girls).
5
See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
6
By traditional institutional press, I refer to national, regional, and local print news
organizations such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street
Journal, The Chicago Tribune, The Miami Herald, etc. The electronic institutional press
would include entities such as the broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC), CNN,
MSNBC, and CSPAN.
The Trump approach now is not just to dispute the accuracy of particular
stories or accounts of factual events, but to label “real news” as “fake” simply if it
does not support the executive’s version of events. See supra note 4. This indicates “a
comprehensive, categorical labeling rather than a narrower critique of particular
coverage . . . .” RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and
the Press, 49 AZ. ST. L. J. 1301, 1314 (2018). Of course, in addition to the broadside
“fake news” attack on the press as an institution, President Trump also continues to
use the phrase to challenge the accuracy of specific news stories about him. See, e.g.,
Billy Bush, Yes, Donald Trump, You Said That, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03/opinion/billy-bush-trump-accesshollywood-tape.html?_r=0 (responding to President Trump’s recent suggestion that
an unflattering recording in which he admits to sexual misconduct was faked).
7
Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Calls the News Media the ‘Enemy of the American
People’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/business/trump-calls-the-news-media-theenemy-of-the-people.html; see also Andrew Higgins, Trump Embraces ‘Enemy of the
People,’ A Phrase With A Fraught History, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/26/world/europe/trump-enemy-of-the-peoplestalin.html (describing use of phrase by Stalin and Mao, among other authoritarian
leaders).
8
The strategic dissemination of fake information is also infecting the processes of
regulatory rule-making today. See, e.g., Paul Hitlin, Kenneth Olmstead & Skye Toor,
Public Comments to the Federal Communications Commission About Net Neutrality Contain
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evidently very dangerous for democracy.9 If the press is to help
ensure government accountability by serving as democracy’s
watchdog, it cannot simultaneously be perceived as
democracy’s enemy. If public discourse is flooded with false
information, at a minimum, voters will not know what to
believe. Incompetence, demagoguery, and corruption10 in the
public realm are a likely result. Moreover, as if this were not a
sufficient threat to the democratic order, “fake news” is also a
threat, inter alia, to the stability of the financial markets as well,
with the ability to disrupt markets “on an unprecedented
scale.”11 Whether for competitive advantage, terror, or
geopolitical gamesmanship, the deployment of market-affecting
fabricated information is a looming danger ahead. Simply put,
therefore, “fake news” presents profound—and likely
increasing—challenges for both the public and private spheres
today.
Of course, intentionally false news (variously referred to
as propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation) is hardly a
new phenomenon, either in politics or in commerce.12 And
government officials preceding Donald Trump have certainly
indulged in press-bashing.13 But circumstances are importantly
Many Inaccuracies and Duplicates, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 29, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/11/29/public-comments-to-the-federalcommunications-commission-about-net-neutrality-contain-many-inaccuracies-andduplicates/ (reporting what appeared to be strategic use of bot-generated comments,
many apparently using fake identifying information, in comments filed with the
Federal Communications Commission’s proceeding on the rollback of net neutrality
rules).
9
For a view that enemy construction of the press should be seen through a
Schmittian lens as an invitation to the destabilization of other institutions beyond the
press as well, see Jones & Sun, supra note 6; see also Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional
Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93 NYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (identifying
“new forces at work that should make us concerned that the same disease plaguing
today’s political dialogue will infect (or further infect) the judiciary”).
10
See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy),
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 209–211 (2018) (suggesting that local and regional
corruption is likely to result from a decline in robust local and regional media
covering statehouses).
11
Tom C. W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1292–94
(2017) (describing, inter alia, threats of mass misinformation); see also infra Section
III.B.
12
From Octavian’s false claims about Mark Anthony’s last will to George Orwell’s
War of the Worlds broadcast, history is rife with notable examples of fabricated
news. See, e.g., Lionel Barber, Fake News In The Post-Factual Age, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
16, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c8c749e0-996d-11e7-b83c-9588e51488a0;
see generally Michael C. Dorf & Sidney G. Tarrow, Stings and Scams: ‘Fake News,’ the
First Amendment, and the New Activist Journalism, 20 J. CONST. L. 1 (2017) 1
(describing the growth in volume and intensity of “fake news” on the Internet for
several years prior to the 2016 US presidential election).
13
How can one forget that Vice President Agnew, speaking William Safire’s words,
famously characterized the press as “nattering nabobs of negativism” during the
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different today. We now find ourselves in an informational
environment where technology enables psychometric targeting,
information floods, and filter bubbles;14 a political environment
typified by escalating polarization, extremism, and distrust; a
commercial environment in which financial markets depend on
high-speed trading by bots; and a journalistic environment
marked by economic pressure, declining shared norms, a
resurgent partisan media, harassment of journalists, and
increasing uncertainty about the degree of remaining legal and
non-legal protection for the press.
Thus, the various flavors of “fake news” today present a
powerful threat because of enhanced technology, political
polarization, and reduced public trust in increasingly precarious
traditional accountability institutions. The dark side of “cheap
speech”15 is that technology enables the increasingly effective
weaponization of fabricated information and facilitates the
global implementation of speech control strategies by
governments and others in pretended response to public
concern over “fake news.” The sitting President’s relentless
critique of the mainstream press, when joined with
technologically weaponized “fake news” being disseminated to
a politically polarized public, undermines already-fragile public
trust in the press.16 The issue is particularly complex because of
the party asymmetry in views about “fake news”17 and the
asymmetric polarization of media.18 And the traditional press’s
Nixon Administration? See David Remnick, Nattering Nabobs, NEW YORKER (July
10, 2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/07/10/nattering-nabobs.
14
See, e.g., Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
(September 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendmentobsolete (describing noxious characteristics of the current information environment).
The term “filter bubble,” coined by Eli Pariser, refers to the tendency of
personalization on the web to offer users only news consistent with their world views
and preferences. See ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: HOW THE NEW
PERSONALIZED WEB IS CHANGING WHAT WE READ AND HOW WE THINK (2011).
15
This refers to Professor Eugene Volokh’s early-in-the-history-of-the-Internet-Age
article, Cheap Speech and What It Can Do. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What
It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995) (discussing the likely effects of virtually
costless opportunities for speech on the Internet).
16
See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
17
See David Lazer et al., Combating Fake News: An Agenda For Research and Action,
SHORENSTEIN CTR. (2017), https://shorensteincenter.org/combating-fake-newsagenda-for-research/ (“[M]isinformation is currently predominantly a pathology of
the right . . . .”). The left also appears credulous, however. See, e.g., Ken Bensinger,
Jason Leopold & Craig Silverman, The 1.6 Billion Dollar Hoax, BUZZFEED (Mar. 15,
2017, 6:24 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/how-donald-trumpsenemies-fell-for-a-billion-dollar-hoax?utm_term=.nn8O6Zn4v#.taEBQYgVy
(describing “[a]n elaborate hoax based on forged documents escalates the
phenomenon of “fake news” and reveals an audience on the left that seems willing to
believe virtually any claim that could damage Trump”).
18
See Rob Faris et al., Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and
the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, HARVARD UNIV. BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. (Aug. 16,
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ability to counteract “fake news” and act as watchdog over
government activity and private power is diluted by a variety of
increasing constraints.19 Such threats come not only from the
press’s financial woes, but from a judicial turn away from press
protection and a decline in customary press privileges.20
The nature of the hazards posed by the phenomenon of
“fake news” can best be understood against the background of
these developments. They reveal that no single—or simple—
tactic can address the variety of challenges posed by the multiheaded phenomenon of “fake news.” Nor should it. Because
the issue of the relationship between the press, the government,
and the public is so profoundly important and difficult; because
“fake news” is such a multi-faceted and evolving phenomenon;
and because today’s information environment is so
complicated, proposing remedies to address the problem
requires great care and restraint.
In that spirit, this Article suggests beginning with a
three-pronged approach—focusing on platform self-regulation,
audience information literacy, and empowerment of the press
itself.21 The recommendations relating to platforms and
2017), https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2017/08/mediacloud; see also
Michael Barthel & Amy Mitchell, Americans’ Attitudes About the News Media Deeply
Divided Along Partisan Lines, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 10, 2017),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/13/2017/05/09144304/PJ_2017.05.10_MediaAttitudes_FINAL.pdf; see also Vidya Narayanan et al, Polarization, Partisanship and
Junk News Consumption over Social Media in the US, UNIV. OXFORD: COMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA PROJECT (Feb. 6, 2018), http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/93/2018/02/2018-1.pdf. (finding that the distribution of fake
and other “junk” news is “unevenly spread across the ideological spectrum” and that
a network of “extreme hard right pages—distinct from Republican pages—share the
widest range” on Facebook).
19
For an argument that the construction of the press as an enemy by the Trump
Administration has undermined not only the ability of the press to serve as watchdog
of government, but also the press’s function as educator and public proxy, see Jones
& Sun, supra note 6.
20
For another article noting the decline in customary privileges for the press, see
RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American Press, 112
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 47
(2017), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1251&context=nulr_online.
21
There is little consensus, studies tell us, on whether the many suggested solutions
for “fake news” are likely to be successful. See Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie,
Internet and Technology, The Future of Truth and Misinformation Online, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/10/19/the-future-of-truthand-misinformation-online/; see also Laura Hazard Owen, There Is ‘Nothing
Resembling Consensus’ About Whether the Online Misinformation Problem Can Actually be
Solved, NIEMANLAB (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/10/there-isnothing-resembling-consensus-about-whether-the-online-misinformation-problemcan-actually-be-solved/ (describing split among experts as revealed by recent Pew
report). That there is no assurance, however, does not mean that a multi-valent
approach to amelioration is not worth exploring.
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audiences are designed principally to address the problem of
fabricated stories. The recommendation with respect to the
press is designed to redress the costs to institutional legitimacy
of calling the mainstream media as a whole “fake news.” The
goal is to try to achieve a virtuous circle, with each prong
reinforcing the others in order to reduce harms attributable to
both types of “fake news” charges. The Article does not
recommend express governmental attempts to prohibit or limit
“fake news” directly.22 It does, however, recommend legislative
and judicial expansion of affirmative rights for the press.
Demonized by the right, the mainstream press today seems
poised to be swept into the left’s recent attempts to desacralize
the First Amendment on the ground of its “ideological drift”23
to the right. The Article suggests that progressive scholars’
critiques of recent libertarian doctrinal developments with
respect to the freedom of speech24 should in no way impede the
enhancement, recommended here, of the First Amendment’s
protections for a free and independent press.
The Article’s first recommendation focuses on selfregulation by major information intermediaries.25 Data suggests
22

Instead of attempting to mandate prohibitions on “fake news,” the Article first
seeks to explore the possibilities of self-regulatory approaches because of concerns
about official censorship. See Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake
News,” Disinformation and Propaganda, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Mar. 3, 2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Iss
ues/Expression/JointDeclaration3March2017.doc&action=default&DefaultItemOp
en=1 [hereinafter Joint Declaration] (joint declaration by UN Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression and others, recognizing threat of fake news but warning
against censorship in regulation). The Article assumes that voluntarily-adopted
counter-measures are preferable to mandated prohibitions, and asserts that framing
the issue correctly could lead to fruitful self-regulatory efforts—particularly when
information intermediaries and other commercial market participants come to see
the self-regulation of “fake news” as in their long-term economic self-interest. This
Article does see a place for government rules—not in prohibiting “fake news,” but in
mandating enhanced press rights so that the press can effectively serve its watchdog
function and begin to rebuild public trust. See infra Section IV.
23
Professor Jack Balkin coined the phrase “ideological drift” to describe shifts in
constitutional interpretation in which radical or liberal ideas become mainstream
orthodoxy and are then appropriated by conservatives. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism
About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375,
383 (1990) (noting that ideological drift can move from right to left or left to right,
but is more commonly reflected in “comparatively liberal principles that later serve
to buttress comparatively conservative interests.”); see also J.M. Balkin, Ideological
Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 (1993).
24
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
25
See infra Section III.A. As Jack Balkin has persuasively argued, these
intermediaries are now the central factors in the private governance of free speech.
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2018). I use the term “self-regulation” here not to deny that reality, but to distinguish
their regulatory decisions from those mandated by legislatures or courts.
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that much fabricated news has been circulated virally through
the predominant social media platforms. Thus, the first step in
addressing the problem would be to focus on those platforms
and look to ways to dis-incentivize the generation and
dissemination of factually false stories.26 Powerful news
intermediaries like Facebook and Google have already begun
their own self-regulatory exercises, variously relying on
algorithmic identification of problematic content, fact-check
disclosure approaches, and attempts to prioritize high quality
news content.27 The platforms’ interests in reputation and
customer satisfaction are likely to exert non-legal pressure on,
and provide alternative incentives for, such self-regulatory
efforts. The principal questions here will concern the
effectiveness of the platforms’ private solutions in light of their
own economic incentives in the advertising marketplace, and
the appropriateness of turning powerful intermediaries such as
Google and Facebook into private censors.
In addition to technological solutions28 with which the
platforms are experimenting, the Article recommends that
information intermediaries adopt expanded sponsorship
disclosure obligations in connection with their ad sales. If
targeted psychometric marketing of “fake news” in order to
exploit people’s weaknesses can be disrupted (at least to some
degree) via disclosures, then the perfect storm of “fake news”
and the “AI propaganda machine”29 might be more easily
deflected. Promises of this sort have already been made by
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg30 in the shadow of pending
legislation;31 remaining issues include Facebook’s followthrough and the position of other major platforms.

26

This Article’s recommendations with respect to platform regulation and audience
self-help are geared principally to constraining the fabricated content type of “fake
news.” The recommendations with regard to the press itself are geared to the use of
the “fake news” label as a press-delegitimizing governance and discipline tactic.
27
See infra Section III.
28
Technology-based “fake news solutions” beyond the platforms’s current initiatives
are developing as well. Perhaps the most innovative such suggestion is a proposal
for blockchain-enabled decentralized journalism. Civil, the first journalism
marketplace of this sort, is a proselatyzer for how blockchain will reputedly eliminate
all fake news. See CIVIL, https://joincivil.com/; see also infra Section III.
29
Berit Anderson & Brett Horvath, The Rise of the Weaponized AI Propaganda Machine,
SCOUT (Feb. 9, 2017), https://scout.ai/story/the-rise-of-the-weaponized-aipropaganda-machine.
30
See, e.g., Hamza Shaban & Matea Gold, Facebook, Google and Twitter Face Proposed
Bill Targeting Shadowy Political Ads, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/09/22/facebookgoogle-and-twitter-could-face-a-new-law-targeting-shadowy-politicalads/?utm_term=.a164babf66e4.
31
See infra Section III.A.2.c (discussing the pending Honest Ads Act).
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Virtually all of the scholarly discussions of “fake
news”—including this Article—focus principally on the need to
solve the problem because of the political threat it poses to
elections and democracy. Yet framing the issue as primarily a
political matter misses the fact that both politics and commerce
are threatened by the proliferation of “fake news.” Recognition
of that reality would align the incentives of those concerned
about market integrity with those concerned about elections
and democracy. More widespread and sincere commitment to
the exploration of effective “fake news” counter-responses
could emerge as a result. Corporate entities today are all aware
(many from experience) that they are potential victims of hacks
and data breaches, and now increasingly interpret cybersecurity as a corporate responsibility (although admittedly with
varying degress of success). Framing the “fake news” problem
in a way that analogizes it to cybersecurity is likely to trigger
commercial entities’ “buy-in” to the project of reducing “fake
news.” This is not to minimize the importance of “fake news”
to democracy, nor is it to assume that the solutions to the “fake
news” threats to financial markets are necessarily the same as
the solutions to the threats in the political context. Rather, it is
to recognize that self-regulation efforts are more likely to
succeed if they enlist the practical and sincere commitment of
participants in both the political and commercial domains.
Still, a focus on technological solutions and platform
self-regulation alone is unlikely to be either sufficient or
unambiguously desirable. Thus, a second recommendation for
dealing with “fake news” would be to address how to empower
audiences in their ability to distinguish “fake news.” Calls for
critical media literacy have been around for many years.32 But if
today’s barrage of Internet-spread “fake news” can really
influence political and commercial outcomes, then it is
important to examine at a granular level what kinds of
interventions could actually succeed in helping the public
distinguish true from false information better than they
currently do. The challenge here is to create more successful
tools by incorporating the insights of political science and
modern cognitive psychology concerning the effectiveness of
corrections in light of cognitive biases and in contexts in which
people operate within political echo chambers.33
32

See, e.g., Douglas Kellner & Jeff Share, Critical Media Literacy Is Not An Option, 1
LEARNING INQUIRY 59 (2007) (arguing that critical media literacy is an imperative for
participatory democracy in the 21st Century).
33
See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the Challenge,
165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137 145–46 (2017),
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Research has begun to emerge addressing this issue, and
various cognitive biases have been identified correlating with
people’s susceptibility to “fake news.”34 Empirical data to date
do not appear to have reached full consensus on the impact of
those biases or what corrective information designs might
neutralize them effectively. Still, some research suggests that
people are likely to change their beliefs when they are
challenged by surprising validators, and that their beliefs can be
influenced by the choice of style, format, and contextrecognition in factual corrections. Further research will be
needed so that “the new media literacy” approach can properly
drive policy.
In addition to effectiveness, the principal issue with
respect to this aspect of the Article’s recommendations is likely
to be whether the proposed new approach to information
literacy might itself present a legitimacy trap. In other words,
structuring media literacy with a view to avoiding cognitive
biases which lead to the viral spread of falsity can itself end up
replicating the very kind of manipulation that it is designed to
combat. That is an important risk to avoid.
Abstracting out from the correction of false stories, the
Article’s third set of recommendations focuses on ways to push
back against the delegitimizing effects of the “fake news”
charge when it is used as an overall institutional attack on the
press. The goal here is to generate a counter-narrative of press
function to re-legitimate the press and promote audience trust.
The current informationscape ironically represents the very
moment when the press can come into its own. It can do so by
engaging in excellent investigation and reporting and rebuilding
public trust. But how?
First, the tools. Scholars have highlighted the disparity
in First Amendment protections of publication and
newsgathering and decried the extensive constitutional
protection of false speech as opposed to the minimal protection
of truth-seeking newsgathering.35 Even before the Trump
Administration, during the Obama years, both doctrine and
practice had begun to scale back protections for journalistic
activity.36 In addition to continuing—and even enhancing—
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=penn
_law_review_online; see also infra Section III.B.
34
See infra Section III.B.
35
See Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 12.
36
See, e.g., James Risen, If Trump Targets Journalists, Thank Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/opinion/sunday/if-donaldtrump-targets-journalists-thank-obama.html (discussing Obama Administration’s
approach to the press); see also infra Section II.A.
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those developments, the Trump Administration has notably
diminished customary, informal press-privileging practices.37
And modern court practice—even with respect to publication—
appears to be taking a less press-protective turn. The principal
doctrinal recommendation on this front—perhaps counterintuitively—is to reverse those trends and increase press
protection, especially for newsgathering, protection from leak
prosecutions, and balancing newsworthiness with other values.
The recommendation to reverse current doctrine and practice is
grounded on the bet that the modern context of “fake news”
provides an opportunity for the press to shine in its watchdog
role. The law should give the press more access to the
information it needs to cover the “real” (and not the distracting)
news in greater depth and more accurately.
Then the ethics and practice. If granted these enhanced
protections, the press, in turn, must live up to them. It must
address its journalism standards, engage in serious journalism
and investigative work enabled by the expanded press
protections recommended here, focus on reporting rather than
opinion (perhaps eliminating the op-ed page, for example), be
more transparent with the public about its norms and processes,
resist having its agenda respond to that of the partisan media
ecosystem,38 and work “to avoid being drawn into alignment
with either of the parties.”39
The results will surely be imperfect, but the alternative is
worse: a neutered and supine press operating merely to
entertain the fragmented and polarized audience in an
increasingly authoritarian global political environment.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I describes the
phenomenon of “fake news,” addresses various taxonomies of
“fake news,” and situates the two ways in which “fake news” is
37

See generally Jones & West, supra note 20 (describing some such diminutions);
Carol Pauli, Enemy of the People: Negotiating News at the White House (Texas A&M
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17–49, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007970 (same); see also infra
Section II.B.
38
See Yochai Benkler et al., Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered
Broader Media Agenda, COLUM. J. REV. (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php (noting how
“a right-wing media network anchored around Breitbart developed as a distinct and
insulated media system” that set the agenda for both the conservative media and
“strongly influenced the broader media agenda.”)
39
Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, “You’re Fake News!” The 2017
Poynter Media Trust Survey, POYNTER (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://poyntercdn.blob.core.windows.net/files/PoynterMediaTrustSurvey2017.pdf
. This is particularly important because of the distrust fomented by despite the
increasingly politicized media landscape fostered by Democratic support for the press
and unrelenting attacks on the media from the White House. See id.
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deployed in the news media’s relationship to government in the
age of Trump. Section I.A describes various taxonomies of
“fake news.” Section I.B explains the ways in which fabricated
news has been weaponized by artificial intelligence (“AI”),
social media dissemination, and public skepticism about the
press and other authoritative social institutions. Section I.C lays
out the impact on public trust of relentless presidential critique
of the press. Finally, Section I.D notes the threats posed by the
various types of previously discussed “fake news” outside the
context of politics—and specifically with respect to the financial
markets. Then, Section II describes the instability in—and
indeed extensive reduction of—press privilege that has been
occurring in judicial and administrative decisions, legislative
action, customary accommodations, and the treatment of
journalists. It also describes the complexity of the current media
landscape against which these changes are taking place. The
Section maintains that these developments are encouraged and
given cover by the ubiquitous “fake news” charge. It then
argues that these developments are having a particularly
pernicious chilling effect on modern journalism. Next, Section
III begins the discussion of possible solutions to the “fake
news” problem, specifically addressing the viability and
desirability of self-regulatory solutions by platforms in Section
III.A. The Section also sketches possible regulatory approaches,
and raises the question of the extent to which the “fake news”
phenomenon can be used as a cover for demagogic speech
control at a moment when progressive arguments seek to
desacralize the First Amendment. Section III.B focuses on
arguments for enhanced information literacy and de-biasing
strategies. It sketches the interdisciplinary work that, as it
proceeds, might help ground literacy strategies in cognitive and
political science in order to be more effective. Finally, Section
IV turns its attention to the delegitimizing effect on public trust
in journalism of the “fake news” attack on the mainstream
press as an institution. It argues that the growing phenomenon
of “fake news” is—perhaps counterintuitively—the very reason
justifying press preferences with respect to both newsgathering
and publication today. It begins the conversation both about
what kinds of press privileges would best help journalism today,
and what kinds of changed press practices might help reduce
the potential abuse of the expanded press protections that the
Article recommends.
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I. “FAKE NEWS” AND THE PRESS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP
The numerous instances of fabricated political
information that have gone viral since 2016 have led the public
to believe in factually inaccurate information, possibly
influenced the presidential election in the United States, and, at
a minimum, “triggered a precipitous decline in public
confidence in election integrity . . . .”40 Recent revelations
indicate widespread use on social media of targeted false
information by Russian interests attempting to influence
American politics during the 2016 election season.41 In
addition, the Trump Administration’s demonization of
mainstream news organizations cannot help but undermine the
public’s view of the press. That has surely been the goal of the
Trump Administration in seeking to use “fake news” as a tool
of governance. These two uses of “fake news” amplify one
another. To the extent that the “fake news” concerns politics,
the combined effect of these developments is one that
fundamentally challenges American democracy. The potential
impact of “fake news” goes even further, however—extending
to commerce and markets, education, and virtually every other
social activity. The mass circulation of deliberate falsehoods,
when joined with public distrust in infrastructural institutions,
paints a terrifyingly dystopian potential future.
This Section describes how technology and the new
media environment weaponize “fake news,” and how the
President’s delegitimizing attacks on the mainstream media
(amplified by the alt-right media itself) affect public trust in the
truth of the news they receive. The Section then addresses the
threats posed by fabricated information in contexts outside
politics—principally in the commercial world.

40

Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News,
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 57, 59 (2017).
41
See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo & Sharon LaFraniere, 13 Russians Indicted as Mueller Reveals
Effort to Aid Trump Campaign, NY TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/russians-indicted-muellerelection-interference.html; Mike Isaac & Scott Shane, Facebook’s Russia-linked Ads
Came in Many Disguises, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/technology/facebook-russia-ads-.html;
Tom McCarthy, Facebook, Google and Twitter Grilled by Congress Over Russian
Meddling—As It Happened, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2017, 5:40 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/live/2017/oct/31/facebook-googletwitter-congress-russian-election-meddling-live.
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A. Taxonomies of “Fake News”
The term “fake news” has no single definition because it
refers to a wide variety of things.42 Still, the phrase is an
umbrella term referring to “real threats to meaningful public
debate on the Internet[]”43 and is therefore worth mapping. A
number of taxonomies have been proposed to define “fake
news,” some focusing on the content of the material
disseminated, some focusing on the intent behind the
dissemination, and some on both.44
Most agree that the phrase refers to the intentional
dissemination of false information. We can imagine “fake
news” as representing a spectrum—both with regard to truth
and with regard to disseminators’ intent.45 Some “fake news”
42

See, e.g., Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer, & Jane R. Bambauer, Identifying and
Countering Fake News, UNIV. OF ARIZ. 1, 4,
https://law.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/asset/document/fakenewsfinal_0.pdf
(last visited Mar. 14, 2018) (“The term has been used to refer to so many things that
it seems to have lost its power to denote at all; as a result, several media critics have
recommended abandoning it entirely.”).
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., id.; see also Faking News: Fraudulent News and the Fight for Truth, PEN AM. 1,
23 (Oct. 12, 2017), https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017-FakingNews-11.2.pdf [hereinafter Faking News]; see also Fabio Giglietto et al., Fake News and
the Election: A New Taxonomy for the Study of Misleading Information within the Hybrid
Media System (Univ. of Urbino, Italy, Working Paper No. 15–17, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2878774 (describing processcentered rather than actor-centered approach to the dissemination of false
information online).
45
Verstraete, Bambauer, and Bambauer propose the following taxonomy: “[w]e
define satire as a news story that has purposefully false content, is financially
motivated, and is not intended by its author to deceive readers”; “[a] hoax is a news
story that has purposefully false content, is financially motivated and is intended by
its author to deceive readers”; “[p]ropaganda is news or information that has
purposefully biased or false content, is motivated by an attempt to promote a
political cause or point of view, and is intended by its author to deceive the reader”;
[t]rolling is presenting news or information that has biased or fake content, is
motivated by an attempt to get personal humor value (the lulz), and is intended by its
author to deceive the reader.” Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42, at
5–7. The Verstraete report then offers “a new way of organizing different types of
fake news according to their distinctive attributes. The two defining characteristics
used to identify species of fake news are (1) whether the author intends to deceive
readers and (2) whether the payoff from fake news is motivated by financial interests
or not.” Id. at 8. The report recognizes mixed intent, mixed motives, and mixed
information as problems in crafting its typology. See id. at 9–12.
Another approach describes seven types of problematic content: satire or
parody, misleading content, imposter content, fabricated content, false connections,
false context, and manipulated content. See Claire Wardle, Fake News. It’s
Complicated, FIRST DRAFT (Feb. 16, 2017), https://firstdraftnews.com/fake-newscomplicated/ (defining satire or parody as information having no intention to cause
harm but the potential to fool; misleading content as “misleading use of information
to frame an issue or individual”; imposter content as “when genuine sources are
impersonated”; fabricated content as “100% false [new content], designed to deceive
and do harm”; false connections as “when headlines, visuals or captions don’t
support the content”; false context as “when genuine content is shared with false
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consists of wholly fabricated stories, often developed and
disseminated as “clickbait”—to generate advertising revenue.46
Other instances of wholly fabricated “fake news” are designed
to achieve political ends of persuasion.47 Another type of “fake
news” is political satire (and even some entertainment
“news”).48 There are also conspiracy theorists and ideologues
making up stories on social media. Some stories contain kernels
of true information, but also falsity or incorrect inferences from
true facts.
The “fake news” charge is also a generalized assertion
that news organizations consistently lie or distort the truth in
their reporting, and are thus illegitimate sources of information
generally. This kind of “fake news” charge can be seen as a
claim that such news organizations operate pursuant to what
might be called ideological “fake newsworthiness” norms.49
Those who make the blunderbuss “fake news” charge against
mainstream news organizations—like President Trump and
various organs of the alt-right and alt-lite media—rely on news
organizations’ publication of unverified material50 or
contextual information”; and manipulated content as “when genuine information or
imagery is manipulated to deceive”).
46
Hundreds of Macedonian teenagers gained notoriety for their successful generation
and dissemination of pro-Trump, anti-Clinton stories whose content was completely
false and fabricated. See Subramanian, supra note 3.
47
Recently, Facebook has admitted that thousands of fake advertisements were
placed on the social media site by shadowy entities with connections to the Russian
government. See, e.g., Isaac & Shane, supra note 41.
48
The Onion is the paradigmatic example. The online magazine does not say
anywhere on its front page that it is a satirical outlet and that none of its reporting is
true. See Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42 (discussing The Onion).
49
I am indebted to RonNell Andersen Jones for the phrase.
50
For example, in early 2017, BuzzFeed published an unverified “dossier” alleging
deep ties between Trump and the Russian government and Trump-compromising
material in Russian hands. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, & Mark Schoofs, These
Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties to Russia, BUZZFEED (Jan. 10, 2017, 9:09PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/these-reports-allege-trump-has-deep-tiesto-russia?utm_term=.pf1Eer9aq#.bwQdZeEqK.
I refer to the alt-right and alt-lite media to distinguish them more traditional
conservatively-inclined mainstream media outlets (such as the Wall Street Journal,
for example). While the term “alt-right” is often used to refer to elements of the
white supremacist movement in the US, “alt-lite” refers to “right-wing activists who
refuse[] to publicly embrace white supremacist ideology.” From Alt Right to Alt Lite:
Naming the Hate, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/from-alt-right-to-alt-litenaming-the-hate; see also Justin Wm. Moyer & Perry Stein, ‘Alt-right’ and ‘Alt-lite’?
Conservatives Plan Dueling Conservative Rallies Sunday in D.C., WASH. POST (Jun. 23,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/alt-right-and-alt-lite-conservativesplan-dueling-conservative-rallies-sunday-in-dc/2017/06/22/242d8de2-56bd-11e79fb4-fa6b3df7bb8a_story.html?utm_term=.4a042f4c1d3a (describing the split). For a
description of the alt-lite blogger ecosystem, see Tyler Bridges, “Alt-Lite” Bloggers and
the Conservative Ecosystem, SHORENSTEIN CTR. (Feb. 20, 2018, 9:30 AM),
https://shorensteincenter.org/alt-lite-bloggers-conservative-ecosystem/ (examining
“the important role that ‘alt-lite’ bloggers play in promoting, amplifying, and

247

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

journalistic errors as evidence of liberal media bias.51 This
Article does not focus on unintentionally erroneous news
reports, regardless of their partisan origin in conservative- or
liberal-leaning media, in the range of “fake news” it addresses.
fortifying Donald Trump’s anti-establishment message to his conservative
supporters.”)
51
With respect to BuzzFeed’s publication of the Russian dossier, see, e.g., David
French, The Russia Dossier Story: A Perfect Storm of Clinton Deception, Media
Irresponsibility, and Democratic Moral Blindness, NAT’L REVIEW (Oct. 25, 2017, 3:00
PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/453104/russian-dossier-hillaryclintons-lies-reveal-media-bias (criticizing the story as a partisan liberal lie).
BuzzFeed’s publication was controversial in mainstream media circles as well. See,
e.g., Rory Carroll, Buzzfeed Publishes Unsubstantiated Trump Report, Raising Ethics
Questions, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2017, 6:35 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/jan/10/buzzfeed-publishes-donaldtrump-russia-documents-ethics-questions). In addition, conservative and alt-right
media have fastened on any journalistic error in mainstream media reports as proof
of bias. See, e.g., John Nolte, Fake News Firehose: Science Proves Media Are Not Making
‘Honest Mistakes’ About Trump, BREITBART (Dec. 12, 2017),
http://www.breitbart.com/big-journalism/2017/12/12/science-history-provemedia-not-making-honest-mistakes-trump/.
Recently, both ABC and CNN aired noteworthy false reports. See, e.g.,
Amy B. Wang, ABC News Apologizes for ‘Serious Error’ in Trump Report and Suspends
Brian Ross for Four Weeks, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-andentertainment/wp/2017/12/03/abc-news-apologizes-for-serious-error-in-trumpreport-suspends-brian-ross-for-four-weeks/?utm_term=.d6d71a57f345 (“Ross had
incorrectly reported Friday that during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump had
directed Michael Flynn to make contact with Russian officials before the election.”);
Callum Borchers, CNN Armed Trump With New Ammunition. Sure Enough, He
Launched Another ‘Fake News’ Attack, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/12/08/cnn-just-armedtrump-with-new-ammunition-to-launch-another-fake-newsattack/?utm_term=.886e84f1e695 (erroneously reporting that Donald Trump, Jr.
received an email granting access to Wikileaks documents concerning the
Democratic National Committee hack on September 4 rather than September 14).
While both ABC and CNN admitted fault and corrected their stories, some
damage had already been done; not only had the ABC story apparently caused a slip
in the stock market, but the fact that the news organizations made the unintentional
errors to begin with gave ammunition to those who wished to perpetuate the
narrative of the mainstream media as engaged, willfully, in “fake news”
dissemination. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 51.
Still, there is a significant difference between intentional dissemination of
known falsity and unintentional error which is corrected immediately after discovery.
Error is inevitable. The inference that ABC and CNN were engaging in a pattern of
“fake news” dissemination in order to undermine the President is unwarranted from
the facts in these two instances. At best, both evidence a journalistic tendency to
look for a scoop on a scandal and act too quickly. Even if a journalistic tendency to
seek scandal could make a journalist more prone to accept the truth of asserted
evidence of scandal, that is a far cry from intentionally blanketing the conversation
with knowing and targeted falsehoods. And the discovery of two erroneous news
stories—immediately retracted—cannot reasonably be said to prove that the entire
output of the mainstream media should be considered illegitimate. The critical issue
is whether journalistic standards are used both to reduce the occurrence of error and
to mitigate the impact of errors that do get through, as they inevitably sometimes
will. It is for these reasons that this Article does not focus on unintentionally
erroneous reporting in its analysis of “fake news.”
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The breadth and complexity of the reference to “fake
news” is used by some as a reason to reject the phrase itself.52
Others argue that the umbrella term presents a range of dangers
to public discourse and that different forms may be susceptible
to different sorts of responses.53 At one extreme, platform-based
advertising initiatives could provide concrete ways to
disincentivize the dissemination of fabrications designed to
generate click revenue. At the other end of the spectrum,
concrete attempts to deter fabricated information will not defang “fake news” broadsides like President Trump’s attempts to
sow doubt over mainstream news organizations’ overall
political coverage.
The next section addresses what is particularly
worrisome about fabricated false information. The succeeding
sections address the dangers of the “fake news” charge as a
sword designed to cut down the credibility of the press.
B. The Weaponization of Fabricated “Fake News”
Technology can all too easily weaponize false speech for
maximum believability and impact. This is not only because the
architecture of social media enables viral spreading of
information, but because AI can increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of distributed content through targeting and
automation. A flood of targeted emotional manipulation,
Facebook dark posts, and ubiquitous bots automatically
peddling54 real “fake news” 55 can stealthily influence public
52

See, e.g., Hossein Derakhshan & Claire Wardle, Ban the Term ‘Fake News’, CNN
(Nov. 27, 2017, 3:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/26/opinions/fake-newsand-disinformation-opinion-wardle-derakhshan/index.html; see also Margaret
Sullivan, It’s Time to Retire the Tainted Term ‘Fake News’, WASH. POST. (Jan. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/its-time-to-retire-the-tainted-termfake-news/2017/01/06/a5a7516c-d375-11e6945a%2076f69a399dd5_story.html?utm_term=.861076611a76.
53
By their taxonomies, some scholars seek to find ways to control the harmful type
of fake news while protecting democratically-desirable political satire. See, e.g.,
Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42 (making this point explicitly). But
see generally Jeremy Littau & Daxton R. Stewart, “Truthiness” and Second-Level Agenda
Setting: Satire News and Its Influence on Perceptions of Television News Credibility, 9
ELECTRONIC NEWS 122 (2015) (observing that satire shows undermine cable and
television news credibility).
54
See, e.g., Chengcheng Shao et al., The Spread of Fake News by Social Bots, Cornell
Univ. Library, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.07592.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2018)
(finding evidence, in an analysis of Twitter, that social bots play a key role in the
spread of fake news).
55
In this Article, I use the phrase “real ‘fake news’” to refer to fabricated stories
designed to achieve particular ends, whether of political strategy or financial gain or
both. By contrast, the Article uses the phrase “fake ‘real news’” to refer principally
to the political strategy of delegitimating the mainstream media by characterizing
real journalism as ‘fake’ when news organizations challenge government’s
characterization of events. (The phrase could of course also be read to refer to
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opinion and behavior.56 Voice-mimicking and video-simulating
technology invites the fabrication of news that is very difficult
to debunk.57 While the possible threats posed by such amplified
“fake news” are clear in the context of politics, manipulated
information flows can have much broader harmful effects as
well—in markets far beyond politics.58 The structure of the
information ecosystem—built around powerful platforms that
act as information intermediaries—augments the effectiveness
and therefore magnifies the dangers of strategic deployment of
“fake news,” for political, regulatory, and commercial
purposes.59
Fabricated political information has been virally
disseminated to an astonishing degree since 2016, much of it on
social media.60 Recent reports suggest that American voters
inaccurate or ideoligcally biased reporting, which is how President Trump
characterizes the mainstream media’s political output.).
56
I am aware of the fraught character of any claim of “manipulation.” I mean here
only to point to systemic attempts, enhanced by use of artificial intelligence, to
influence people’s behaviors by appealing to their weaknesses as identified through
data analytics.
57
See, e.g., Denise Clifton, Fake News on Twitter Flooded Swing States That Helped
Trump Win, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 28, 2017, 1:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/09/fake-news-including-from-russiansources-saturated-battleground-states-trump-barely-won/; Adam Clark Estes,
Insanely Accurate Lip Syncing Tech Could Turn Fake News Videos Into a Real Problem,
GIZMODO (July 12, 2017, 12:55 PM), https://gizmodo.com/insanely-accurate-lipsynching-tech-could-turn-fake-new-1796843610; Fake News: You Ain’t Seen Nothing
Yet, THE ECONOMIST (July 1, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/scienceand-technology/21724370-generating-convincing-audio-and-video-fake-events-fakenews-you-aint-seen; Olivia Solon, The Future of Fake News: Don’t Believe Everything
You Read, See or Hear, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2017, 1:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/26/fake-news-obama-videotrump-face2face-doctored-content. The recent rise of “deepfakes”—“AI-assisted
face-swap porn, ofen featuring a celebrity’s face mapped onto a porn star’s body”—
indicates the increasing technological sophistication of video manipulation
techniques. See Louise Matsakis, Artificial Intelligence is Now Fighting Fake Porn,
WIRED (Feb. 14, 2018, 4:46 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/gfycat-artificialintelligence-deepfakes/(describing the phenomenon and AI-focused methods of
fighting it).
58
See, e.g., Chris Flood, Fake News Infiltrates Financial Markets, FIN. TIMES (May 5,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a37e4874-2c2a-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c; see
also Larry Greenmeier, Could AI Be the Future of Fake News and Product Reviews?, SCI.
AM. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/could-ai-be-thefuture-of-fake-news-and-product-reviews/; Renae Merle, Why Fake News is a Problem
for Wall Street, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/10/12/why-fakenews-is-a-problem-for-wall-street/?utm_term=.2321471f4a20.
59
For a recent description of what is new in today’s information economy and how
the change finds no adequate space in traditional First Amendment theory, see
Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for Platform
Governance, 127 YALE L.J.F. 337, 338 (2017), (discussing how online platforms, as
the prime producers of fake news, reveal gaps in existing First Amendment theories).
60
See, e.g., Gaughan, supra note 40, at 66 (addressing the presence of fabricated
stories during the 2016 election and identifying fake news as a product of media
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were exposed to more “fake news” than accurate political
information on Twitter during the 2016 election contest61 and
that “some of the most widely shared stories on social media
were fake.”62 One study suggests that the volume of shared
news from dubious sources was comparable to the news from
individual mainstream news sources (e.g., the New York
Times).63 Although the conclusion is of course contested,64
many still question whether “fake news” played a role in the
outcome of the 2016 presidential election.65 Research reveals
fragmentation); Lazer et al., supra note 17, at 5; see also Andrew Guess, Brendan
Nyhan & Jason Reifler, Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence From the
Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign, DARTMOUTH 1, 7
(January 9, 2018), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf
(estimating that 25% of Americans visited a fake news website during the last
presidential campaign).
61
See, e.g., Philip Howard & Bence Kolanyi, Social Media Companies Must Respond to
the Sinister Reality Behind Fake News, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2017, 7:03 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/sep/30/social-media-companies-fakenews-us-election (discussing the unequal distribution of fake news across the country
during the 2016 election). A study by BuzzFeed of the last three months of the 2016
campaign showed that the top 20 fake election news stories on Facebook reached
over 8.7 million readers, compared to the 7.3 million readers who received real
election news stories on Facebook. See Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How
Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED (Nov.
16, 2016, 5:15 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-electionnews-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.ctvjNY0R2#.iq36M0VPq
(displaying graphical depictions of the viral fake election news stories). Admittedly,
the BuzzFeed study undercounted the amount of real news to which Facebook users
were exposed because it apparently excluded Reuters, AP, and small newspaper
stories. Gaughan, supra note 40, at 66. Even so, the comparative numbers are
staggering. See generally Hasen, supra note 10 (describing the vast amount of “fake
news” before and after the inclusion of all news sources).
62
See, e.g., Lazer et al., supra note 17 (and source cited therein).
63
Id. at 4.
64
See, e.g., Brian Flood, Real News Did More Damage Than Fake News On Election Day,
FOX NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/09/28/realnews-did-more-damage-than-fake-news-on-election-day.html (asserting a lack of
evidence proving that fake news influenced the 2016 election); Hunt Allcott &
Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON.
PERSP. 211, 232 (2017); see also Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler , supra note 60, at 12
(concluding that while fake news “is unlikely to have changed the outcome of the
2016 election . . . , exposure to it or similarly dubious and inflammatory content can
still undermine the quality of public debate, promote misperceptions, foster greater
hostility toward political opponents, and corrode trust in government and
journalism.”); Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J.
DEMOCRACY 63 (2017) (providing an overview of the role of social media in the 2016
presidential election).
65
See, e.g., Clay Calvert & Austin Vining, Filtering Fake News Through a Lens of
Supreme Court Observations and Adages, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153 (2018); Caitlin
Dewey, Facebook Fake-news Writer: ‘I Think Donald Trump is in the White House Because
of Me’, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2016/11/17/facebook-fake-news-writer-i-think-donald-trump-is-in-thewhite-house-because-of-me/?utm_term=.592469fb964b (interviewing a news writer
who thinks articles like theirs that included “fake news” contributed to Trump
becoming elected); see also Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell, & Jesse Holcombe,
Journalism & Media, Most Americans Believe Fake News Is Sowing Confusion, PEW
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that “false information didn’t flow evenly across social
networks [with more spreading on the right than the left]” and
that “[a]verage levels of misinformation were higher in swing
states than in uncontested states,” prior to the 2016 U.S.
presidential election.66
RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/manyamericans-believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/ (indicating public belief that fake
news is having an impact); Hasen, supra note 10, at 208 (“[T]he potential for fake
news to influence future election outcomes is manifest . . . .”).
Many opponents of President Trump believe that he won the election
because voters were misled by such “fake news” harmful to Hillary Clinton.
Although the empirical evidence of the electoral effect is not conclusive, studies do
show extensive propagation of fabricated anti-Clinton messages in swing states. For
studies and discussions of the issue, see Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 64
(presenting results from a survey that used web browsing data, fact-checking
websites, and results from an online survey to show empirical data about the impact
of fact news on the 2016 election) and Clifton, supra note 57 (discussing a current
study about the effect of “fake news” in the 2016 election on voters). See also Philip
N. Howard et al., Social Media, News and Political Information during the US Election:
Was Polarizing Content Concentrated in Swing States?”, UNIV. OXFORD:
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA PROJECT (2017), http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/89/2017/09/Polarizing-Content-and-Swing-States.pdf
(presenting results analyzing the effect of computational propaganda from the 2016
election on public life). Recent revelations of extensive Russian disinformation on
Twitter and Facebook indicate sophisticated attempts to interfere in the American
presidential election. See Issie Lapowsky, What We Know—and Don’t Know—About
Facebook, Trump, and Russia, WIRED (Sept. 26, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-facebooktrump-and-russia/ (describing the prevalence of Russian advertisements on Facebook
that were “fake news” and reached users). The actual electoral impact of such
misinformation is much harder to assess. See Apuzzo & LaFraniere, supra note 41
(“American intelligence officials have said they have no way of calculating the effect
of the Russian influence.”). A recent New York Times op-ed by Brendan Nyhan,
one of the preeminent researchers of the impact of fake news argues that “people
should not assume . . . huge [electoral] effects” from electoral “fake news.” Brendan
Nyhan, Fake News and Bots May Be Worrisome, but Their Political Power is Overblown,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/upshot/fakenews-and-bots-may-be-worrisome-but-their-political-power-is-overblown.html. By
contrast, a post-election survey undertaken by the Comparative National Elections
Project concludes that “fake news most likely did have a substantial impact on the
voting decisions of a strategically important set of voters.” Richard Gunther, Erik C.
Nisbet, & Paul Beck, Trump May Owe his 2016 Victory to ‘Fake News,’ New Study
Suggests, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 15, 2018 10:59 AM),
https://theconversation.com/trump-may-owe-his-2016-victory-to-fake-news-newstudy-suggests-91538; Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck, & Erik C. Nisbet, Fake News
Did Have a Significant Impact on the Vote in the 2016 Election: Original Fill-Length
Version with Methodological Appendix 1–5 (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://u.osu.edu/cnep/files/2015/03/Fake-News-Piece-for-The-Conversationwith-methodological-appendix-11d0ni9.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). In any
event, what is less contested is a negative effect of “fake news” on public discourse.
See, e.g., Nyhan, supra (“None of these findings indicate that fake news and bots
aren’t worrisome signs for American democracy. They can mislead and polarize
citizens, undermine trust in the media, and distort the content of public debate.”).
66
Howard & Kolanyi, supra note 61. A recent study found that fake news
consumption was heavily concentrated during the election season among the 10% of
people with the most conservative online information diets. Guess, Nyhan, &
Reifler supra note 60, at 5. Still, the study also suggested that more direct study of
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The composition of today’s information ecosystem
enables, and even encourages, the viral distribution of “fake
news” on social media. This is important because a large
segment of the American population gets its news online and
specifically on social media.67 The ease of sharing online can
ensure those who generate “fake news” that it will be widely
disseminated. Social media platforms are said to provide a
“megaphone” to small numbers of actors who, “armed with
technical, social or political know-how[,]” distribute large
volumes of “fake news.”68 The multiplicity, density, and
clustering of homogeneous echo chambers (enabled by social
influence and the ease of unfriending) also means that each user
is likely to be bombarded by the same message from numerous
sources.69 To the extent that such platforms, like Facebook,
reach massive numbers of people, it may be that the fake or
ideologically slanted news they disseminate may have the
greatest effects on less politically astute or ideologically partisan
consumers.70 These realities create “ideal conditions for
selective exposure and confirmation bias.”71 Information
overload and attention scarcity limit the ability of social
networks to distinguish among shared messages with respect to
quality.72 The spread of “fake news” is also greatly enhanced by
the use of bots.73 “Fake news” is said to become viral not
because it is shared over long information cascades among a
large number of average social media users, but because it is
spread by celebrities and media sources.74 Studies indicate that
the biggest indicator of whether a social media user will
forward “fake news” is the amount of news shared by that
selective exposure to fake news was needed, as “small groups can . . . propel
fabricated claims from their echo chambers to widespread visibility, potentially
intensifying polarization and negative affect toward opposing candidates.” Id.
67
See, e.g., Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017),
http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms2017/ (reporting that “as of August 2017, two-thirds (67%) of Americans report that
they get at least some of their news on social media—with two-in-ten doing so
often”).
68
Lazer et al., supra note 17, at 5.
69
Id. at 7 (and sources cited therein).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. On Twitter, fake news can be widely disseminated by active “cyborg” users
who automatically share news from particular sets of sources. Id.; see also First
Evidence That Social Bots Play a Major Role in Spreading Fake News, MIT TECH. REVIEW
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608561/first-evidence-thatsocial-bots-play-a-major-role-in-spreading-fake-news/ (reporting on study that
suggests bot-operated accounts are significantly more likely to spread fake news on
social media than those run by humans).
74
Lazer et al., supra note 17, at 8.
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person: the more news s/he shares, the more likely s/he is to
share some “fake news.”75 Moreover, profiles of those likely to
share “fake news” indicate older people and those who are
more extreme on the political spectrum.76 Studies have shown
that people find it difficult to distinguish between real and “fake
news” on the Internet.77
The difficulty of distinguishing between true and false
information on social media is likely to be further exacerbated
by recent technological developments. Significant strides have
been made in technology that would allow the generation and
proliferation of increasingly seamless and practically
undetectable fabricated events and statements.78 Reports herald
“a new breed of video and audio manipulation tools, made
possible by advances in artificial intelligence and computer
graphics, that will allow for the creation of realistic looking
footage of public figures appearing to say, well, anything.”79
Real “fake news”—fabricated stories designed to
achieve a particular end—is particularly pernicious when
disseminated as part of a complex political strategy that mines
big data to hyper-target audiences susceptible to its messages.
One important element in the dangerous mosaic implicated by
“fake news” in the digital environment is the ability to target
individual voters or desired groups of voters. This allows the
speaker to tailor political disinformation to particular voters’ or
groups’ emotional and/or cognitive biases and weaknesses—
and therefore, presumably, manipulate their behavior.
The sophistication of the disinformation campaigns
varies. Research indicates that sophisticated players use data
analytics and artificial intelligence to enhance the efficiency of
their propaganda.80 For example, Cambridge Analytica, which
75

Id.
Id.; see also Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, supra note 60, at 5.
77
See, e.g., Gaughan, supra note 40, at 32 (and sources cited therein).
78
See, e.g., Solon, supra note 57 (discussing the impact on fake news of evolving AI
technology that will enable the production of close-to-undetectable fake video and
audio clips of public figures); see also Noah Smith, The Robots Will Make the Best Fake
News, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 17, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-17/the-robots-will-make-thebest-fake-news (same); Karen Hao, Researchers Have Figured Out How to Fake News
Video With AI, QUARTZ (July 19, 2017), https://qz.com/1031624/researchers-havefigured-out-how-to-fake-news-video-with-ai/ (same).
79
Solon, supra note 57; see also Mona Kasra, Cuihua Shen, & James O’Brien, Seeing Is
Believing: Do People Fail to Identify Fake Images on the Web?, Paper Presented at the 17th
Annual Conference of the Association of Internet Researchers 4 (October 2016),
http://graphics.berkeley.edu/papers/Kasra-SIB-2016-10/ (explaining how people
are not good at distinguishing real news from fake news even if they are looking for
cues of uncredibility).
80
Anderson & Horvath, supra note 29; see also Dipayan Ghosh & Ben Scott,
#Digitaldeceit: The Technologies Behind Precision Propaganda on the Internet,
76
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mines data in order to engage in strategic political
communication, boasts that in the U.S. alone, it has “played a
pivotal role in winning presidential races as well as
congressional and state elections.”81 Reports assert that the
company is owned by conservative parties, features Breitbart’s
Steve Bannon on its board, and has reportedly declined to work
on Democratic campaigns.82 It allegedly leverages data
analytics to engage in microtargeting by using its
algorithmically derived predictive personality profile to deliver
“personalized,
adaptive,
and
ultimately
addictive
propaganda.”83 The point is not only to gauge a voter’s likely
behavior correctly, but, when necessary, to seek to change it by
exploiting his or her emotions.84 Some analysts are concerned
that, at least to some degree, psychometric approaches can
sway people’s political opinions and votes.85
SHORENSTEIN CTR. (Jan. 2018), https://naproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/digital-deceit-final-v3.pdf (describing
variety of ways in which “fake news” is weaponized online).
81
CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA, https://capolitical.com/?__hstc=163013475.732b9ad50fa76e9cea2d511cf3dd2727.1506885131
112.1506885131112.1506885131112.1&__hssc=163013475.1.1506885131112&__hsf
p=3969316057 (last visited Mar. 14, 2018) (proclaiming, in part, “We find your
voters and move them to action. CA Political has redefined the relationship between
data and campaigns. By knowing your electorate better, you can achieve greater
influence while lowering overall costs.”); see also Anderson & Horvath, supra note 29
(“By leveraging automated emotional manipulation alongside swarms of bots,
Facebook dark posts, A/B testing, and fake news networks, a company called
Cambridge Analytica has activated an invisible machine that preys on the
personalities of individual voters to create large shifts in public opinion.”).
82
See Anderson & Horvath, supra note 29; see also Nina Burleigh, How Big Data Mines
Personal Info to Craft Fake News and Manipulate Voters, NEWSWEEK (June 8, 2017, 1:01
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2017/06/16/big-data-mines-personal-infomanipulate-voters-623131.html.
83
See Anderson & Horvath, supra note 29. Using a variety of data derived from
people’s offline and online activities (including Facebook and Twitter posts), the
company’s algorithm is said to have created personality profiles with 5000 data
points for each adult American. See id.
84
See Anderson & Horvath, supra note 29 (“Using those dossiers, or psychographic
profiles as Analytica calls them, Cambridge Analytica not only identifies which
voters are most likely to swing for their causes or candidates; they use that
information to predict and then change their future behavior.”); see generally Vian
Bakir & Andrew McStay, Fake News and the Economy of Emotions, 6 DIGITAL
JOURNALISM 154 (July 20, 2017),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21670811.2017.1345645
(explaining how “empathetic media” has evolved to help optimize the spread of fake
news).
85
See, e.g., S.A. Mathieson, Trump, Brexit, and Cambridge Analytica—Not Quite the
Dystopia You're Looking For, THE REGISTER (Mar. 7, 2017, 11:22 AM),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/07/cambridge_analytica_dystopianism/
(discussing studies that provide support for the role psychometrics might have played
in the 2016 election). There are of course those who question the effectiveness of
such psychometric targeting, and whether the concerns about weaponized AI-reliant
political manipulation are overstated.
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Recent reports of attempted state interference in foreign
elections, with revelations by Facebook and Twitter that
Russian interests attempted to influence the 2016 American
presidential election in Donald Trump’s favor through the
deployment of powerful disinformation techniques,86 also
suggest the use of very targeted, sophisticated manipulation
techniques. Specifically, Russian entities with ties to the
Kremlin purchased Facebook ads (including “fake news” ads
and ads designed to trigger emotional partisan responses in
targeted voters), effectively used automated bots to viralize their
messages, and unleashed troll armies to harass and intimidate
opposition speakers.87
This reminds us that “fake news” can also be
weaponized as an invitation to and justification for the
deployment of a variety of public and private informational
censorship tools in response. For example, as Professor Tim
Wu has recently described, the “fake news” trope can be used
to mobilize troll armies and unleash terrorizing chilling effects
in order to suppress contrary speech.88
Moreover, what happens on the Internet also influences
mainstream media coverage, of course. This means that items
86

See, e.g., Apuzzo & LaFraniere, supra note 41 (describing DOJ indictment of
Russian disinformation operatives); Jackson Hudgins & Alyssa Newcomb, Google,
Facebook, Twitter and Russia: A Timeline on the ‘16 Election, NBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017,
12:01 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/google-facebook-twitterrussia-timeline-16-election-n816036 (portraying via timeline the extent to which the
Kremlin influenced the 2016 election through social media); Kurt Wagner, These Are
Some of the Tweets and Facebook Ads Russia Used to Try and Influence the 2016 Presidential
Election, RECODE (Oct. 31, 2017, 8:05 PM),
https://www.recode.net/2017/10/31/16587174/fake-ads-news-propagandacongress-facebook-twitter-google-tech-hearing (providing examples of Russian ad
purchases designed to spread fake news in Trump’s favor throughout the 2016
election).
87
See, e.g., Samuel Earle, Trolls, Bots and Fake News: The Mysterious World of Social
Media Manipulation, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 14, 2017, 8:40 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/trolls-bots-and-fake-news-dark-and-mysterious-worldsocial-media-manipulation-682155 (describing bandwagon effect engendered by
bots); Mary Papenfuss, Russian Trolls Linked Clinton To ‘Satanic Ritual’ In Fake News
Campaign Push: Report, HUFFPOST (Dec. 1, 2017, 12:01 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/russian-trolls-fake-news-hillaryclinton_us_5a20c8afe4b03c44072c6b86 (providing examples of fake news stories
created and disseminated by online Russian bots and trolls); Scott Shane, The Fake
Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitterelection.html; (describing the prevalence of fake Facebook and other social media
profiles created by Russian operators to spread fake news in the 2016 election).
Reports of the Justice Department’s recent indictment of 13 Russians for a
“multipronged, well financed and relentless” disinformation operation indicate that
the indictment provides details of a “sophisticated network designed to subvert the
2016 election and to support the Trump campaign.” Apuzzo & LaFraniere, supra
note 41.
88
Wu, supra note 14.

2018] REAL “FAKE NEWS” AND FAKE “FAKE NEWS” 256
of “fake news”—particularly if they have spread virally
online—can also be further amplified by recirculation through
trusted media non-social media sources. This can happen when
the information is not debunked through the press’s factchecking systems.89 When the press environment itself is
fragmented and ideologically polarized, and when many people
(particularly Republicans) think that the mainstream media
intentionally lies or misleads, then any such errors on the part
of any given press outlet will be characterized not as simple
error, but as evidence of ideologically motivated strategic
lying.90
What is the impact of such weaponized false
information?91 A December 2016 survey by Pew Research
Center reflects that “most Americans suspect that made-up
news is having an impact.”92 Almost 65% of U.S. adults in that
survey—regardless of income, education level, or party
affiliation—said that fabricated news stories “cause a great deal
of confusion about the basic facts of current issues and
89

For example, CNN falsely reported the existence of an investigation into an
alleged pre-inauguration meeting between Trump ally and former communications
director Anthony Scaramucci and Russian interests, and subsequently retracted the
story. See, e.g., Sydney Ember & Michael Grynbaum, At CNN, Retracted Story Leaves
an Elite Reporting Team Bruised, N.Y. Times (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/business/media/cnn-retraction-trumpscaramucci.html?mcubz=1 (describing CNN retraction and subsequent investigative
team restructuring); see also Michael M. Grynbaum, A Costly Retraction for CNN and an
Opening for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/business/media/cnn-retracted-story-ontrump.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (detailing failure of CNN’s fact checking system that led
to release of an inaccurate story).
90
See, e.g, Grynbaum, supra note 89 (identifying such CNN critics ); Sean Hannity,
Trump, Viewers, Hold CNN Accountable for ‘Fake News’, FOX NEWS (June 28, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/06/28/sean-hannity-trump-viewers-holdcnn-accountable-for-fake-news.html (criticizing legitimacy of CNN reporting in light
of false stories).
91
Allcott and Gentzkow identify four major social costs of fake news:
First, consumers who mistake a fake outlet for a legitimate one
have less-accurate beliefs and are worse off for that reason.
Second, these less-accurate beliefs may reduce positive social
externalities, undermining the ability of the democratic
process to select high-quality candidates. Third, consumers
may also become more skeptical of legitimate news
producers, to the extent that they become hard to distinguish
from fake news producers. Fourth, these effects may be
reinforced in equilibrium by supply-side responses: a reduced
demand for high-precision, low-bias reporting will reduce the
incentives to invest in accurate reporting and truthfully report
signals. These negative effects trade off against any welfare gain
that arises from consumers who enjoy reading fake news reports
that are consistent with their priors.
Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 64, at 219.
92
Barthel, Mitchell, & Holcombe, supra note 65.
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events.”93 Responses to the survey indicated that 23% of the
participants admitted to sharing fabricated news stories
themselves.94 “Fake news” appears to figure in political
polarization, whether for reasons of selective exposure or filter
bubbles.95 Perhaps reflecting a cognitive bias, 84% of the
respondents expressed “a fair amount of confidence in their
own ability to detect fake news . . . .”96 Unfortunately,
subsequent surveys suggest that this confidence is in fact
misplaced.97 Analysts argue that such “fake news” exacerbate
polarization (due to the echo chambers and filter bubbles
created by people’s tendencies to follow those who share their
world-view) and stand in the way of shared reality.98 This, in
turn, can lead to scapegoating, reification of prejudices,
enhancing “us versus them” mentalities, and even violence.99 If
fabricated stories are believed by the voting public, they could
affect voters’ views of candidates and sway choices at the
voting booth. Such misinformation can also infect the longterm cultural and political discourse. Even if any particular item
of “fake news” is not thought credible by the public, the fact
that the information ecosystem is awash in fabricated content is
likely to lead to confusion and generalized distrust—as people
increasingly do not know how to tell true from false.
C. Trump’s Relentless Critique of the Mainstream Press as “Fake
News”
In addition to characterizing individual stories as “fake
news” to shift electoral results, politicians now use the “fake
news” charge as a way of casting doubt on mainstream news
93

Id.
Id.
95
For a description of the two major explanations for political polarization, see
Dominic Spohr, Fake News and Ideological Polarization: Filter Bubbles and Selective
Exposure on Social Media, 34 BUS. INFO. REV. 150, 157 (2017) (articulating the
potential role that filter bubbles and selective exposure play in the public’s exposure
to fake news); see also Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, supra note 60, at 1 (asserting view
that the extent of echo chambers is overstated).
96
Barthel, Mitchell, & Holcombe, supra note 65 (“Americans express a fair amount
of confidence in their own ability to detect fake news, with about four-in-ten (39%)
feeling very confident that they can recognize news that is fabricated and another
45% feeling somewhat confident.” This may reflect the third party effect.).
97
A recent study by scientists at Stanford showed that even tech-savvy young people
are “easily . . . duped” by fake news. See Brooke Donald, Stanford Researchers Find
Students Have Trouble Judging the Credibility of Information Online, STANFORD
GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC.: NEWS CTR. (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://ed.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-find-students-have-troublejudging-credibility-information-online.
98
See Lazer et al., supra note 17, at 5; see also Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler supra note 60,
at 1.
99
See Lazer et al., supra note 17, at 5.
94
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organizations’ journalistic coverage as a whole. President
Trump, for example, has consistently demonized the
mainstream press, claiming that particular news organizations
are themselves organs of “fake news” and “enemies of the
American people.”100 This kind of claim goes beyond
characterizing a single story as factually inaccurate. It goes to
the whole journalistic enterprise of the criticized entities—
indeed, of all major media.101 It is a way of signaling to the
public that whatever stories are published by the targeted
outlets should be presumed false because the organization itself
is partisan and consistently engaged in a knowing
dissemination of untruth. In this sense, the Trump attack
constitutes calling “real news” fake.102 It is a governance
technique designed to identify Trump as the only authoritative
source of information and to delegitimate any critical source of
news.103
Obviously, Trump is not the first president to dislike the
press.104 But he is the first president who has felt free to attack
the press as consistently and viciously,105 to target particular
reporters and news organizations by name,106 to threaten

100

See Grynbaum, supra note 89.
Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 14 (characterizing Trump’s rhetoric as “feed[ing] a
narrative that the media as a whole, or at least in vey large part, ought to be thought
of as an enemy”).
102
This is not to say that such “real news” is not sometimes erroneous, overstated, or
misleading. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90. Conservatives claim that the
mainstream media is a liberal machine fundamentally constrained by its coastal
ideology and liberal bias. On the other side, liberal critics of mainstream news
reporting challenge the “he said-she said” character of much modern reporting as
fundamentally mistaken. See, e.g., Chris Edelson, Lies, Damned Lies, and Journalism:
Why Journalists Are Failing to Vindicate First Amendment Values and How a New
Definition of “The Press” Can Help, 91 Or. L. Rev. 527, 530 (2012) (describing
journalistic comfort with he said-she said journalism as resulting from a desire not to
look biased). Without expressing approval for the operations of the modern press
(which I have myself criticized in prior scholarship), I still believe that Trump’s
blunderbuss characterization of the mainstream press’ news coverage as virtually all
fake (particularly in ironic contrast to his inaccurate Twitter statements) is both
undeserved and very dangerous to the standing of the press.
103
For a powerful analysis of government speech as a tool to manufacture doubt and
thereby resist oversight, see Helen Norton, The Government’s Manufacture of Doubt, 16
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 342 (2018).
104
See, e.g., Jones & Sun, supra note 6,, at 21–25 (describing prior press-president
tensions); Jon Marshall, Nixon Is Gone but His Media Strategy Lives On, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/nixonsrevenge-his-media-strategy-triumphs-40-years-after-resignation/375274/ (describing
subsequent uses of Nixonian anti-press tactics).
105
Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 25–28 (distinguishing between presidential
characterizations of the press as “legitimate-but-bothersome” and Trump’s
blunderbuss attack on the press as illegitimate).
106
Id. at 8–10; Jones & West, supra note 20, at 68–69.
101
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retaliation openly and directly,107 and to roll back customary
norms of press access.108 His demeaning characterizations of the
press—as a “pile of garbage” and “among the most dishonest
human beings on earth,”109—are not just crude, but “violate[]
existing customs of publicly treating the press with respect[.]”110
Trump’s choice to declare war on the mainstream press
is not attributable solely to his combative personality, however.
Instead, there are structural factors at play that have
empowered his broadside attacks. First, the press of today is far
more fragmented and far less powerful—economically and
otherwise—than the press bedeviling presidents such as Richard
Nixon.111 The identity of the press is fundamentally contested;
its economic future uncertain; its reputation in question; its
attitude largely defensive. Second, the press is no longer the
sole intermediary able to package and disseminate the words of
politicians to the public. As Trump has shown with his use of
Twitter, presidents today can communicate directly with the
public—without any need for press intermediation. Third,
demonizing the mainstream press is not likely to lead to as
many negative consequences for a politician today—and might
even serve as a unifying focus for his base.112 This is at least in
part because public trust in the institutional press, while
increasing slightly among Democrats, appears to be at an alltime low.113 Non-stop attacks with charges of “fake news” and
the criticism lobbed at the mainstream media by conservative
talk radio since the 1990s114 surely have some impact on public
trust.
107

See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Just Issued A Direct Threat to the Free And
Independent Media, CNN: THE POINT (Oct. 12, 2017, 8:51 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/11/politics/donald-trump-media-tweet/index.html
(reporting Trump threat of license non-renewal in retaliation for network’s
criticisms).
108
See infra Section II.B; see also Jones & West, supra note 20, at 64–72 (describing
Trump’s use of access as a way to “punish or control press coverage”).
109
Jones & West, supra note 20, at 68.
110
Id. at 68 (“In stark contrast to past administrations, he has failed to model respect
for the institution of the press and for its importance to American democracy.”).
111
Gaughan, supra note 40, at 64 (describing how the 2016 American election
highlighted that the press is more fragmented today in contrast to the 1970s).
112
See Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 38 (“Trump appears to be employing the pressenemy rhetoric to consolidate support among his base and to reinforce his narrative
that only he can be trusted to tell the real story . . . . The more people come to view
the mainstream press as the enemy, the more Trump can control the narrative.”).
113
Art Swift, In U.S., Confidence in Newspapers Still Low But Rising, GALLUP (June 28,
2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/212852/confidence-newspapers-lowrising.aspx.
114
See, e.g., NICOLE HEMMER, MESSENGERS OF THE RIGHT: CONSERVATIVE MEDIA
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 46–47 (2016) (describing
conservative talk radio); Issie Lapowsky, Old-School Talk Radio is Still Big Enough to
Break Candidates, WIRED (Apr. 13, 2016, 7:00 AM),
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President Trump’s incessant refrain of mainstream news
organizations as organs of “fake news” seeking to dupe and
mislead the public has made it acceptable for people to think of
the press as the enemy—and to treat journalists as such.
Professors Andersen Jones and Sun have recently explained
that the powerful delegitimating effect of casting the press as an
outsider, rather than as a legitimate (if sometimes wrong)
participant in public debate.115 This move not only defuses the
power of the press and brings it under the thumb of executive
authority, but it also encourages the process of undermining
other social and governmental institutions that might serve as
counterweights to authoritarian executives.116
The press itself is far from monolithic now; there was
doubtless little surprise when President Obama identified a
“balkanized” media as contributing to “partisan rancor and
political polarization.”117 President Trump’s technique for
undermining the mainstream press depends in part on
exploiting fissures within the press itself and relying on the
drumbeat of distrust that right-wing talk radio has generated in
mainstream media.118 His war against the press takes advantage
of a public already primed to believe the worst of at least some
parts of the media marketplace. Studies show increasing levels
of distrust in the press since the glory days of Watergate.119
https://www.wired.com/2016/04/conservative-talk-radio-survived-social-mediaage/ (same).
115
Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 8 (“Trump is consistently and unrelentingly
delineating the press as an enemy—an ‘other’ that threatens the political unity of the
state and that ought to be distrusted, countered, and perhaps ultimately stripped of
ordinarily observed rights and liberties because of this exceptional status.”).
116
See id. (considering impact of enemy construction of the press on other democratic
institutions).
117
David Nakamura, Media Critic Obama is Worried That ‘Balkanized’ Media is Feeding
Partisanship, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/media-critic-obama-is-worried-thatbalkanized-media-are-feeding-partisanship/2016/03/27/8c72b408-f1e3-11e5-89c3a647fcce95e0_story.html?utm_term=.aa3269fe08ca.
118
See, e.g., Ken Miller, As Hyper-Conservative Media Surged, Republicans’ Trust in News
Cratered, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 19, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/19/ashyper-conservative-media-surged-republicans-trust-in-news-cratered/ (attributing
increasing distrust of the media by Republicans in part to the influence of
conservative talk radio).
119
Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 30. For studies on public attitudes toward news
media, see Swift, supra note 113 (referencing trend of declining public trust in the
media, which hit a historic low in 2016); see also Art Swift, Democrats’ Confidence in
Mass Media Rises Sharply From 2016, GALLUP (Sept. 21, 2017),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/219824/democrats-confidence-mass-media-risessharply-2016.aspx?g_source=MEDIA&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles
[hereinafter Swift, Democrats’ Confidence] (illustrating rise of Democratic confidence in
the media since 2016 and the overall higher levels trust in media from Democrats
than Republicans); Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low,
GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-
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Whether because of right-wing radio’s refrain that the
mainstream media has a strongly liberal bias,120 and/or because
of negative views of television news on news satire programs
such as Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show or Steve Colbert’s Colbert
Report,121 many Americans do not believe that the mainstream
media will report the truth without fear or favor. There is some
asymmetry with respect to this view, with more Republicans
than Democrats convinced of liberal media bias.122
Empirical data in this connection are worrisome. Public
opinion surveys show a widening partisan gap in perceptions of
the media,123 particularly in connection with “fake news.” Trust
and confidence in the media “varies dramatically by party
identification and approval of President Trump’s job
performance.”124
Forty-four
percent—almost
half—of
Americans (and 74% of Republicans) believe that the news
media fabricate stories about Trump.125 A substantial
minority—31%—in a recent survey indicate agreement with
Trump’s tweet that the media are the “enemy” and “keep
political leaders from doing their jobs.”126 The survey also
shows that “one in four Americans (25%) endorses draconian
limitations on press freedom.”127
Obviously, this is just one survey and even it does not
indicate a belief by the majority of Americans that the press is
the enemy of the public. Even if many incorrectly believe that
one or another story is false or unfairly biased against the
president, they will not all necessarily generalize from that to a
conclusion that all the mainstream news media are illegitimate.
Furthermore, it is possible that the constant refrain will itself
backfire, with people beginning to doubt whether every
criticism of the Trump Administration could possibly be “fake
news.” A recent poll indicates that 83% of Americans think the
tension between the White House and the news media is
mass-media-sinks-newlow.aspx?g_source=MEDIA&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles [hereinafter
Swift, Americans’ Trust] (describing 2016 study diagnosing public distrust of the
media as at its highest point).
120
See Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 32 (describing “sustained attack by conservative
media—particularly talk radio—on the credibility and trustworthiness of the
mainstream media”).
121
See Littau & Stewart, supra note 53.
122
Andrew Dugan & Zac Auter, Republicans’, Democrats’ Views of Media Accuracy
Diverge, GALLUP (Aug. 25, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/216320/republicansdemocrats-views-media-accuracy-diverge.aspx.
123
Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, supra note 39, at 2.
124
Id.
125
See id.
126
Id. at 5.
127
Id.
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unhealthy, and 73% say that these tensions impede their access
to important national political news and information.128 Still,
the combination of “real ‘fake news’” and President Trump’s
use of the “fake news” slogan to engage in scorched earth
institutional delegitimation both undermine the press and
potentially manipulate individual political beliefs and/or
behavior.129 The Administration’s rhetoric about the press,
when combined with public concern about massive circulation
of false information online, suggests at a minimum that
Amercians will feel increasingly confused about what is true in
politics and commerce and increasingly uncertain about where
to turn to find out. Any information market participants who
understand both the limited attention of audiences and the
character of the public’s appetite for emotion-triggering
information will understand that they can use the distraction of
“fake news,” drama, personal attacks, and labeling the press as
the enemy as ways of distracting coverage from the “real” news
in politics.130
D. The Threat of “Fake News” Beyond Politics
Virtually all of the public discussion about “fake news”
has focused on the electoral and political context in which its
various guises have become a problem. But we have already
begun to see instances in which “fake news” has been used to
manipulate commercial markets and the dissemination of false
information in attempts to influence regulatory policy.
On the commercial front, for example, the SEC has
already acted to shut down several “fake news” websites
dedicated to spreading false commercial information131—but it
128

See Michael Barthel, Jeffrey Gottfried & Amy Mitchell, Most Say Tensions Between
Trump Administration and News Media Hinder Access to Political News, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/04/04/most-say-tensionsbetween-trump-administration-and-news-media-hinder-access-to-political-news/.
129
The technique is one of throwing doubt on any mainstream news narrative. See
James Warren, Right-wing Media is Losing its Mind Over Las Vegas, A Reflexive Drive to
Poke Holes in the Mainstream Narrative Has “Opened The Floodgates” to Unhinged
Conspiracy Theorizing, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 5, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/right-wing-media-is-losing-its-mindover-las-vegas (quoting the view that “It doesn’t matter if the audience believes any
of it, per se. What’s important is to make the situation so muddled that the average
person, already primed over years to distrust the traditional media, can shrug their
shoulders about what ‘the real truth’ is and move on.”).
130
Indeed, the Trump Administration has been accused of using such distraction
methods to avoid coverage and discussion of its substantive policy moves. See, e.g.,
Charles Blow, Attacking Media as Distraction, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/opinion/trump-attacks-twittermedia.html?_r=0.
131
See, e.g., Wailin Wong, The FTC Just Shut Down All Those Fake News Websites
Hawking Diet Products, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2012, 7:42 PM)
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stands to reason that there are many more. As for the financial
markets, 132 there are a few notable examples. For example, the
intentional dissemination of a hoax statement about the
asserted death of Ethereum’s chief executive reportedly led to a
$4 billion market value drop for the company.133 Forbes reports
that “[i]n 2013, $130 billion in stock value was wiped out in a
matter of minutes following an AP tweet about an “explosion”
that injured Barack Obama.” 134 This was one example of how
misinformation on social media “can be manipulated to impact
high-frequency trading algorithms that rely on text to make
investment calls.”135 Such manipulation, unlike the political
kind, is likely to have extensive individual economic
repercussions.136
In light of the apparently easy availability of “fake
news” tools on the dark web,137 and the immense amount of
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-ftc-just-shut-down-all-those-fake-newswebsites-hawking-diet-products-2012-3; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC
Permanently Stops Fake News Website Operator that Allegedly Deceived
Consumers about Acai Berry Weight-Loss Products (Feb. 7, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/02/ftc-permanently-stopsfake-news-website-operator-allegedly; see also Renae Merle, Allegations of ‘Fake News’
Stretch Beyond Politics, WASH. POST (July 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/company-moved-marketwith-fake-news-stories-sec-alleges/2017/07/04/419a3bd4-54f9-11e7-b38e35fd8e0c288f_story.html?utm_term=.dcd81003fca9.
132
See Merle, supra note 58; see also Kenneth Rapoza, Can “Fake News” Impact The
Stock Market?, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2017, 9:05 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/02/26/can-fake-news-impact-thestock-market/#4d7a180c2fac; Chris Versace, “Fake News” Has Not Spared the
Financial Markets, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 1, 2017, 9:08 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/fake-news-impact-on-financial-markets-2016-12.
133
See Anderson & Rainie, supra note 21; Jeff John Roberts, Hoax Over “Dead”
Ethereum Founder Spurs $4 Billion Wipe Out, FORTUNE (June 26, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/06/26/vitalik-death/. Similarly, a false claim that Gary
Cohn, the White House economic adviser, was resigning led to stock drops and
market unease over the summer. See, e.g., Bob Bryan, False Rumors that Gary Cohn is
Leaving the White House Just Spooked Wall Street—For Good Reason, BUS. INSIDER (Aug.
17, 2017, 11:46 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/gary-cohn-false-tweetleaving-trump-white-house-stock-market-reaction-2017-8. Notably, a momentary
Dow Jones Newswire headline falsely claiming that Google planned to buy Apple
led to an uptick in Apple’s stock price and, more importantly, demonstrated that the
bots responsible for executing 90% of daily trading on the stock markets could easily
be fooled by false information into “mov[ing] markets significantly.” Merle, supra
note 58 (quoting Professor Tom Lin); see also Lin, supra note 11, at 1292–94.
134
Rapoza, supra note 132.
135
Id. Such trading systems often use algorithms to analyze news, social media and
tweet activity to assess market sentiment. See id.
136
See Barry Ritholtz, Why Fake News Is So Harmful to Investors, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23,
2017, 10:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-23/whyfake-news-is-so-harmful-to-investors.
137
See, e.g., Lion Gu, Vladimir Kropotov, and Fyodor Yarochkin, Fake News and
Cyber Propaganda: The Use and Abuse of Social Media, TREND MICRO (June 13, 2017),
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digitalthreats/fake-news-cyber-propaganda-the-abuse-of-social-media.
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hyper-personalized data for psychometric purposes that is
available in auction markets, economic “fake news” might
become an attractive second front to political “fake news” for a
variety of market participants. Indeed, it is not hard to imagine
exponential growth in market-focused “fake news” under such
circumstances. Market-affecting “fake news” could be deployed
both for financially-motivated reasons (by competitors and/or
criminals),138 for politically-motivated ends (by partisans and/or
goverments), and as weapons of terror. Some strategic actors
could easily wield combinations of directly electoral and public
policy-oriented “fake news” and directly market-affecting “fake
news” to achieve maximal disruption.
Concerns about the market threats posed by the
phenomenon of “fake news” will doubtless become increasingly
common in American boardrooms. Just as cybersecurity has
become a central board matter in response to widespread
hacking of corporate databanks, issues regarding market
impacts of disinformation are likely to rise in salience for
corporate management. Shareholders have already filed
proposals with Facebook, Alphabet (Google’s parent), and
Twitter requesting “in depth reports” about Russian use of their
platforms during the 2016 election and what they are doing
with respect to the dissemination of “fake news.”139
Commercial entities have already begun to develop detection
algorithms that could provide users with reliability odds as to
the accuracy of the disseminated content.140 Of course,
investment algorithms “use machine learning to try and weed
out unreliable sources, but the systems are not perfect and can
still fall victim to the same misinformation as humans.”141
The strategic use of inaccurate factual information for
policy advantage has also recently come to light in connection
with regulatory processes. For example, the Federal
Communications Commission’s recent review of the net
neutrality rules generated the submission of 21.7 million public
138

See Rapoza, supra note 132 (“If you can lower the price of a stock by one percent
by purposefully manipulating the news flow by producing content and if you have
the right trading mechanism in place, you can capitalize on that," says Gordon.
“Imagine if you can recognize that the story is not the least bit credible and you
know the stock will recover, you can really capitalize on that knowledge.”).
139
See, e.g., Emily Chasan, Shareholders Press Twitter, Facebook and Google on Fake News,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2017, 5:16 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-30/shareholders-press-twitterfacebook-and-google-on-fake-news; see also ‘Fake News,’ Hate Speech & Free Expression:
Corporate Responsibility in an Age of Alternative Facts, OPENMIC (May 2017),
http://fakenews.openmic.org/OpenMIC-Fake-News.pdf.
140
Rapoza, supra note 132.
141
Id.
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comments on the Commission’s website.142 One Commissioner
publicly expressed concern that a majority of the public
comments—which expressed opposition to net neutrality—
were “fake.”143 A subsequently released Pew Research Center
report144 confirms that many submissions “seemed to include
false or misleading personal information” and “some share . . .
may have been submitted in bulk using automated processes,
such as bot campaigns.”145 This manipulation of the public
comment process during regulatory agency rulemaking is not
unique,146 but presents another instance of the potentially
disruptive effect of false information outside the explicitly
political context.
These developments show that “fake news” presents
viable threats not only to political life, but to markets and
governmental administration—indeed, to the entire spectrum of
human enterprise.
II. INCREASED INSTABILITY IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL PRESS
PROTECTIONS
The distrust engendered by press-delegitimizing “fake
news” charges worsens the many already-existing challenges to
press functions today. The “fake news” crisis has been a major
challenge for the press—which has faced a double whammy.
On the one hand is the extensive flow of “fake news” with
which the mainstream media cannot adequately keep up with
correctives. On the other hand is the apparently increasing
public distrust engendered by the “fake news” charge. The
142

See, e.g., Hitlin, Olmstead, & Toor, supra note 8; Aaron Mak, Study Finds Most
Public Comments to the FCC on Net Neutrality Were Duplicates, SLATE (Nov. 29, 2017,
10:00 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/11/29/net_neutrality_public_com
ments_to_fcc_contain_millions_of_duplicates_inaccurate.html.
143
April Glaser, Trump’s FCC Is About to Destroy Net Neutrality, and a Democratic
Commissioner is Calling Foul, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2017, 6:29 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/11/17/trump_s_fcc_is_about_to_d
estroy_net_neutrality.html.
144
Hitlin, Olmstead, & Toor, supra note 8.
145
Id.
146
The comments filed in response to the FCC’s notice and comment proceedings
relating to broadcast indecency are a notable prior example of the strategic capture of
public commenting by ideological groups using new technology to inflate the
appearance of public consensus on the regulatory policy. See, e.g., Lili Levi, First
Reports: The FCC's Regulation of Indecency, FIRST AMEND. CTR. 28–29 (2008),
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/FirstReport.Indecency.Levi_.final_.pdf (describing the
influence of Parents Television Council’s form letters on the FCC’s stated rationale
for tightening its indecency rules).
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press’s ability to serve as a check on “fake news” has been
compromised by media’s own behavior and economic
circumstances, by the rise of an aggressive new right-wing
press,147 and by a reduction in press protections in the United
States.
Scholars identify a decline in protections for journalistic
activities both in courts and in the political sphere.148 President
Trump’s viral tweets149 provide ammunition for a public already
showing distrust of the media.150 Although the press is at
present under attack principally from the right, the left too is
increasingly adding its critical voice.151 The economic pressures
facing American journalism have received too much ink to
warrant further description here.152 These pressures have
already led modern news organizations to problematic
commitments
to
native
advertising,153
increasing
147

In addition to conservative-leaning mainstream news outlets like Fox News and
right-wing talk radio, a “distinct right-wing media network . . . made up of relatively
new outlets” has grown since the 2008 election. See Emily Bell & Taylor Owen, The
Platform Press: How Silicon Valley Reengineered Journalism, TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL
JOURNALISM (Mar. 29, 2017), https://towcenter.org/research/the-platform-presshow-silicon-valley-reengineered-journalism/. Included in the agenda of right-wing
media was discrediting the mainstream media and develop an alternative narrative,
using Facebook to distribute their stories. Id.; see also Alice Marwick & Rebecca
Lewis, Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online, DATA & SOC’Y 1, 26, 44 (May
15, 2017),
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinfor
mationOnline.pdf.
148
See, e.g., Amy Gajda, The Present of Newsworthiness, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 145
(2016); see also Jones & West, supra note 20, at 49 (“[O]ur free press sits atop an
increasingly fragile edifice. This edifice is supported by a number of legal and
nonlegal pillars, such as the institutional media’s relative financial strength, the
goodwill of the public, a mutually dependent relationship with government officials,
and the backing of sympathetic judges. Each of these supports, however, has
weakened substantially in recent years . . . .”).
149
On how President Trump uses Twitter to engage directly with his base, endrunning intermediaries, and how bashing the media as “fake news” is a common
thread in his tweets, see Tony Lee, Bannon Praises Trump’s Twitter Use: POTUS
‘Disintermediates Media,’ Speaks Directly to Voters, BREITBART (Sept. 10, 2017),
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/09/10/bannon-praises-trumptwitter-use-potus-disintermediates-media-speaks-directly-to-voters/; Barthel &
Mitchell, supra note 18.
150
See, e.g., Jonathan Easly, Poll: Majority Says Mainstream Media Publishes Fake News,
THE HILL (May 24, 2017, 10:10 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/334897-poll-majority-says-mainstreammedia-publishes-fake-news; see also Swift, Americans’ Trust, supra note 119; Faking
News, supra note 44; see also Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 30.
151
See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, WashPost Is Richly Rewarded for False News About Russia
Threat While Public Is Deceived, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 4, 2017, 9:28 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/01/04/washpost-is-richly-rewarded-for-false-newsabout-russia-threat-while-public-is-deceived/.
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For recent articles describing the terrain, see Jones & West, supra note 20, at 55–
58; see also Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 29–31.
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See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Killing the Golden Goose: Will Blended Advertising
and Editorial Content Diminish the Value of Both?, Paper Presented at Yale Law
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sensationalism,154 abandonment of important beats,155 and
simple distraction. The media sector itself reflects internal
conflicts as to news values.156 At a minimum, the viral
distribution of “fake news” encourages and provides cover for
increasing reductions in press rights and privileges. In turn, the
press’s increasingly endangered position diminishes its ability to
promote accountability—by both government actors and
powerful private intermediaries. When the press is paralyzed in
its ability to respond effectively, the environment presents
opportunities for corruption, unchecked authoritarianism, and
a profoundly diminished version of democracy.157
At the same time as the “fake news” developments, the
press has been facing reduced or at least increasingly unstable
protections for its journalistic work. This is particularly evident
in the newsgathering context. This development did not emerge
from the Trump Administration, of course. Journalists have
characterized the Obama Administration’s approach to press
protection as lukewarm at best.158 Courts as well have
undergone a shift.159 At a minimum, there has been a significant
School Information Society Conference Commercial Speech II: Creeping
Commercial Speech and Its Impact (2017) (transcript available at
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/isp/documents/killng_the_golden_g
oose_2016_last.pdf); Lili Levi, “A Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of
the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647 (2015).
154
See, e.g., AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND
PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015) (criticizing the modern press for its
sensationalism and diagnosing judicial push-back as a result).
155
On the print press’ reduction of local and state-side news coverage, see Joyce
Dehli, Rebuilding Local Journalism as an Essential Democratic Force, NEIMAN: REPORTS
(Nov. 15, 2016), http://niemanreports.org/articles/rebuilding-local-journalism-asan-essential-democratic-force/.
156
See, e.g., Bill Keller, Is Glenn Greenwald the Future of News?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/a-conversation-in-lieu-of-acolumn.html.
157
Skeptics might contend that President Trump’s attacks on the mainstream press
have ironically revived a dying industry. After all, the Washington Post has been
hiring reporters. See, e.g., Ken Doctor, ‘Profitable’ Washington Post Adding More Than
Five Dozen Journalists, POLITICO (Dec. 27, 2016, 11:13 AM),
http://www.politico.com/media/story/2016/12/the-profitable-washington-postadding-more-than-five-dozen-journalists-004900. Moreover, subscriptions are up
significantly for the New York Times since the presidential election. See, e.g., Joe
Concha, NY Times Subscriptions Doubled in 2016, THE H ILL (Feb. 2, 2017, 11:09 AM),
http://thehill.com/media/317531-ny-times-subscriptions-doubled-in-2016. Yet this
flurry of support by liberal critics of the Trump Administration cannot eliminate the
overall negative impact of both the epidemic of false news stories and the consistent
political attacks on the institutions of the press.
158
See, e.g., Hadas Gold, Risen: Obama Administration is Greatest Enemy of Press
Freedom, POLITICO (Feb. 17, 2015, 11:36 PM),
https://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2015/02/risen-obama-administration-isgreatest-enemy-of-press-freedom-202707.
159
See, e.g., GAJDA, supra note 154; Jones & Sun, supra note 6; Jones & West, supra
note 20.
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doctrinal recognition of counter-interests to newsworthiness,
such as privacy, in news-related lawsuits. “Fake news” is the
newly added ingredient to this increasingly press-constraining
mix. Donald Trump’s deployment of the “fake news” trope,
which challenges both individual stories and also the legitimacy
of the journalistic project as a whole, has served the Trump
Administration as an articulated justification—or at least a
cover or support—for reduced press protections. Long-term
customs promoting press access have been disrupted. This has
doubtless increased the press’s reliance on leaks, which in turn
has placed the press in government’s bulls-eye. The Trump
Administration’s anti-press rhetoric also appears to have
emboldened other actors to threaten journalists and put
roadblocks in the way of their operations.
A. A Press-Skeptical Legal Turn
Many claim that the First Amendment has not been
interpreted to provide any special protections for journalists.160
The Supreme Court, for all its dicta lauding the constitutional
and democratic centrality of the press, has not established a
robust press-protective jurisprudence under the First
Amendment Press Clause.161 Indeed, recently, the Court has
moved from “largely favorable and praising depictions of the
press to largely distrusting and dismissive ones.”162 It has
asserted that media corporations are not different from any
other type of corporation with respect to constitutional speech
rights.163
Morevoer, scholars have noted a long-established
disparity between the constitutional protection afforded to
publication and the far-less-robust protection recognized by the
courts with respect to the press’s newsgathering activities.164
160

See, e.g., Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Jones & West, supra note 20, at 52.
162
RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253, 255 (2014); see also Jones & West, supra note 20, at 58–
59 (cataloguing evidence for the conclusion that the Court “has also grown less
interested in press protections”).
163
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
164
See, e.g, Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 12 (“Taken as a whole, First Amendment
doctrine produces a startling juxtaposition. Stings—defined here to mean efforts to
uncover hidden information that the public has an interest in knowing—are legally
vulnerable, while scams—the propagation of opinions and purported statements of
fact that rest on false information—are generally protected.”); Jones & West, supra
note 20, at 53 (“Despite recognizing in dicta that news gathering is not without its
First Amendment protections and noting that ‘without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press would be eviscerated, the Court has almost never
actually protected the process of gathering information.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying and Lying: Intrusive
Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TULANE L. REV. 173 (1998).
161
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Although anonymous sources have been central to journalistic
revelations of government criminality, the Supreme Court
rejected a First Amendment-based journalist privilege in
Branzburg v. Hayes.165 Admittedly, there appeared to be a
subsequent lower court consensus reading Justice Powell’s
“enigmatic”166 concurrence in the case to reflect judicial
recognition of a constitutionally grounded journalists’
privilege.167 Recent cases, however, suggest a turn away from
that stance, featuring courts less disposed toward constitutional
claims by journalists seeking to protect sources.168 Current
scholarship as well purports to undermine, through analysis of
the Branzburg Justices’ papers, the theory used by lower courts
to read Branzburg broadly and more press-protectively than
Justice White’s opinion does on its face.169 Moreover,
sometimes reporters claim the need to engage in newsgathering
by subterfuge, undercover reporting, attack video—sometimes
known as “the dark arts.”170 At this time, there is very little
protection for journalists who are caught engaging in these
activities.171 Some courts have even gone so far as to find that
165

408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 725 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
167
See, e.g., William E. Lee, A Revisionist View of Journalist’s Privilege: Justice Powell,
Bransburg and the “Proper Balance”, 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 116, nn. 17,
18, 19 (2016) and cases cited therein.
168
The most famous of such recent cases involved New York Times reporter James
Risen’s refusal to name his source for his revelation, in his book State of War, of a
secret CIA plan to foil Iran’s nuclear program. See United States v. Sterling, 724 F.
3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Risen’s assertion of First Amendment reporter’s
privilege). See also infra text accompanying note 199.
169
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 167.
170
These are, of course, not universally accepted as ethical practices, and many
journalism best practices codes frown on them as a rule. See, e.g., BROOKE KROEGER,
UNDERCOVER REPORTING: THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEPTION (2012). In England, the
tabloid press’ phone hacking practices led to a massive scandal, an independent
inquiry, and a new type of press regulation. See, e.g., Lili Levi, Journalism Standards
and “the Dark Arts”: The U.K.'s Leveson Inquiry and the U.S. Media in the Age of
Surveillance, 48 GA. L. REV. 907 (2014). Still, undercover reporting has a long history
and has led to numerous revelations in the public interest. See e.g., Alan K. Chen &
Justin F. Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment 19–25 (Univ.
Denver Sturm College of Law, Working Paper No. 15-07, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585089 (describing the “long
tradition of using deception as a means of gaining access to knowledge that would
otherwise be obscured from public view.”); see also Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 12 (on
the legal dangers to activists of engaging in investigative newsgathering).
171
See Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 12, at 9 (“[T]he case law generally permits the
application of laws governing property, contract, and other matters to be used to
keep journalists and activists away from their targets.”); Anthony L. Fargo, The Year
of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the
Federal Journalist’s Privilege, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1063, 1076–77, 1079–80
(2006). Numerous laws—such as trespass laws, invasion of privacy, limits on secret
recordings, the new spate of “ag-gag” laws, business torts—all make undercover
reporting more chancy. See Chen & Marceau, supra note 170, at 29–33.
166
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journalists engaging in undercover reporting by, for example,
accepting employment from the subjects of their undercover
reporting implicates not only the usual tort and privacy claims,
but also breach of fiduciary duty.172 Similarly, the variation in
laws regarding phone taping173 makes it difficult for news
organizations to engage lawfully in surreptitious recording.
And although the Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper 174 found that a
radio station’s publication of a cellphone conversation that had
likely been illegally obtained was protected by the First
Amendment, it did not offer broad newsgathering protection.175
Even as to publication, some recent lower court
developments indicate that courts are increasingly crediting
plaintiffs’ privacy claims in order to justify constriction of press
speech.176 Similarly, at least some recent cases indicate that
courts are becoming less deferential than in the past to
journalists’ assertions about what should be considered
newsworthy.177 Losses for news media in defamation cases are
more likely and more expensive than in the past.178
It is important not to exaggerate. There are, of course,
still many press protections in the law,179 so the legal turn is far
172

See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F. 3d 505 (4th Cir.
1999).
173
For a reference guide to such laws by journalists for journalists, see The Legal
Limits Of Recording Conduct And Conversations, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/digital-journalistslegal-guide/legal-limits-recording-conduct-and-conver (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
174
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
175
Plus, Bartnicki’s impact in the lower courts “has been virtually nonexistent.”
Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment
Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 453 (2006).
176
Professor Amy Gajda has documented this development in her book, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS
(2015), and in a more recent article. See Gajda, supra note 148; see also RonNell
Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It Matters, 66
ALA. L. REV. 253, 255 (2014) (on Supreme Court’s shift from “largely favorable and
praising depictions of the press to largely distrusting and dismissive ones”).
177
See Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation
of the Press, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2009); see also Brian Murchison et al.,
Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7,
11–12 (1994) (making a similar argument in the defamation context).
178
The massive Hulk Hogan verdict is one example. See Lili Levi, The Weaponized
Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding as a New Threat to Journalism, 66 AM. U.
L. REV. 761 (2017); see also Jones & West, supra note 20, at 58 (noting that the press
has only prevailed in 39% of the libel and privacy cases that have gone to trial since
2010, by contrast to its 52% win rate a decade earlier).
179
There are, of course, legal contexts in which the press has received significant
protection. Most states have reporter privilege statutes and there are both federal and
state documentary access protections. Although some courts have analyzed
newsworthiness claims more rigorously and have taken privacy concerns more into
account, other courts have continued to grant the press a presumption of
newsworthiness for published material. Attempts to legislate to limit journalistic
access—such as “ag-gag” laws—have faced daunting constitutional challenges. The
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from complete. Still, such protections (and protective
interpretations) are not writ in stone, and practices of
government forbearance can just as easily be reversed.180 Many
existing press protections incorporate exceptions for
extraordinary circumstances.181 If courts are convinced by
combinations of national security and privacy arguments that
press activity poses a threat to the public interest, those
protections could be whittled, at least in application in
particular cases. Thus, at a minimum, journalists and news
organizations can no longer assume the degree of legal
protection for the press on which they could have reasonably
relied during the judicial “golden age” of press law.182
In addition, President Trump and his Administration
have very clearly set out to reduce the press’s legal protections.
For example, during his campaign, Trump insisted that, if
elected, he would “open up” libel law (and thereby reduce
protections for the press).183 Even though, as president, he
cannot overrule the constitutionally grounded limits on
defamation law recognized in New York Times v. Sullivan,184 he
could use his bully pulpit to influence both the filing of
defamation actions and the attitude of juries deciding state
defamation cases. He could also potentially reshape the
Supreme Court in a way that might lead to a shift away from
the protections of New York Times v. Sullivan, either doctrinally
or in attitude.185 Ideological third-party litigation funders can

Daily Mail principle is very helpful to news organizations when they choose to
publish true information that they did not themselves collect illegally. Lower courts
applying these principles have on numerous occasions chosen to apply the principle
protectively even when journalists have had reason to know that the material that
they are publishing was probably obtained illegally. And the government has
engaged in forbearance vis-à-vis journalists even when they have arguably violated
the law.
180
See, e.g., Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 44.
181
Id.
182
See Lyrissa Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819 (2012)
(describing the “golden age”); see also Gajda, supra note 177 (arguing that news
media lawyers’ assumptions about the press-protective character of the First
Amendment are unrealistic and dangerous for the press in the current moment).
183
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Can Trump Change Libel Laws?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/politics/can-trump-change-libellaws.html?mcubz=1.
184
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (constitutionalizing state
defamation law and requiring public officials to prove actual malice by the press in
defamation actions).
185
But see Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 12, at 23 (“[A]s president there is little he can do
to accomplish this goal [of ‘opening up’ libel law]”).
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also reasonably interpret such signals as invitations to forge
ahead.186
Recently, President Trump publicly threatened to revoke
NBC’s broadcast licenses over the network’s report that he had
called for a tenfold increase in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.187
Although the executive does not have the power to order the
revocation of broadcast licenses (which are granted and
renewed by the independent Federal Communications
Commission), these threats were eerily reminiscent of thenPresident Nixon’s desire to use the FCC’s licensing process to
threaten the Washington Post, which held broadcast licenses.188
The license revocation threats have generated concerns about a
chilling effect on the networks, especially if they are seen as a
“dog whistle” for Trump supporters to file challenges to license
renewals.189
186

For a an exploration of the potential chilling effects of third party litigation
funding in press contexts through discussion of the Hulk Hogan invasion of privacy
case against Gawker, see Levi, supra note 178.
187
See, e.g., Peter Baker & Cecilia Kang, Trump Threatens NBC Over Nuclear Weapons
Report, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/us/politics/trump-nbc-fcc-broadcastlicense.html?_r=0. In another example of threatening a press organ, Trump
promised during the campaign that Amazon—Washington Post owner Jeff Bezos’
business empire—would “have such problems” if he became president. Tim
Stenovec, Donald Trump Just Said if He's Elected President Amazon Will Have Problems,
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2016, 5:14 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/donaldtrump-says-amazon-will-have-such-problems-2016-2. Since the election, President
Trump is reported to have “repeatedly suggested that Congress should look into
Amazon’s taxes.” Jones & West, supra note 20, at 71.
President Trump has also threatened lawsuits against the press on
numerous occasions. Jones & West, supra note 20, at 70–71 (listing the news entities
he threatened with legal action during the campaign). His threats of legal action
were taken seriously at least by the American Bar Association, which “spiked” a
planned article about Trump’s history of meritless lawsuits. The article was slated to
appear in an ABA publication but was removed because of “the risk of the ABA
being sued by Mr. Trump.” Jonathan Peters, What Trump Could (and Couldn’t) Do to
Restrict Press Freedom if Elected, COLUM. J. REV. (Oct. 27,
2016), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/donald_trump_lawsuits_press_fre
edom.php.
188
See, e.g., James Warren, Trump’s Threat to Yank TV Licenses Looks a Lot Like a Nixon
Move. Here’s Why., POYNTER (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.poynter.org/news/trumps-threat-yank-tv-licenses-looks-lot-nixonmove-heres-why; Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, “Chilling” the
Internet? Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 35, 47–50 (1998).
189
See Baker & King, supra note 187 (quoting former FCC Chairman). Only one
FCC Commissioner so far has explicitly criticized President Trump’s comments. See
Andrew Rafferty, First Amendment Advocates Push Back on Trump’s Licensing Threat,
NBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2017, 12:32 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/first-amendment-advocates-pushback-trump-s-licensing-threat-n809941 (reproducing FCC Commissioner
Rosenworcel’s tweet on the subject).
The signaling effect of Trump’s statements in this regard is clear in his
statement that “[i]t[] is frankly disgusting the way the press is able to write whatever
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The Trump Administration has also been very vocal
about its intention to “stem leaks” to the press from
government.190 As has been frequently noted, governments
often govern by leak191 and are sometimes rendered accountable
by leak.192 This Administration has announced a war on leaks—
not only of classified information, but of “controlled
unclassified” material.193 Attorney General Sessions was
reported to recommend polygraph testing of government
they want to write . . . [a]nd people should look into it.” David Nakamura, Trump
Escalates Threats Against Press, Calls News Coverage ‘Frankly Disgusting’, WASH. POST
(Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-escalates-threatsagainst-press-calls-news-coverage-frankly-disgusting/2017/10/11/32996dba-ae9c11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.c118e2865f8b.
190
See, e.g., Helen Murillo, Trump Is Going After Legal Protection for Journalists,
FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 10, 2017, 11:36 AM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/10/trump-is-going-after-legal-protections-forjournalists/; Charlie Savage & Eileen Sullivan, Leak Investigations Triple Under Trump,
Sessions Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/us/politics/jeff-sessions-trump-leaksattorney-general.html?_r=0; Joe Pompeo, In the Trenches of Trump’s Leak War,
VANITY FAIR (Aug. 29, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/08/donald-trump-leak-war-reporter-fearl;
see also Majority Staff Report, State Secrets: How an Avalanche of Media Leaks is Harming
National Security, COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
U.S. SENATE (July 6, 2017), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/state-secretshow-an-avalanche-of-media-leaks-is-harming-national-security
[http://perma.cc/6T6T-94N7].
191
See generally David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns
and Condones Unlawful Disclosure of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 513 (2013).
192
President Trump habitually lambasts leaks and leakers now. See, e.g., Shannon
Pettypiece, Margaret Talev & Chris Strohm, Trump’s Focus on Leaks and Loyalty Puts
Sessions in Crosshairs, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2017, 12:11 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-26/trump-s-focus-on-leaksand-loyalty-puts-sessions-in-cross-hairs; Trevor Timm, Beware of the Trump
Administration’s Coming Crackdown on Leaks—and Journalism, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://freedom.press/news/trump-administrations-comingcrackdown-leaks-and-journalism/. However, Trump’s administration—like all
preceding executives—surreptitiously offers information to the press. See, e.g.,
Matthew Yglesias, The Trump Administration’s New Anti-Leak Memo Leaked Last Night,
VOX (Sept. 14, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/9/14/16305384/mcmaster-memo-leaks (“[I]n the Trump
administration everything leaks); Michael Grynbaum & John Koblin, After Reality
Winner’s Arrest, Media Asks: Did ‘Intercept’ Expose a Source?, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/business/media/intercept-reality-winnerrussia-trump-leak.html (“Journalism in the Trump era has featured a staggering
number of leaks from sources across the federal government, providing bombshell
revelations . . . .”). Ironically, however, President Trump often praised WikiLeaks
during his campaign. See, e.g., David Choi, 5 Times Trump Praised Wikileaks During
His 2016 Election Campaign, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 13, 2017, 10:41 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-wikileaks-campaign-speeches-julianassange-2017-11.
193
See Yglesias, supra note 192 (quoting McMaster anti-leak memo); see also Chris
Geidner, Trump Administration Launches Broad New Anti-Leak Program, BUZZFEED
(Sept. 13, 2017, 9:00 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/trumpadministration-launches-broad-new-anti-leakprogram?utm_term=.mlomLyGqx#.ayDNp85X4.
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employees to identify leakers.194 Recently, National Security
Advisor McMaster reportedly circulated a memo asking the
heads of all federal agencies to engage in an “organization-wide
event to engage their workforce in a discussion on the
importance of protecting classified and controlled unclassified
information, and measures to prevent and detect unauthorized
disclosures.”195 Trump’s signing of an executive order
establishing new whistleblower protections at the Office of
Veterans Affairs signals that it is leaking information to the media
with which his Administration is most concerned.196 To the
extent that the Trump Administration’s efforts to eliminate
government leaks are successful, the press will be denied access
to important information that would enable it to do its job. This
is particularly the case now because other avenues of access to
information by the press are being intentionally constrained.197
Will the current Administration continue the traditional
practice of not prosecuting the press under espionage laws over
the publication of leaked national security material and
information? Reports that President Trump, in a private
meeting with former FBI director James Comey, recommended
that the agency consider jailing journalists who publish
classified information198 suggests not. The uptick in the number
of prosecutions of leakers of national security information
under the Obama Administration, as well as that
Administration’s focus on the reporters to whom the leakers
194

See Geidner, supra note 193 (citing to Axios report).
Id. (quoting McMaster memo). Ironically, the memo was leaked to BuzzFeed.
See Geidner, supra note 193.
196
This is not to say that leakers outside the federal government will be protected
under the current Administration. For example, NSA contractor Reality Winner is
currently being prosecuted under the Espionage Act for revealing classified
information. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Intelligence Contractor is Charged in First Leak
Case Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/us/politics/reality-winner-contractorleaking-russia-nsa.html. Nor is it to suggest that the whistleblower-protective
rhetoric is actually matched in practice. For a skeptical account, see Joe Davidson,
Victims Say VA Whistleblower Retaliation is Growing Under Trump, Despite Rhetoric,
WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/10/30/victims-sayva-whistleblower-retaliation-is-growing-under-trump-despiterhetoric/?utm_term=.950723e15cc1.
197
See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B. Government
efforts to stop leaks also doubtless have parallels in the private context. Many
potential leakers in private companies whose businesses affect public life are
doubtless afraid of liability under broadly worded non-compete and confidentiality
agreements.
198
See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, Sydney Ember & Charlie Savage, Trump’s Urging
That Comey Jail Reporters Denounced as an ‘Act of Intimidation’, N.Y. TIMES (May 17,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/business/media/trumps-urging-thatcomey-jail-reporters-denounced-as-an-act-of-intimidation.html.
195
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provided their information,199 lead to worries that the Obama
Administration has “handed [Trump] a road map”200 for
increasingly aggressive use of the Espionage Act to keep
reporters in check.201 Even if the journalists to whom
whistleblowers leak their information are not themselves
prosecuted—at least in notable numbers—it is nevertheless
likely that the Trump Administration will continue the Obama
Administration’s expanded use of media subpoenas and
surveillance under cover of concerns about national security.202
Prosecutorial discretion, when coupled with lessprotective internal government guidelines and a brash rhetoric
delegitimizing the press, is likely to expand “as applied” threats
to the press. Federal policy about subpoenaing reporters to
testify as to their sources is determined by the guidelines of the
Department of Justice. Those guidelines were significantly
revised during the Obama Administration to be more pressprotective in response to controversies over a seizure of
Associated Press’s telephone records and a search warrant for a

199

Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 46–47. The Obama Administration deployed the
Espionage Act against reporters on two occasions. In one instance, the government
attempted to use the Espionage Act prosecution in order to force New York Times
reporter James Risen to reveal a source. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Times Reporter Will
Not Be Called to Testify in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/times-reporter-james-risen-will-not-becalled-to-testify-in-leak-case-lawyers-say.html. In the other instance, the government
identified Fox News reporter James Rosen as an unindicted co-conspirator in an
Espionage Act prosecution of a government advisor for leaking national security
materials, and searched his personal emails. See, e.g., Brian Stelter & Michael D.
Shear, Justice Dept. Investigated Fox Reporter Over Leak, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/us/politics/white-house-defends-trackingfox-reporter.html. In these kinds of situations, the press is used as a cat’s paw in
order to achieve other goals. To the extent that the press’ sources are not in
government—and not even in jurisdictions where the US can exercise jurisdiction—
pressuring the press can provide benefits in multiple ways. Even if the actual
provider of the information can’t be prosecuted, the next-best alternative is public
pressure on the press, which can aid the government’s own propaganda effort.
200
See, e. g., Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 47; see also James Risen, If Donald Trump
Targets Journalists, Thank Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/opinion/sunday/if-donald-trump-targetsjournalists-thank-obama.html.
201
See, e.g., Apuzzo, supra note 199.
202
In addition to prosecution or the threat of prosecution under the Espionage Act,
the Obama Administration monitored journalists and obtained journalists’ records
using secret subpoenas. See, e.g., id. For a report about the Obama Administration’s
treatment of the press, see Leonard Downie & Sara Rafsky, The Obama
Administration and the Press, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 10, 2013),
https://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post911.php. There is little reason to believe that the Trump Administration, with its
declared war on leakers, will not amplify those practices in the attempt to identify
leakers through journalists’ records and communications.
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Fox News reporter’s emails.203 In August 2017, however,
assertedly in response to concerns about leaks of classified
information, Attorney General Jeff Sessions (a presidential
appointee who serves at the President’s will)204 announced that
the DOJ would be reviewing the guidelines with respect to
news organizations and media subpoenas in such cases.205
There is currently no federal shield law, although press
organizations have called for one. Proposed legislation of that
kind almost passed a few years ago,206 and a current bill has
been introduced.207 To the extent that prior federal shield
legislation was scuppered by massive leaks,208 recent floods of
leaked confidential data such as the Paradise Papers raise
questions about the likely passage of current proposed
legislation. That leaves journalists at the mercy of state law.
Although most states have reporter shield laws in place,209 they
differ in their scope of protection and coverage.210 There will be
increased ambiguity in journalistic protections under such
legislation as both the nature of reporting and the identity of
reporters further changes. For example, how will courts
interpreting these state statutes deal with journalism practiced
algorithmically, by robots? How will they deal with journalism
produced in teams with members of many news organizations
203

For links to the relevant documents, see Amending the Department of Justice
Subpoena Guidelines, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
https://www.rcfp.org/attorney-general-guidelines (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
204
See Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 46 (on reporter subpoena protections as a matter
of custom subject to change under Attorneys General who serve at the pleasure of
the President).
205
Federal policy on reporter subpoenas can be found in the Department of Justice’s
guidelines. Policy Regarding Obtaining Information From, or Records of, Members
of the News Media; and Regarding Questioning, Arresting, or Charging Members of
the News Media, 28 CFR § 50.10 (2015). The Attorney General, who is appointed
by and serves at the pleasure of the President, has control over those guidelines. See
Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 46. Over the summer, Attorney General Sessions
stated that the DOJ was reviewing policies regarding journalist subpoenas, and
announced Administration efforts to battle what he called a “staggering number of
leaks undermining the ability of our government to protect this country.” Julia
Edwards Ainsley, Trump Administration Goes on Attack Against Leakers, Journalists,
REUTERS, (Aug. 4, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usatrump-sessions-leaks/trump-administration-goes-on-attack-against-leakersjournalists-idUSKBN1AK1UR.
206
See Dorf & Tallow, supra note 12.
207
See, e.g., Paul Fletcher, Sessions’ Testimony Prompts New Federal Shield Law Bill
Protecting Journalists, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017, 8:45 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulfletcher/2017/11/29/sessions-testimonyprompts-new-federal-shield-law-bill-protecting-journalists/#4f555a374912.
208
See, e.g., William E. Lee, The Demise of the Federal Shield Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 27, 34 (2012) (noting that support for a federal shield law “evaporated” in
2010 when Wikileaks “began posting a trove of classified documents”).
209
See Dorf & Tallow, supra note 12 and sources cited therein.
210
See Jones & West, supra note 20, at 55 and sources cited therein.
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across state lines? In any event, state shield laws typically
provide qualified rather than absolute protection.211
In addition to uncertainty about the degree of protection
provided by the patchwork of state reporter’s privilege laws,
other non-legal factors also have a likely impact on source
protection. There is evidence that governments engage in
surveillance of journalistic activity (often in order to promote
other policy goals, such as fighting terror).212 Many reporters
believe that they are constantly under surveillance. Technology
now provides tools that will permit governments and/or private
intermediaries to use reporters’ electronic activities to reveal
information about their sources. Still, this does not make law
irrelevant, and does not eliminate the dangers for
newsgathering posed by the lack of legal protection.
Technology deflecting surveillance exists as well. May
journalists use encryption, tradecraft, burner phones, and other
anti-surveillance behavior in order to avoid unintentionally
revealing their sources or areas of investigative focus?213 Indeed,
many mainstream news organizations have begun to solicit
anonymous material and provide technological protection to
sources.214
The Washington Post’s new slogan is Democracy Dies in
Darkness.215 What casts light is access to information,
documents, and persons. Currently, news organizations have
some amount of access to government information under both
state and federal law. Some states have extensive sunshine laws
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See Dorf & Tallow, supra note 12, at 15–16 and sources cited therein.
See, e.g., With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming
Journalism, Law, and American Democracy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 28, 2014),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/28/liberty-monitor-all/how-large-scale-ussurveillance-harming-journalism-law-and; see also Trevor Timm, Lawsuit Aims to
Uncover How Government Surveils Journalists, COLUM. J. REV. (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/watchdog/government-surveillance-journalists.php.
213
See, e.g., Carl Fridh Freberg, The Death of Source Protection? Protecting Journalists’
Sources in a Post-Snowden Age, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POLITICS (Aug. 2015),
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63140/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile
_shared_repository_Content_POLIS_Death%20of%20source%20protection_Kleberg
_Death%20of%20source%20protection_2015.pdf; Julie Posetti, The Eroding State of
Source Protection, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM NETWORK (May 29, 2017),
https://gijn.org/2017/05/29/the-eroding-state-of-source-protection/.
214
The front page of the New York Times now asks: “Got a confidential news tip?”
and provides a variety of secure ways to contact the paper. See N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2016/newstips/?WT.nav=topnews&actio
n=click&clickSource=story-heading&hp&module=first-columnregion&pgtype=Homepage&region=top-news (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
215
See Paul Farhi, The Washington Post’s New SloganTurns Out to Be an Old Saying,
WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/thewashington-posts-new-slogan-turns-out-to-be-an-old-saying/2017/02/23/cb199cdafa02-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.ca75811f8de7.
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for government activity, while others are much more limited.216
As for the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), that
legislation has significant limits—both in its wording and its
application.217 Reduction of press protections can be seen in the
administrative context as well, particularly in the interpretation
of exceptions and statutory implementation. For years,
journalists have complained of delays in compliance with
FOIA requests.218 Stories also reveal incompleteness and
increased costs in government responses to documentary
access.219 And this is in prior years, when presidents paid at
least lip service to the value of government transparency. What
impact might a changed approach have at the Department of
Justice’s Office of Information Policy, which oversees agency
compliance with the FOIA?220 In addition to reducing public
access to government data, scholars also note the Trump
Administration’s reduced information-collecting (so that there
is less information for journalists and analysts to parse).221
Further problems are posed by journalist access to some but not
all documents or information when documentation is produced
by and/or held in a variety of hands. All this becomes
particularly problematic as technology presents opportunities
for news organizations to analyze data sets in order to reveal
new types of explanatory journalism. Access to data becomes
increasingly important in an environment where stories are
based in data, and where news organizations will increasingly
seek to support their reporting by making the underlying data
available to readers should they wish to see it. Finally, to the
216

For links, see https://www.nfoic.org/coalitions/state-foi-resources/statefreedom-of-information-laws.
217
The statute contains 9 important exceptions that government agencies can use to
withhold document access or provide partial access. For prominent criticisms of the
FOIA regime, see Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L. J. 1361, 1361–1437
(2016); David E. McCraw, The “Freedom From Information” Act: A Look Back at Nader,
FOIA, and What Went Wrong, YALE L.J.F. (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-freedom-from-information-act-a-lookback; David Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1097 (2017).
218
See, e.g., Delayed, Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front, PROPUBLICA (July
21, 2016, 8:01 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/delayed-denied-dismissedfailures-on-the-foia-front. Public records have also been denied by state government
officials. See Chad G. Marzen, Public Records Denials, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
(forthcoming 2018) (arguing for increased penalties).
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See, e.g., Delayed, Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front, supra note 218; see
also Josh Gerstein, Obama Administration in FOIA Fees Fight, POLITICO (May 28, 2015,
7:51 AM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2015/05/obamaadministration-in-foia-fees-fight-207810.
220
See Peters, supra note 187.
221
See, e.g., Norton, supra note 103. The flip side of that strategy is to enhance
“infoglut.” See Julie Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 382–89 (2016).
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extent that newspapers have in the past spearheaded not only
freedom of information requests, but also litigation to effectuate
informational access rights, the financial conditions of
newspapers and the reduction in reporters necessarily
undermine those practices.222
In sum, with respect to legal rights, an overview of the
environment suggests—at best—greater instability for the press
today.
B. Reductions in Customary Privileges
In addition to legal rights as such, the press has in the
past benefited from access privileges based on custom.223
President Trump and his Administration have significantly
reduced such customs and traditional safeguards. This has been
particularly notable in the area of access. For example, during
the campaign, Trump revoked the press credentials of some
press organizations,224 blacklisted particular reporters and news
organizations on the basis of their coverage of Trump,225 and
made it difficult for reporters to cover him in numerous
practical ways.226 Both Trump and his campaign staff refused to
talk to certain reporters, whether on or off the record, and
declined to abide by traditional norms for designated press
pools.227
Once in office, the Trump White House greatly upended
customs previously expected by the press. For example, the
White House specifically excluded disfavored journalists from
press briefings.228 President Trump did not permit the American
press to attend some important diplomatic meetings attended
by the foreign press.229 He changed the traditions pursuant to
which press routinely traveled with the president and were
informed of presidential plans to go out in public.230 President
222

See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a PostNewspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2011) (describing the role of
newspapers in information-forcing legislation and litigation).
223
On the press’ non-legal safeguards, see RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West,
Don’t Expect the First Amendment to Protect the Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/dont-expect-the-first-amendmentto-protect-the-media.html; see also Jones & West, supra note 20.
224
See, e.g., Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 15.
225
See, e.g., Jones & West, supra note 20, at 64.
226
See id. (cataloguing transactions costs).
227
See id.
228
See, e.g., Callum Borchers, White House Blocks CNN, New York Times from Press
Briefing Hours Aafter Trump Slams Media, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/24/white-houseblocks-cnn-new-york-times-from-press-briefing-hours-after-trump-slamsmedia/?utm_term=.15d804058c83.
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Jones & West, supra note 20, at 65–6.
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Id.
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Trump has also held few press conferences himself, breaking
with long-standing presidential tradition.231 He has consistently
refused to take questions from reporters he saw as hostile or
employed by news organizations he dislikes.232 When he has
met with the press in such conferences where he or his aides
expect tough questions, Trump has called on “sycophantic
news outlets” instead.233 Trump and his Administration have
retaliated against news organizations seen as reporting
negatively on him.234 Recently, it was reported that the White
House Press Secretary had threatened a CNN reporter with
exclusion if he asked any questions during a recent presidential
bill-signing ceremony.235
In addition to reducing the press’s access to the
President and his Administration, these kinds of reversals to
custom send a clear message both to the public and to elites
who might otherwise be wary of crossing the press that the
mainstream institutional press is now an enemy to be resisted
and not feared.236
C. Harassment and Danger
Journalism in the U.S. has become more physically
dangerous. Beginning during the presidential campaign, Trump
“encouraged supporters to join him in taunts and jeers directed
at the press corps.”237 The extreme rhetoric—a clear departure
from norms observed even by candidates and prior presidents
who disliked the press238—sent a clear signal. The drumbeat of
press criticism by the Trump Administration appears to have
emboldened people to attack journalists doing their jobs.239 The
231

Id. at 67.
Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 15 (noting Trump’s belittling of journalists and their
employers and refusing to take their questions at his first post-election press
conference).
233
Jonathan Peters, Trump and Trickle-down Press Persecution, COLUM. J. REV. (2017),
https://www.cjr.org/local_news/trump-and-trickle-down-press-persecution.php
(quoting journalism professor).
234
Jones & West, supra note 20, at 70.
235
CNN’s Jim Acosta Complains of White House Threat, DENV. POST (Dec. 12, 2017,
5:01 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/12/12/cnns-acosta-complains-whitehouse-threat/.
236
Agreeing with that conclusion, Professors Jones and West catalogue the ways in
which the Trump Administration has violated previously-established norms of
respect with which prior presidents treated the press. See Jones & West, supra note
20, at 68–70.
237
Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 8–9 (“Mocking, criticizing, and verbally attacking
individual reporters and media executives became a staple of Trump’s
presentations.”); see also Faking News, supra note 44, at 11.
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See Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 10.
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See, e.g., Martin Pengelly & Joanna Walters, Trump Accused of Encouraging Attacks
on Journalists with CNN Body-Slam Tweet, The GUARDIAN (July 2, 2017, 2:21 PM),
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attitude toward the press of both the public and government
officials influences the way in which reporters are treated.
Recently, a reporter asking a question of a state political
candidate was “body slammed” and physically hurt by the
candidate; surprisingly, the candidate’s assault was minimized
and the reporter’s attitude criticized by a troublesome number
of people.240 When officials cannot tell the difference between
activists and journalists covering protests, they respond by
strong-arming the journalists as well.241 This extends beyond
political venues to academia as well; numerous stories recount
the degree to which student journalists are harassed and
excluded when covering campus protests.242 To be sure,
reporting in the United States is still significantly safer as a
physical matter than in many places in the world—in which
journalists are subject to threats, violence, physical harm, and
death.243 Still, reports of physical altercations between
government officials and journalists are deeply troubling.244
Beyond physical attacks, technology now permits the
mobilization of human or bot mobs directing verbal attacks and
threats at disfavored journalists.245 This is another example of
increasingly effective harassment in response to speech, and it
raises significant questions about a chilling effect on the press’s
activity.

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/02/trump-body-slam-cnn-tweetviolence-reporters-wrestlemania.
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See, e.g., Michael Grynbaum, A Journalist Was Body Slammed, but Some Conservatives
Want the News Media to Apologize, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/us/journalist-body-slammed-republicansapology-media.html.
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See Jonathan Peters, Journalists Arrested in DC Inauguration Protests Have Law On
Their Side, COLUM. J. REV. (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/watchdog/journalist_arrested_inauguration_protest_felony.ph
p.
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See Austin Huguelet & Daniel Victor, ‘I Need Some Muscle’: Missouri Activists Block
Journalists, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/us/university-missouri-protesters-blockjournalists-press-freedom.html.
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The Committee to Protect Journalists compiles attacks on the press. See Attacks on
the Press: 2017 Edition, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS
https://cpj.org/2017/04/attacks-on-the-press.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2018); Elana
Beiser, Record Number of Journalists Jailed as Turkey, China, Egypt Pay Scant Price for
Repression, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Dec. 13, 2017).
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with more authoritarian governments. Last summer, for example, persons in the
employ of President Erdogan of Turkey beat up protesters picketing in front of a
venue in Washington DC in which Erdogan was speaking.
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See, e.g., Emma Green, The Tide of Hate Directed at Jewish Journalists, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2016),
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D. Press Self-Censorship
It is doubtless the case that many journalists see this
moment—when the press is under unprecedented attack by a
sitting president—as an emboldening one. Indeed, it is precisely
the cultivation of this attitude that this Article celebrates and
recommends. At the same time, it would be naïve to believe
that an economically burdened press, pressured by oligopolistic
platforms on the one hand and unceasing threats by
government officials on the other hand, would not step very
gingerly into political quagmires. It is unsurprising, for
example, that after a CNN story on Russian connections to
Anthony Scaramucci was debunked as inaccurate, it was not
enough for the three responsible reporters to tender their
resignations.246 The rest of the team was purportedly taken off
stories on potential ties between the Trump Administration and
Russia.247 To be sure, a few examples like this do not
unassailably reflect chill. Various national newspapers, like the
New York Times and the Washington Post, have continued to
report critically on the Trump Administration—indeed, to a
degree that makes Trump supporters agree with the President
that the Russia inquiry is no more than a “witch hunt.”248
Outside the strictly political and electoral contexts, there
appears to be evidence that “the Gawker Effect”249 is leading to
increased timorousness by news organizations regarding the
publication of investigative stories.250 It was subsequently
revealed that Hulk Hogan’s breach of privacy action against
Gawker was bankrolled by Silicon Valley conservative
billionaire Peter Thiel.251 The $140 million damage award in the
case led to the bankruptcy and shuttering of Gawker.252 Since
that case, journalists report a significant increase in legal
oversight of their investigative stories, and ultimate decisions to
246
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248
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back away from stories of sexual misconduct in the music and
entertainment industries.253 The possibility of ideologically
motivated third party funding of lawsuits against the press must
be perceived by news organizations as particularly threatening
in an environment in which judges, juries and the public assess
their processes with a jaundiced eye.254
Another worrisome aspect of the legal context concerns
newspapers as litigation plaintiffs and law enforcers. Scholars
have noted that current economic circumstances will likely
significantly reduce newspapers’ ability to serve as
constitutional litigators and legal enforcers.255 The “new media”
online are unlikely to step into the newspapers’ historical role
253

See Sullivan, supra note 249 (quoting BuzzFeed’s assistant general counsel as
saying that “[t]here’s a lot of uncertainty and fear out there, post-Gawker”); see also
Kim Masters, Fighting ‘the Gawker Effect’ in the Wake of Weinstein, COLUM. J. REV.
(Oct 13, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/first_person/amazon-roy-price.php (describing
the numerous mainstream media organizations that refused to publish Masters’
article on allegations of sexual impropriety involving Roy Price, the powerful head of
Amazon Studios). Masters warned that
[i]n the wake of Hulk Hogan’s successful lawsuit against Gawker,
a case that essentially bankrupted the company, we seem to be at
a point when the wealthy feel emboldened to try to silence
reporters by threatening litigation even if they stand virtually no
chance of winning. Some of the lawyers vetting my story
expressed fears that even the weakest of legal claims could wind
up being heard by a dangerously hostile judge or jury. Their usual
caution seemed to have turned into very real fear.
Id. Masters’ story was rejected by mainstream outlets and ultimately posted by the
tech website The Information. Id. Unlike the R. Kelly story published by BuzzFeed,
the Masters story on Roy Price at various points relied on unnamed sources. This
suggests an increased risk-aversity with respect to publication of stories without
sources willing to go on the record with their claims. This kind of attitude is likely to
lead to particularly conservative reporting in the political context.
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Weinstein. See Masters, supra note 253. That the New York Times does not appear
to have censored its coverage of Harvey Weinstein after it broke the story of the
many sexual harassment assertions about him does not mean that the Gawker Effect
does not lead to self-censorship by news organizations—and perhaps even by the
New York Times in other contexts.
In addition to the likely chill portended by third party funding in press
contexts, we can also predict a chilling effect on the press from aggressive litigation
postures or boundary-pushing prosecutorial choices by government lawyers as well.
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See Jones, supra note 222, at 559 (“For the past 100 years, newspapers and
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enforcers.” see also Jones & West, supra note 21, at 57. Jones and West note that
“[s]truggling news organizations are . . . less able to afford to defend press freedoms
in the courts or to lobby for favorable legislation.” Id. see also Eric Newton, A News
Industry ‘Less Able’ to Defend Freedom, KNIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 21, 2016),
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as ligitant.256 The likely reduction in public interest First
Amendment litigation undertaken by newspapers is principally
attributable to the difficult financial circumstances in which
newspapers find themselves. But increased risk-aversity toward
litigation is doubtless also influenced by the increasing
uncertainty of achieveing press-protective results in litigation.
Ironically, press protection is at a low ebb doctrinally
and in practice at the very moment that journalists need every
tool in their arsenal to debunk “fake news” and revive their
constitutional role. In fact, the insistence by the executive
branch that the mainstream media should not be believed
worsens the threat posed by “fake news.” By generating a
narrative that delegitimizes real news and its purveyors as fake,
and presiding over increasing instability in press protections,
the Trump Administration adopts an approach that sacrifices
not only the press, but also the public that is duped by real
“fake news.”
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF “FAKE NEWS”?
The public discourse about how to deal with “fake
news” generally seems to recommend technological solutions,
audience empowerment solutions, and legal solutions. This
Article as well follows that three-pronged convention, although
it focuses in this Section specifically on platform technological
experiments and audience media literacy suggestions. With
respect to platforms, this Article calls for a reframing of the
“fake news” problem to enhance the likely robustness of their
self-regulatory efforts. With respect to audiences, it
recommends granular engagement with empirical research in
political science and cognitive psychology in order to enhance
the likely effectiveness of information literacy programs.
With respect to legal solutions to the “fake news”
problem, proponents domestically focus principally on
regulating online intermediaries.257 This Article does not
recommend mandatory regulations seeking to prohibit “fake
news.” This is because there are reasons to suspect that selfregulation could lead to relatively equivalent results. Even if not
required to do so, platforms are likely to adopt at least some of
the kinds of technological and disclosure-focused solutions that
would likely pass constitutional muster if adopted legislatively.
Nor is legislation to prevent “fake news” beyond that likely to
256
257
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be effective. Instead, the Article argues that affirmative legal
intervention should be saved for something else. As is described
in Section IV below, the Article argues that the adoption of
legal and customary rules to privilege the press is more likely to
stem the tide of the most dangerous type of “fake news”
discourse than regulatory obligations potentially vulnerable to
constitutional attack.
A. Platforms: Technological and Disclosure-Based Self-Regulatory
“Fixes”
The major information platforms—such as Facebook
and Google—are now engaged in attempts to curtail “fake
news” technologically.258 With regard to technological fixes,
this Article does not propose to second-guess the details of the
various approaches being explored by Facebook’s software
engineers. It does, however, recommend that, in addition to
their recent “fake news”-curbing initiatives, social media
platforms add sponsorship disclosure requirements to their ad
sales contracts.259
In addition to platform technological initiatives, there is
also scholarly experimentation with respect to developing
computational methods and algorithmic tools to help in the
identification and control of “fake news,”260 at least some in
response to the Fake News Challenge competition.261 The
258

See Balkin, supra note 25 (explaining the pressures put on such companies, by both
governments (what he calls “new school” speech regulation) and end-users (what he
calls “a feature of community governance”) to solve the problem of fake news).
259
Here I speak about sponsorship disclosure so that end-users can learn who has
paid for the information they consume. But Balkin makes a broader point about
transparency in this environment—that in today’s context of private speech
governance, “due process becomes an increasingly important value.” Id.
260
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Fergus Bell, A Global Guide to Initiatives Tackling “Fake News”, GLOBAL
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM NETWORK (May 8, 2018),
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and artificial intelligence.” FAKE NEWS CHALLENGE,
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technology-focused approach has also now generated Civil, a
fledgling experiment in blockchain-based journalism as a way
to eliminate “fake news.”262 For practical reasons having to do
with the reach and power of the major communications
platforms, the following Section principally focuses on
Facebook.
1. Current Self-Regulatory Initiatives by Facebook
The code-based self-regulatory effort by the major
platforms has various aspects and is evolving. Even though
studies suggest that the largest volume of fabricated news
during the 2016 election season was disseminated via
Facebook, the company’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg initially
denied both the extent of political misinformation distributed
by Facebook and its likely impact on the election, calling the
latter “a pretty crazy idea.”263 Zuckerberg also vehemently
disputed the claim that Facebook was a media organization,
consistently characterizing it as a technology company.264 This
meant that Facebook saw itself simply as transmitting others’
speech, and not as having any kind of editorial or curatorial

for significantly automating parts of the procedure human fact checkers use today to
determine if a story is real or a hoax.”).
262
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Publications, NEIMAN: LAB (Oct. 25, 2017),
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage the argument that
blockchain would, in one fell swoop, reverse the modern press’ woes with respect to
both financing and “fake news.” Suffice it to say that the controversies over Bitcoin
have shown that blockchain technology is still very early in its infancy, despite the
hype, and that we are not yet in a position to address the issue with sufficient
information. Moreover, even if the approach would be an economically effective
alternative for advertising support for the press, its radically decentralized format
raises questions about the downsides of eliminating the editorial and curatorial
function in favor of individual contracting between readers and reporters. The
institutional press has an important democratic value, and it is unclear how that
would be leveraged in a blockchain journalism world.
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Election, NPR: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Nov. 11, 2016),
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also Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 12. For an extensive exploration of Zuckerberg’s
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2018 07:00 AM, https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2years-of-hell/.
264
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responsibility with respect to the information transmitted.265
Facebook took the position that it did not wish to be a censor or
the arbiter of truth for society.266
Thereafter, under pressure as evidence of Russian
election meddling via social media came increasingly to light,
Facebook revised its approach toward “fake news.” The
company became more active in attempting to reduce
misinformation in three areas: disrupting economic incentives
in the advertising space; calling out “fake news” in users’ news
feeds; and helping provide tools for information literacy.267
With regard to advertising, Facebook announced steps to
diminish the economic incentives for traffickers of
misinformation, and decided to prohibit repeat offenders from
advertising on the platform.268 Facebook has recently hired
1,000 additional employees to review and remove ads.269 In
addition, to the extent that only a few sources generate much of
the viral “fake news,” identifying those sources and engaging in
a platform-based attempt to reduce promotion of information
from those sources could reduce the distribution of “fake
265

See. e.g., Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 263 (describing the history of
Facebook’s self-perception as a platform and not a publisher).
266
Mark Zuckerberg Facebook Post, FACEBOOK (Nov. 12, 2016),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103253901916271.
267
See Adam Mosseri, A New Educational Tool Against Misinformation, FACEBOOK:
NEWSROOM (Apr. 6, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/a-neweducational-tool-against-misinformation/ (“At Facebook we have been focusing on
three key areas: disrupting economic incentives because most false news is
financially motivated; building new products to curb the spread of false news; and
helping people make more informed decisions when they encounter false news.”) see
also Faking News, supra note 44, at 29–40.
268
See Adam Mosseri, Working to Stop Misinformation and False News, FACEBOOK:
NEWSROOM (Apr. 6, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/working-tostop-misinformation-and-false-news/ (“When it comes to fighting false news, one of
the most effective approaches is removing the economic incentives for traffickers of
misinformation. We’ve found that a lot of fake news is financially motivated. These
spammers make money by masquerading as legitimate news publishers and posting
hoaxes that get people to visit their sites, which are often mostly ads. Some of the
steps we’re taking include: Better identifying false news through our community and
third-party fact-checking organizations so that we can limit its spread, which, in turn,
makes it uneconomical . . . Making it as difficult as possible for people posting false
news to buy ads on our platform through strict enforcement of our policies . . .
Applying machine learning to assist our response teams in detecting fraud and
enforcing our policies against inauthentic spam accounts . . . Updating our detection
of fake accounts on Facebook, which makes spamming at scale much harder . . .
[Making] updates so people see fewer posts and ads in News Feed that link to lowquality web page experiences . . . [Making] updates to address cloaking so that what
people see after clicking an ad or post matches their expectations . . . [Making] an
update in which repeat offenders that repeatedly share stories marked as false will no
longer be allowed to advertise on Facebook.”).
269
Kurt Wagner, Facebook is Hiring Another 1,000 People to Review and Remove Ads,
RECODE (Oct. 2, 2017, 11:00 AM),
https://www.recode.net/2017/10/2/16395342/facebook-mark-zuckerbergadvertising-policies-russia-investigation-election-moderators.
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news.”270 With regard to “helping people make more informed
decisions,”271 Facebook developed and disseminated
educational tools for information literacy, inaugurated the
Facebook Journalism Project to collaborate with news
organizations in developing products to help journalists and
citizens “make smart choices about what they read;”272 and
joined the News Integrity Initiative, “a global consortium
focused on helping people make informed judgments about the
news they read and share online.”273 In order to curb the spread
of “fake news,” Facebook entered into partnerships with thirdparty fact-checking organizations—such as Snopes, PolitiFact,
the Associated Press, and FactCheck.org—in order to factcheck shared news stories.274 The company announced, as part
of a News Feed Update, that it would begin testing a “more
info” button that users could click to obtain additional context
about articles in their news feeds.275 Facebook has also
promised to make available information to users indicating
whether or not they followed Russian bot-generated “fake
270

See, e.g., Lazer et al., supra note 17.
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.; see also Faking News, supra note 44, at 64–69. Originally, Facebook sought to
identify fact checker-identified false stories with a “disputed” label. In December
2017, however, Facebook announced that it would stop using the “disputed” tag on
stories in light of its conclusion that the red “disputed” flag was actually
counterproductive. See Catherine Shu, Facebook Will Ditch Disputed Flags on Fake
News and Display Links to Trustworthy Articles Instead, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/20/facebook-will-ditch-disputed-flags-on-fakenews-and-display-links-to-trustworthy-articles-instead/; Sara Fischer, Facebook Stops
Putting “Disputed Flags” on Fake News Because it Doesn’t Work, AXIOS (Dec. 27, 2017),
https://www.axios.com/facebook-drops-fake-news-flags-because-they-had-reverseeffect-2520310212.html. Instead, Facebook said it would use “Related Articles” to
provide context for fake news on the ground that this new strategy is likely to lead to
fewer shares of fake news than the “disputed” flag. Fischer, supra (noting also that
the company is “starting a new initiative to better understand how people decide
what’s accurate based on the news sources they ‘[d]epend upon,’ or likely follow and
engage with on Facebook.”); see also Shu, supra (on Facebook decision to show
“Related Articles” or link to content from reputable publishers).
275
Andrew Anker, Sara Su & Jeff Smith, News Feed FYI: New Test to Provide Context
About Articles, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/news-feed-fyi-new-test-to-providecontext-about-articles/ (“For links to articles shared in News Feed, we are testing a
button that people can tap to easily access additional information without needing to
go elsewhere. The additional contextual information is pulled from across Facebook
and other sources, such as information from the publisher’s Wikipedia entry, a
button to follow their Page, trending articles or related articles about the topic, and
information about how the article is being shared by people on Facebook. In some
cases, if that information is unavailable, we will let people know, which can also be
helpful context . . . Helping people access this important contextual information can
help them evaluate if articles are from a publisher they trust, and if the story itself is
credible. This is just the beginning of the test.”).
271
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news” during the election period.276 More recently, the
company announced that it would prioritize posts from friends
and family (as opposed to media posts or posts from brands) in
its News Feed.277 To mitigate possible increases in shared
misinformation, Facebook also announced that it would ask
users to identify trusted news sites and introduce “high quality”
news into feeds.278
Other major information intermediaries have also
announced their self-regulatory responses to the spread of
disinformation online.279 And scholars have been generating a
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See, e.g, Alex Hern, Facebook to Tell Users if They Interacted with Russia’s ‘Troll Army’,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2017, 4:45 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/23/facebook-to-tell-users-ifthey-interacted-with-russia-troll-army.
277
Zuckerberg said that the point of the change was to shift back from passive
consumption to engagement with personal posts that generate discussion. Mark
Zuckerberg Facebook Post, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104413015393571.
278
Mark Zuckerberg Facebook Post, FACEBOOK (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104445245963251.
279
For example, Google, the predominant search engine, has announced changes to
its search algorithm and the ways in which it presents results in order to combat
“fake news.” Ben Gomes, Our Latest Quality Improvements for Search, GOOGLE: THE
KEYWORD (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.blog.google/products/search/our-latestquality-improvements-search/; see also Faking News, supra note 44, at 40–48. Google
representatives described the search engine update as blocking access to “offensive”
sites and foregrounding more “authoritative content.” Id.; see also Alex Hern, Google
Acts Against Fake News on Search Engine, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2017, 10:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/25/google-launches-majoroffensive-against-fake-news; Danae Metaxa-Kakavouli & Nicolas Torres-Echeverry,
Google’s Role in Spreading Fake News and Misinformation, STANFORD LAW SCH.: LAW &
POL’Y LAB (Oct. 2017), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/SSRN-id3062984.pdf. Google has also partnered with
fact-checking groups to include links to their posts in Google News’ story clusters
and fact check labels in Google News articles. Frederic Lardinois, Google’s Fact Check
Feature Goes Global and Comes to Google Search, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/07/fact-check-the-world-is-flat/; see also Sheldon
Burshtein, The True Story on Fake News, 29 INTELL. PROP. J. 397, 408–10 (2017); see
also Heather Timmons, Google Executives are Floating a Plan to Fight Fake News on
Facebook and Twitter, QUARTZ (Feb. 8, 2018), https://qz.com/1195872/googlefacebook-twitter-fake-news-chrome/(describing possible notification system via
Google’s Chrome browser extension).
In addition to Google and Facebook, Twitter too has stated that it will try
to fight fake news with “trust indicators.” See Seth Fiegerman, Facebook, Google,
Twitter to Fight Fake News with ‘Trust Indicators’, CNN: TECH (Nov. 16, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/16/technology/tech-trust-indicators/index.html;
see also Faking News, supra note 44, at 49–51.
Of the major social media players, it appears that Snapchat is the only one
not to have a significant “fake news” problem. This is said to be due to Snapchat’s
structure. See Max Chafkin, How Snapchat Has Kept Itself Free of Fake News,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 2017, 4:30 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-10-26/how-snapchat-has-keptitself-free-of-fake-news.

2018] REAL “FAKE NEWS” AND FAKE “FAKE NEWS” 290
variety of other code-based approaches to the identification and
minimization of “fake news.”280
2. Assessing Platform Self-Regulation
How effective are these interventions likely to be? With
respect to what kinds of “fake news”? Are there structural
reasons to doubt them? Given the secrecy of the platforms’
processes and their proprietary algorithms, will there be
adequate ways to assess the effectiveness of their efforts—or
will we just have to trust in the accuracy of the platforms’
assurances? Even if platform initiatives will effectively reduce at
least some types of harmful “fake news,” is it desirable to leave
speech regulation to non-journalistic commercial platforms?
Credible arguments can be made that Facebook’s “fake news”
initiatives are either too good or not good enough.
a. Effectiveness
The likely effectiveness of self-regulation by these social
media platforms is a complicated issue. On the one hand, their
financial models rely on advertising and on scraping as much
data as possible from the online activities of all their users to
attract advertisers. Although Facebook will surely attempt to
reduce the manipulation of its own platform for strategic
political purposes, it still faces the imperatives of its own
economic business model.281 Some have argued that because
virality (which increases profits for information intermediaries)
is driven by emotional appeals and sensationalistic material
rather than high-quality news reporting, entities like Facebook
will have a fundamental ambivalence about their commitment
to “fake news” reduction.282 At a minimum, one could wonder
280

See, e.g., Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42, at 28 (employing user
feedback, fingerprinting known fake news items, source identification).
281
The point has even been made in comedy, with the evil character Professor Chaos
in a recent South Park episode saying, “I make money from Facebook for my fake
content in order to pay Facebook to promote my fake stories.” Josh Constine, South
Park Slams Facebook for Selling Fake News, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/12/south-park-vs-zuckerberg/; see also Thompson
& Vogelstein, supra note 263 (on the economic rewards of sensationalistic content on
social media). For a pessimistic view by an early Facebook investor about the
possibility of effective self-regulation by the company for this reason, see Roger
McNamee, How to Fix Facebook—Before it Fixes Us, WASH. MONTHLY
(Jan./Feb./Mar. 2018), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/januaryfebruary-march-2018/how-to-fix-facebook-before-it-fixes-us/.
282
See, e.g., Josef Drexl, Economic Efficiency Versus Democracy: On the Potential Role of
Competition Policy in Regulating Digital Markets in Times of Post-Truth Politics, in
COMPETITION POLICY: BETWEEN EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2881191); see also Bell &
Owen, supra note 147 (observing that “the structure and the economics of social
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whether the platforms’ cost/benefit calculus will prompt the
most extensive and expensive efforts to reduce “fake news.”
After all, in light of the fact that they will never be able to
eliminate “fake news” entirely and that both unsuccessful and
semi-successful attempts will inevitably lead to harsh critique
anyway, will the platforms have the incentive to invest
maximally in trying to discipline “fake news” on social media?
Even without fundamental skepticism about the
platforms’ commitment to the reduction of misinformation
online, it is obvious that self-regulatory models in which the
platforms partner with other entities to check facts will best
succeed if their partners are perceived as credible by readers.
Are the fact-checking entities with which Facebook has
partnered generally seen as credible? Studies suggest that there
has been an uptick in the number of fact-checking organizations
recently.283 At least some of them, however, have been
characterized by the right-wing press as liberal propagandists,284
while others, such as the conservative Weekly Standard,
Facebook’s new fact-checking partner, have been attacked by
liberals.285 In any event, because of the speed with which “fake
platforms incentivize the spread of low-quality content over high-quality material.
Journalism with high civic value—journalism that investigates power, or reaches
underserved and local communities—is discriminated against by a system that favors
scale and shareability.”); Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42, at 25
(describing some fake news as “a symptom of surveillance capitalism, the economic
model underlying many Internet platforms that monetizes collecting data”); see also
Farhad Manjoo, Can Facebook Fix Its Own Worst Bug?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/magazine/can-facebook-fix-its-own-worstbug.html?_r=0 (worrying about Facebook’s ability to ignore the likes and dislikes of
its users in order to address the pervasive climate of fake news when the whole basis
of the social network is responsiveness to its users’ likes and dislikes). A recent New
America report, #Digitaldeceit, argues that “[t]he financial interests that drive the
core technologies of the leading internet platforms and the objectives of
disinformation campaigners are often aligned.”
283
See, e.g., Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Fighting Falsehoods Around the World: A Dispatch on
the Growing Global Fact-checking Movement, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/07/14/fightingfalsehoods-around-the-world-a-dispatch-on-the-global-fact-checkingmovement/?utm_term=.c8fe63144d6c.
284
See, e.g., James Covert, Facebook Under Fire for Picking ‘Liberal’ Outlets to Fact-check,
N.Y. POST (Dec. 16, 2016, 12:52 PM), https://nypost.com/2016/12/16/facebookunder-fire-for-picking-liberal-outlets-to-fact-check/; see also Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler,
supra note 60 (study noting that fact-checking “may not effectively reach people who
have encountered the false claims it debunks” and concluding that “[p]ositive views
of fact-checking are less common among fake news consumers (48%), especially
those who support Trump (24%)”).
285
Sam Levin, Conservative Weekly Standard to Aid in Facebook Fact-Checks, Prompting
Outcry, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2017, 4:07 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/06/facebook-weeklystandard-fake-news-fact-check (“The Weekly Standard will be the first right-leaning
news organization and explicitly partisan group to do fact-checks for Facebook,
prompting backlash from progressive organizations, who have argued that the
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news” can propagate on social media, it is very likely that fact
checkers will find it difficult to provide real-time rebuttals.
Recent reports suggest that Facebook fact-checkers themselves
doubt the efficacy of the company’s initiative: “nearly a year
after rolling out a new plan to fight misinformation, Facebook’s
fact checkers are skeptical that their work is much more than
hastily applied public-relations effort.”286
Social scientists have now publicized a new wrinkle—
the “implied truth effect.”287 A recent study suggests that users
who do not see a “disputed” label on an item of information on
social media will therefore assume that the information must be
true. Since fact-checking and “disputed” labeling can never be
perfect in today’s information glut environment, the findings
prompt the question whether “disputed” labeling can backfire—
as Facebook itself concluded when it decided to switch away
from such labeling recently.288
In addition, Facebook’s attempts to identify and isolate
“fake news” purveyors is likely to become a game of whack-amole, or an arms race, as the identified websites morph to avoid
identification. This means that the process will be an iterative
one, requiring adaptation as “fake news” purveyors change
their modus operandii in response to attempts to inhibit their
success.289 Given Facebook’s blindness to past attempts to
manipulate the platform,290 questions might be raised about
likely competence going forward as well.
magazine has a history of publishing questionable content.”). But see Alexios
Mantzarlis, Conservative Websites Are Far More Likely to Attack Fact-Checkers Than Their
Liberal Counterparts, POYNTER, (June 8, 2017),
https://www.poynter.org/news/conservative-websites-are-far-more-likely-attackfact-checkers-their-liberal-counterparts (reporting earlier study).
286
Maya Kosoff, Facebook’s Fact-Checkers Say They’re Little More Than a P.R. Ploy,
VANITY FAIR (Nov. 13, 2017, 5:37 PM),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/11/facebooks-fact-checkers-say-theyrelittle-more-than-a-pr-ploy.
287
Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, The Implied Truth Effect: Attaching
Warnings to a Subset of Fake News Stories Increases Perceived Accuracy of Stories
Without Warnings (Dec. 8, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3035384 (hypothesizing an
“implied truth effect” in a study that found that “the presence of warnings caused
untagged stories to be seen as more accurate than in the control.”).
288
See supra text accompanying note 274.
289
See Anderson & Rainie, supra note 21 (quoting Tom Rosenstiel: “Whatever
changes platform companies make, and whatever innovations fact checkers and
other journalists put in place, those who want to deceive will adapt to them.
Misinformation is not like a plumbing problem you fix. It is a social condition, like
crime, that you must constantly monitor and adjust to. Since as far back as the era of
radio and before, as Winston Churchill said, ‘A lie can go around the world before
the truth gets its pants on.’”).
290
For a description of how slow Facebook was to identify “fake news”
manipulation, see Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 263.
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Moreover, recent changes to Facebook’s News Feed
have been contested by those who believe that a focus on posts
that encourage engagement could amplify the spread of
engagement-triggering hoaxes and conspiracy theories.291 Even
though Facebook has committed to the provision of “high
quality” news to mitigate that possibility, its reliance on
crowdsourcing source legitimacy from its users has been
criticized.292 And the deprioritization of news from media
organizations might have “extinction-level” consequences for
some small or niche news purveyors.293
A more optimistic narrative is also possible, however.
Social media companies are doubtless sensitive to how their
users and advertisers perceive them.294 To the extent that
Facebook users feel manipulated by an onslaught of “fake
news” on the platform, there is likely to be a dip in trust and a
corresponding reputational impact on the company. In fact,
several Facebook shareholders have attempted to use corporate
law rules to recommend shareholder proposals requesting that
Facebook report to the shareholders on the company’s efforts to
address the problem of “fake news.”295 In addition to Facebook
291

See, e.g., Matthew Ingram, Facebook Changes Could Help the Media Kick its Algorithm
Addiction, COLUM. J. REV. (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.cjr.org/innovations/facebook-changes-news-feed.php;
292
See, e.g., Berhnard Clemm, Facebook Wants Its Users to Drive out Fake News. Here’s
the Problem with That, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/01/facebookwants-to-drive-out-fake-news-by-having-users-rate-news-outlets-credibility-heres-theproblem-with-that/?utm_term=.5feb64a79ff1 (explaining that the “reliability of the
“trusted sources” measure is dubious, [because] people in superficial surveys of this
kind often indicate trust in fake sources that have familiar and vaguely credible
names [and because] partisan Facebook users with a high interest in promoting
“their” media could bias the results”).
293
Matthew Ingram, Facebook Changes Could Help the Media Kick its Algorithm
Addiction, COLUM. J. REV., (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.cjr.org/innovations/facebook-changes-news-feed.php (quoting Mother
Jones Senior Editor Ben Dreyfuss). Jonah Engel Bromwich & Matthew Haag,
Facebook Is Changing. What Does That Mean for Your News Feed?, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/technology/facebook-news-feedchanges.html (describing impact on brands and publishers).
294
It is instructive in this regard that Google’s parent company, Alphabet, recently
identified fake news as a reputational business risk. Jillian D’Onfro, Google Now Lists
Fake News and ‘Objectionable Content’ as Risks to its Business, MSN (Feb. 6, 2018, 3:23
PM), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/technologyinvesting/google-now-listsfake-news-and-objectionable-content-as-risks-to-its-business/ar-BBIMTqe; see also
Renee DiResta, There are Bots. Look Around., RIBBONFARM (May 23, 2017),
https://www.ribbonfarm.com/2017/05/23/there-are-bots-look-around/
(“Becoming hosts of unchecked disinformation campaigns negatively impacts the
three things businesses care most about: top line revenue, downstream profit, and
mitigating risk. It will ultimately destroy the value of their networks.”).
295
Amy Lee Rosen, Shareholders Demand Google and Facebook Report on Fake News
Policies, CONG. QUARTERLY, (Feb. 3, 2017), 2017 WL 460653. But see Hasen, supra
note 10, at 227 (noting that shareholder activism has thus far been unsuccessful).
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users, brands that have advertised on Facebook have their own
reputations to consider. Such advertisers have been increasingly
vocal in refusing to have their ads run next to objectionable
content.296 In order to retain such advertisers, Facebook has
economic incentives to tweak its programmatic ad-buying
algorithms to reduce the likelihood of embedding brands’ ads in
“fake news” or other commercially undesirable content.
Furthermore, to the extent that social bots play a significant
role in the dissemination of “fake news” soon after it is
published, attempts to reveal and thus curb bot accounts might
be a useful step in tackling the “fake news” problem.297
Another, more inchoate, element is the question of
personal commitment to improvement on the part of the new
platform lords. For example, media reports suggest that
Facebook’s Zuckerberg, after an initial period of denial about
Facebook’s role in political discourse, has revised his “personal
techno-optimism” and made a personal commitment that
Facebook “fix the problems swirling around it[.]”298 Arguably,
Facebook’s decision knowingly to adopt a News Feed strategy
that would lead users to leave Facebook and have a downward
impact on the company’s share price299 indicates a more serious
commitment to experimenting with ways to contain “fake
news” and improve discourse online.300 At a minimum, the fact
that the new media landscape is dotted with billionaire
saviors301 should prompt an expanded and more complex
analysis of corporate incentives.
296

See, e.g., Sapna Maheshwari, Facebook Moves to Keep Ads From Running on
Objectionable Videos, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/media/facebook-ads.html?_r=0.
297
See Shao et al., supra note 54.
298
Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 263.
299
Zuckerberg Facebook Post, supra note 278 (describing projected impact on time
spent by users on Facebook); Edoardo Maggio & Matt Weinberger, Facebook's Stock
is Dropping After it Announced That it's Making Big Changes to its News Feed, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2018 7:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/facebooksstock-dropping-following-news-feed-announcement-of-the-changes-its-making-to-thenews-feed-2018-1 (describing impact on stock).
300
The point here is not to laud or criticize any of the particular approaches
Facebook has been taking with respect to the proliferation of “fake news.” Nor is it
to suggest that Zuckerberg’s expressed commitments are entirely altruistic and
unrelated to promoting long-term profit-maximizing business and legal strategies. It
is to argue that allowing for—and studying the results of—such experimentation
could bear some fruit in the “fake news” containment strategy.
301
See Ryan Chittum, Jeff Bezos’ Landmark Purchase of the Washington Post, COLUM. J.
REV. (Aug. 5, 2013),
https://archives.cjr.org/the_audit/jeff_bezoss_landmark_purchase.php (“We’ve
now officially entered the Billionaire Savior phase of the newspaper collapse—for
good or ill.”); see also Alex Pareene, Billionaires Gone Wild, COLUM. J. REV. (Winter
2018), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/rich-journalism-media.php (criticizing a
media landscape operating pursuant to the whims of the new “press barons”).
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With respect to its new approach to the News Feed,
Facebook may be attempting to shift from a strategy of
prohibiting “fake news” as such to a strategy designed to crowd
out “fake news” through personalized sharing of high quality,
trusted content.302 Such an approach might be more effective
than a directly prohibitive approach if Facebook develops user
surveys designed to assess user trust in a granular and
sophisticated way.303 For example, questions that seek to
determine the basis of user trust—whether the user trust is
based on content or aligned political/ideological commitments
or group identity or emotional reactions—could provide a rich
picture of what sources are trusted and why. As has already
been noted, the “trusted sources” metric’s dangers could be
neutralized by “adjusting for the absolute level of
familiarity.”304 It is not impossible that the wisdom of the
crowd—if carefully collected and intelligently analyzed—could
provide a path to better quality information on social media.
Facebook’s News Feed modification might also have
some beneficial effects on publishers.305 Shifting some news
consumption directly to publishers themselves might offer the
possibility of enhanced reputational branding by press outlets.306
Moreover, as the new Facebook News Feed strategy reduces
302

See Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 263 (“For the past year, Facebook has
been developing algorithms to hammer publishers whose content is fake; now it’s
trying to elevate what’s good.”).
303
Of course, this would not be the case if Facebook simply used the two question
survey that the company is reportedly proposing to use in assessing its users’ trust in
news sources. See Shan Wang, Facebook’s trust survey, which will help determine
News Feed ranking, is two questions. But it’s not as simple as it sounds.
NEIMANLAB (Jan. 25, 2018 12:25 PM),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/01/facebooks-trust-survey-which-will-helpdetermine-news-feed-ranking-is-two-questions-but-its-not-as-simple-as-it-sounds/
(describing the survey and the fact that responses will be used in conjunction with
other user data). Moreover, if Facebook continues to eschew any role in making
editorial decisions—either because the company is afraid of being accused of
leftward bias, see Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 263, or because it does not
want to become the world’s most powerful censor, see Samidh Chakrabarti, Hard
Questions: What Effect Does Social Media Have on Democracy?, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM
(Jan. 22, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/01/effect-social-mediademocracy/ (“[W]e don’t want to be the arbiters of truth”)—it might be difficult to
ensure that high quality news will in fact crowd out the junk news that undermines
democracy.
304
Clemm, supra note 292.
305
Reportedly, Facebook is “experimenting with giving publishers more control over
paywalls and allowing them to feature their logos more prominently to reestablish
the brand identities that Facebook flattenend years ago.” Thompson & Vogelstein,
supra note 263.
306
Admittedly, that may be better news for “traditional news brands than for digitalnative ones.” Joshua Benton, If Facebook Stops Putting News in Front of Readers,
Will Readers Bother to go Looking for It?, NIEMANLAB (Jan 12, 2018, 12:00 PM),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/01/if-facebook-stops-putting-news-in-front-ofreaders-will-readers-bother-to-go-looking-for-it/.
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publishers’ incentives to tailor their news content to the adsupported, click-based model that makes Facebook tick, they
may recommit to an exploration of the kind of serious
journalism that promotes democracy and the public interest.307
Given that total elimination of “fake news” on social
media is an unattainable goal, Facebook representatives have
claimed relative success. For example, Facebook recently
asserted that it had successfully minimized the dissemination of
misinformation during the German election of late September
2017.308 Previously, the company had employed various
initiatives to reduce the dissemination of false information
during the most recent French election and the U.K.’s Brexit
vote.309 Facebook has also claimed that “future impressions on
stories labeled false by third-party fact checkers dropped by 80
percent—ostensible proof that its fact-checking system works,

307

See Jason Koebler, Facebook is Deprioritizing Our Stories. Good., MOTHERBOARD
(Jan. 11, 2018, 9:32 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/zmqgn4/facebook-algorithm-newsfeed-change. The question of how to fund excellence in journalism in today’s
economic climate is beyond the scope of this Article. Several possibilities can be
mentioned, however. There has been a move toward paywalls of various kinds for
digital media, and Facebook has recently changed its algorithms to recognize
publisher paywalls. See Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 263; Natalie Jarvey,
Facebook to Launch Publisher Paywalls, Video News Section, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/facebook-launchpublisher-paywalls-video-news-section-1084144. Suggestions to create incentives for
subscriptions in the U.K. include tax deductions for media subscriptions. Amanda
Meade, Journalism Inquiry Recommends Tax Deductions for News Media Subscriptions,
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2018 10:44 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/feb/06/journalism-inquiryrecommends-tax-deductions-for-news-media-subscriptions. In addition, Rupert
Murdoch recently proposed that Facebook pay publishers for use of their trusted
content (along a cable television carriage model). Press Release, Statement of Rupert
Murdoch, Executive Chariman of News Corp, on a Carriage Fee for Trusted
Publishers (Jan. 22, 2018), https://newscorp.com/2018/01/22/statement-of-rupertmurdoch-executive-chairman-of-news-corp-on-a-carriage-fee-for-trusted-publishers/;
Maya Kosoff, Rupert Murdoch to Mark Zuckerberg: Shut Up, Pay Me, VANITY FAIR (Jan.
22, 2018, 6:38 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/rupert-murdochto-mark-zuckerberg-shut-up-pay-me. A recent news report suggests that Facebook
would not be unalterably opposed to such a scheme. Kurt Wagner & Theodore
Schleifer, Here Are the Ways Facebook Said it’s Trying to Help Publishers, RECODE (Feb.
12, 2018, 8:23 PM), https://www.recode.net/2018/2/12/17005058/facebook-helppublishers-news-feed-algorithm-campbell-brown-adam-mosseri-code-media
(“[F]acebook would not rule out paying publishers for content.”).
308
See Jeremy Kahn, Facebook Touts Success in Fighting Fake News in German Election,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2017, 1:53 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-27/facebook-touts-successfighting-fake-news-in-german-election.
309
See, e.g., Natasha Lomas, Google and Facebook Partner for Anti-fake News Drive During
French Election, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/06/google-and-facebook-partner-for-anti-fakenews-drive-during-french-election/.
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albeit not perfectly.”310 Admittedly, Facebook’s partner factchecking organizations complain that a lack of transparency by
the company makes it difficult for them to assess accurately
whether their fact-checking is in fact having a measurable
impact on the dissemination of disinformation on Facebook.311
And a recent unpublished working paper by Pennycook and
Rand suggests that while tagging news stories as disputed led to
a reduction in their perceived accuracy, the effect was
“modest.”312 Still, other studies reveal more optimistic results,313
suggesting that more work needs to be done.
Nevertheless, although success is uncertain,314 and
although the very structure of the social media platforms’
economic model exerts counter-pressures, there are at least two
reasons to believe that the platforms will take the effort
seriously. First, such initiatives are taking place very much in
the public eye and against a backdrop of both domestic and
global regulatory interventions.315 Second, if the “fake news”
problem is understood not just as a problem for democracy,316
but as an economic problem for markets as well, there may be
more consistent commercial as well as consumer pressure on
the platforms to persevere with self-regulatory efforts. The
310

Kosoff, supra note 286. But see Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, supra note 60 (disputing
effectiveness of fact-checking during U.S. presidential election contest).
311
See Kosoff, supra note 286.
312
Pennycook & Rand, supra note 287.
313
See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan, Why the Fact-Checking At Facebook Needs to be Checked,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/upshot/whythe-fact-checking-at-facebook-needs-to-be-checked.html (reporting findings that “the
effects of Facebook-style ‘disputed’ banners on the perceived accuracy of false
headlines are larger than those Mr. Pennycook and Mr. Rand observed. The
proportion of respondents rating a false headline as ‘somewhat’ or ‘very accurate’ in
our study decreased to 19 percent with the standard Facebook ‘disputed’ banner,
from 29 percent in the unlabeled condition. It goes down even further, to 16 percent,
when the warning instead states that the headline is ‘rated false.’”).
314
See, e.g., Anderson & Rainie, supra note 21 (reflecting split on experts’ views on the
tractability of the fake news problem).
315
See, e.g., Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 263 (describing Facebook’s
sensitivity to the prospect of regulation).
316
Casting the problem as principally one for democracy can enable business
corporations (advertisers and otherwise) which are wary of seeming to take partisan
political positions to sit out the political “fake news” brouhaha and simply leave
policing to the platforms. That might be the case for government officials as well,
particularly those concerned about being seen as engaging in censorship. Those who
believe that their political fortunes would be enhanced by seeming to act to control
“fake news” might propose regulatory moves unlikely to pass constitutional muster.
And focusing on the audience—suggesting that the only true solution to the “fake
news” problem is information literacy by the electorate—would surely be seen as an
attractive way of diminishing responsibility for other participants in the
dissemination of “fake news.” To the extent that “fake news” is cast as an
exclusively political problem, then, many information market participants might be
tempted to mouth platitudes about the democratic dangers of the phenomenon while
doing very little as a practical matter.
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existence of multiple nodes of pressure could be useful in
promoting serious attempts to tackle the problem. “Fake news”
today—and, more worryingly, tomorrow—is likely to disrupt
not only elections and governments, but also markets. A clear
recognition of that reality might help put pressure on the
platforms and the rest of corporate America to engage the
problem of “fake news” with seriousness.
b. Desirability
The reality of the platforms’ “fake news” initiatives
makes almost irrelevant the question whether we should
“outsource” the solution to our most important democratic
challenge to private companies with no governmental nor
fiduciary duties to the public and whose efforts are likely to be
shrouded from public view. Still, we might worry, in
characterizing themselves not as media companies but as
simple transmitters or disseminators of information, social
media platforms have told us a fundamental truth about their
origin stories and their commitments. They did not rise from a
journalistic past; they do not hew principally to journalistic
values; they do not see themselves as the guarantors of an
important constitutional tradition.317 Using algorithms injects
the issue of hidden skews and censorship.318 Algorithmic
decision making outsources gatekeeping and censorship to AIpowered filters whose decision making is neither transparent
nor accountable.319 And, as suggested by the story that
Facebook employees admitted to routine suppression of
conservative news last year,320 human involvement may have
negative consequences—including implicit bias.
Of course, the imperfection of platform self-regulation
begs the question “compared to what”? Could direct attempts
317

See Bell & Owen, supra note 147.
Recently, progressive news outlets have criticized the platforms’ efforts to reduce
“fake news” on the ground that the adjusted algorithm in fact has significantly
reduced web traffic to progressive and radical news sites. See, e.g., Don Hazen,
Google’s Threat to Democracy Hits AlterNet Hard, ALTERNET (Sept. 28, 2017, 9:49
AM), https://www.alternet.org/media/editorial-googles-threat-democracy-hitsalternet-hard (referencing negative impact on AlterNet and dozens of other leftleaning or radical outlets); see also Bell & Owen, supra note 147.
319
See Bell & Owen, supra note 147.
320
See, e.g., Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed
Conservative News, GIZMODO (May 9, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://gizmodo.com/formerfacebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006; see also Julia Angwin
& Hannes Grasseger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men from Hate
Speech But Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA (Jun. 28, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internaldocuments-algorithms (discussing Facebook’s rules for deciding when content
should be disallowed on the platform).
318
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by government to censor “fake news” be worse, if President
Trump’s war against the press is an object lesson? 321 Would
legislation be able to neutralize the concerns about private
censorship, given that the platforms would have to
operationalize the regulations anyway? Is it likely that even
with direct government regulation, the increasingly central
information intermediaries would not be pressed into modes of
what Balkin has called “new school” speech regulation?322 We
should not imagine an ideal world in making policy choices.
In light of doubts about platform self-regulation, perhaps
the platforms’ inability to eliminate “fake news” might in fact
be a feature, not a bug.323 Even if self-regulatory efforts could be
effective, an expansive metric for effectiveness in this context
would be undesirable. Successful attempts to eliminate “fake
news” completely would inevitably be overinclusive, censoring
much content that should still be part of the public
conversation.324 And to the extent that observers could identify
when platform self-regulation appeared to be leading to skews,
publicity could have corrective effects.325
One reason to have some hope in the self-regulation
model is that the process of attempting to tackle “fake news”
can make it difficult for the platforms to deny the fundamental
editorial role they have adopted. A recognition of their role as
media companies can trigger more serious attention to
journalistic norms. As Jack Balkin has put it, the increasingly
elaborate private governance of speech
is by no means guaranteed to be free speech
friendly. From the standpoint of free speech
321

But see Julie Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
322
Balkin, supra note 25; Jack Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014).
323
It is in that sense that I worry about the suggestion that the platforms affirmatively
take on the role of directly and explicitly taking positions about fake news stories.
See Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42, at 30–31 (arguing for an
extension of Morozov’s alerting model and asking them to “leverage[e] their
credibility against fake news). Should Facebook put itself in the position of being a
truth arbiter, especially as it sees itself as a tech company rather than a press organ?
Verstraete et al. recognize the drawbacks to such a proposal. Id. at 31–2.
324
PEN America has recently made a similar argument. See Faking News, supra note
44.
325
For example, publicity about the reduction of web traffic to progressive news sites
as a result of algorithmic tinkering could lead to negotiations with Facebook and
potentially helpful revisions to the relevant algorithms. Admittedly, this is an
optimistic interpretation, but it is one grounded on the importance to Facebook of its
reputation with its users and advertisers. Admittedly, the effectiveness of the
consumer-irritation constraint depends to a great extent on whether there are other
competitive options to which users can switch.
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values, the best solution would be for large
international infrastructure owners and social
media platforms to change their self-percetion.
Ideally, they would come to understand
themselves as a new kind of media company,
with obligations to protect the global public good
of a free Internet, and to preserve and extend the
emerging global system of freedom of expression.
Defenders of democratic values should work
hard to emphasize the social responsibilities of
digital infrastructure companies and help them
both to understand and to accept their
constitutive role in the emerging global public
sphere.326
Such social responsibilities suggest the need for
enhanced transparency—both with respect to disclosures about
disseminated content and disclosures about the platforms’ own
processes.327 For example, including sponsorship disclosure
requirements for political advertising purchasers might help put
the brake on some fabricated news viralization. By analogy, the
Federal Communications Act requires the disclosure of the
identities of purchasers of political airtime.328 Even if there were
legal roadblocks to adopting such a disclosure regime
legislatively, voluntary adoption should present far less of a

326

Balkin, supra note 256.
Admittedly, transparency with respect to Facebook’s own algorithms presents a
complicated question. On the one hand, enhanced transparency could help outside
observers analyze platform activities both as to effectiveness and as to unexpected
consequences—thereby supporting accountability. See Faking News, supra note 44
(suggesting the need for greater transparency). On the other hand, both economic
competitiveness concerns and concerns about not revealing too much information to
strategic agents attempting to end-run platform initiatives suggests that platforms like
Facebook will not willingly embrace radical algorithmic transparency. But short of
that, public pressure can increase the scope of what the platforms make public. And
they have begun committing to some kinds of transparency already, as noted in text.
See Balkin, supra note 25 (framing of transparency obligations for platforms as akin to
“due process”). Former FCC Chair Tom Wheeler has recently suggested, as a
middle-ground approach, that social media platforms be required to adopt an open
application software interface enabling third parties to build software to monitor the
results of social media algorithms. Tom Wheeler, How to Monitor Fake News, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/opinion/monitorfake-news.html (arguing that an open application programming interface would
“threaten neither a social media platform’s intellectual property not the privacy of its
individual users” while allowing third party monitoring).
328
For a discussion of political ad disclosure requirements for broadcasting, see Lili
Levi, Plan B for Campaign Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American Politics After
Citizens United? 61 CATH. L. REV. 97 (2011).
327
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problem. Mark Zuckerberg has already publicly promised
enhanced Facebook disclosures, as has Twitter.329
To be sure, the disclosure recommendation will raise the
usual questions about the effectiveness of disclosure regimes.330
Still, there is reason to suspect that disclosure is actually likely
to be effective in the “fake news” context, where anonymity is
one element in hiding attempts to manipulate people’s
opinions. Whatever the justifications for permitting anonymous
speech in a First Amendment regime, strategic uses of “fake
news” to manipulate vulnerable audiences cannot reasonably
be included among them. A deeper problem may be a practical
obstacle to effectiveness of such disclosure requirements. This is
because of the ever-present likelihood that strategic “fake news”
purveyors will find ways to game such disclosure requirements,
inter alia by using corporate shells and anodyne-sounding group
names or avoiding explicit ad buys as such. Requiring the
platforms to search further, behind the names, to identify those
“really” responsible for the content would present both
practical and doctrinal difficulties. Nevertheless, news
organizations and other third party entities can help unearth the
true identities of strategic buyers of “fake news” spots (as, for
example, they did with respect to the Kremlin connections of
the shadowy Russian groups paying to post anti-Clinton ads on
Facebook). There is also an argument that beyond obviously
fabricated factual matter, the breadth of the notion of “fake
news” is such that it would be difficult to distinguish among
different kinds of “fake news.” Be that as it may, a general
disclosure requirement for the purchases of political ads would
not require the platforms to make such fine distinctions.331

329

See, e.g., Alex Heath, Twitter Says t Will Make All Its Ads Public, And Share Who is
Behind Them, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 24, 3017, 4:00 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-will-make-all-ads-public-share-how-theyare-targeted-2017-10.
330
For cites to disclosure skeptics and an argument for corporate-level disclosure in
native advertising contexts, see Levi, supra note 153.
331
To be sure, one of the difficulties in this area is that identifying a post as a political
ad is likely to be problematic, at least on the margins. In other words, as evidenced
by some of the pro-Trump ads purchased on Facebook by Russian interests, the
content may not specifically name a political candidate and may just consist of policy
recommendations or observations consistent with one or another candidate’s
platform. Even though this is a real limitation for the disclosure approach, this
Article does not claim that sponsorship disclosure is a cure-all with respect to “fake
news” writ large. The fact that there will be “fake news” ads which sponsorship
disclosure will not reveal does not mean that we should abandon the beneficial
effects of sponsorship disclosure in the numerous situations in which it might be
helpful.
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c. Regulatory Possibilities
Self-regulatory efforts are often undertaken in the
shadow of, and to forestall, possible regulatory creep.332
Unsurprisingly, “fake news” has generated calls for reform
from people spanning the political spectrum.333 Proposals range
from state legislation prohibiting “fake news,” to pending
federal legislation requiring sponsorship disclosure, and to a
variety of scholarly recommendations for legal responses to
“fake news.”
Domestically, a number of states have considered or
passed laws seeking to prohibit false statements in political
campaign speech.334 New federal legislation attempting to curb
“fake news” is in the offing: John McCain recently joined
Democratic Senators Warner and Klobuchar in introducing the
Honest Ads Act, a bill that would, inter alia, extend FEC
disclosure regulations for political ads to Internet ads.335
Scholars have argued that the platforms’ approach to
“fake news” could be regulated pursuant to election law.336
There has also been discussion of expanded administrative
regulation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),337 which
has extensive jurisdiction to regulate deceptive practices and
has already shut down “fake news” sites in commercial
332

See, e.g., Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J.
711 (1999) (on self-regulation in broadcasting).
333
Admittedly, the “fake news” charge has been deployed more consistently by
conservatives against what they take to be the partisanship and liberal slant of the
mainstream media (such as the broadcast networks, CNN, national newspapers such
as the New York Times and the Washington Post). But liberals as well have been
criticizing conservative outlets for peddling “fake news.” Moreover, both liberals
and conservatives deploy the “fake news” trope when they are trying to make a point
about political slant, rather than mere factual fabrication. It seems likely that both
conservatives and liberals would dislike “fake news” as factual fabrication (even if
they did not agree as to its salience in electoral politics).
334
See Catherine Ross, Ministry Of Truth: Why Law Can’t Stop Prevarications, Bullshit,
And Straight-Out Lies In Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 367, 383-88
(2018) (discussing legislation in 16 states to prohibit lies in campaign speech). The
Supreme Court has not opined on the constitutionality of such legislation. (The
Court only addressed justiciability in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct.
2334 (2014), which involved the Ohio legislation of this kind). “Lower and state
courts have regularly overturned state campaign deception statutes.” Ross, supra.
335
See, e.g., Byron Tau, Proposed “Honest Ads Act” Seeks More Disclosure About Political
Ads, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2017, 5:12 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proposed-honest-ads-act-seeks-more-disclosureabout-online-political-ads-1508440260; see also Balkin, supra note 25 (arguing that the
First Amendment should not be read to preclude regulation of information
intermediaries in connection with algorithmic nuisances). The Honest Ads Act
would amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
336
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 10, at 220–21.
337
See, e.g., Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42 (discussing and
questioning suggestion that the FTC could regulate fake news under its statutory
authority).

303

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

contexts. As the FCC has reportedly been receiving complaints
of “fake news” from television watchers,338 there may also be an
analogy in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)’s
news distortion and hoax regulations.339 A number of scholars
have also recommended varying degrees of roll-back for the
social media platforms’ immunity from liability under Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act for content they
simply transmit and do not operate or control.340 Other legal
approaches focus on attentive enforcement of already-existing
individual causes of action, such as defamation actions against
“fake news” providers.341 Still others focus on constitutional
338

Jonathan Peters, TV Viewers Have Been Sending ‘Fake News’ Complaints to the FCC,
COLUM. J. REV. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/tvviewers-have-been-sending-fake-news-complaints-to-the-fcc.php. The agency
operates under the extremely broad statutory mandate of regulating in the “public
interest, convenience and necessity.” Pursuant to its broad statutory powers, the
Commission adopted a policy regulating news distortion in the broadcast medium.
339
For discussions of the FCC’s news distortion policy and its limits, see Lili Levi,
Reporting the Official Truth: The Revival of the FCC's News Distortion Policy, 78 WASH. U.
L. Q. 1005 (2000); see also Chad Raphael, The FCC’s Broadcast News Distortion Rules:
Regulating By Drooping Eyelid, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 485 (2001).
340
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:
Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity (Univ. Md. Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2017–22, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007720; see also Olivier
Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2017). This is contested
territory. In addition to questions about what precise benefits would likely flow with
respect to “fake news” by a repeal of immunity, recent scholarship suggests that
limiting immunity would inhibit some viable attempts to combat “fake news” (such
as through crowd-sourced presentation of accurate information via platforms such as
Wikimedia). See, e.g., Jacob Rogers, Wikipedia and Intermediary Immunity: Supporting
Sturdy Crowd Systems for Producing Reliable Information, 127 YALE L.J.F. 358 (2017).
The Identifying and Countering Fake News report also took the position recently that we
should consider expanding legal protections for Internet platforms, rather than
reducing such immunities, to encourage them to pursue editorial functions.
Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42, at 22–23.
341
Thus, for example, and depending on the content of the statement, the subject of a
fake news report might be able to sue the fake news creator for defamation. See
generally David O. Klein & Joshua R. Wueller, Fake News: A Legal Perspective, 20 J.
INTERNET L. 1 (2017) (providing a bird’s eye view of various possible legal claims,
including defamation). The traditional defamation lawsuit is unlikely to have much
of a constraining effect on fake news, however. First, many fake news items are
couched in language that would skirt liability under state defamation laws. This can
be because the claims are unlikely to be deemed defamatory, or because the speaker
can claim protection under the constitutional privilege that requires the plaintiff to
prove actual malice on the part of the speaker. Second, at least some of the
originators of even defamatory fake news are not in the United States and are not
subject to the jurisdiction of the US courts. Third, individual lawsuits, even if
possible, are expensive to wage. It would be unrealistic to expect individuals with
limited means to serve as the front guard of society’s efforts to stop the widespread
problem of fake news. In any event, the defamation suit would not undo the harm of
the original statement; it would simply offer the plaintiff damages, if successful.
Fourth, the true harm of any item of fake news is accomplished by its dissemination
and amplification. The problem is that Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act appears to protect those information intermediaries that effectuate that
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challenges to government actors’ incitement of violence and
discrimination to silence counterspeakers.342
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address these
regulatory possibilities in any depth.343 It should be noted that
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
and Expression and representatives of the OSCE, OAS, and
ACHPR issued a joint declaration concerning “fake news” this
year, noting major concerns about the negative effects of
disinformation, but limiting extensive regulatory responses on
freedom of expression grounds.344 With respect to pending
federal legislation, Goodman & Wajert have recently argued
that the Honest Ads Act “is worth implementing because it
could foster a culture of transparency . . . .”345 The existence of
such regulation—as well as Congressional attention to the use
of Facebook by Russian interests seeking to influence the U.S.
presidential election—must surely have been a factor in Mark
Zuckerberg’s promise of enhanced transparency with respect to

dissemination and amplification. For a discussion of defamation standards as
applied to social media, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & RonNell Andersen Jones, Of
Reasonable Readers and Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 155 (2016).
In a new development attempting to address Trump’s own “fake news,” a
number of law professors filed a complaint against Counselor to the President
Kellyanne Conway with the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel for the District of
Columbia for violation of the Rule of Ethics that deems it professional misconduct
for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraid, deceit or
misrepresentation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017).
342
See, e.g., Norton, supra note 103.
343
The viability of attempts to regulate “fake news” under current law has been
discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 10, at 216–21 (discussing election
law). With respect to the FCC, the limits of the agency’s news distortion policy and
the limited application of its hoax policy to radio hoaxes some time ago, not to
mention the fact that even the broad jurisdictional mandate of the Communications
Act of 1934 is limited to broadcast regulation, suggest that the Commission would
not seek to apply either of those policies in an attempt to regulate “fake news” on the
Internet. On the FCC’s regulation of broadcast hoaxes, see Justin Levine, A History
and Analysis of the Federal Communications Commission’s Response to Radio Broadcast
Hoaxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2000). As for FTC regulation, the Commission’s
statutory mandate gives it jurisdiction to regulate deceptive advertising in connection
with the sale of products—a limit that might exclude at least some political “fake
news” stories.
Nor does the Article address the Verstraete et al. suggestion that a trusted media
entity such as the BBC create a non-ad-supported social network that leverages the
trusted entity’s “media expertise to make judgments about news content.”
Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42, at 26 (itself noting the limitations
of this kind of potential solution).
344
See Joint Declaration, supra note 22.
345
Ellen P. Goodman & Lyndsey Wajert, The Honest Ads Act Won’t End Social
Media Disinformation, But It’s A Start (Nov. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064451.
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the identities of purchasers of political ads on Facebook.346 Still,
such legislation invites a cost/benefit assessment in light of the
limited scope of its effectiveness and the breadth and vagueness
of some of its terms.347
Moreover, in its current reading, the First Amendment
is likely to prove a stumbling block with respect to at least some
of the potential regulatory solutions to the “fake news” problem
in the United States.348 Despite decades of Supreme Court dicta
indicating the low value of false factual speech,349 since United
States v. Alvarez, false speech now no longer seems to be seen as
plainly unprotected by the First Amendment as it was
previously.350 Although the decision was fractured and its full
implications uncertain, it is certain that lies no longer sit
completely outside the protections of the First Amendment.351
In keeping with that approach, lower federal courts have struck
down state laws attempting to regulate false political campaign
speech.352 To be sure, Alvarez does not establish that strict
346

Id.; see also Tony Romm & Kurt Wagner, Facebook is Taking a Stricter Stance on
Political Advertising Ahead of Its Testimony to the U.S. Congress Next Week, RECODE (Oct.
27, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/10/27/16555926/facebookpolitical-advertising-ads-2016-russia. On Facebook’s fear of regulation, see
Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 263.
347
Even Goodman & Wajert, who support the Honest Ads Act, recognize its
potentially limited effectiveness and the dangers of some of its vague language:
If the bill passes, its effectiveness will come down to how the
platforms and the FEC interpret the broad definition of “political
advertising” and the FEC’s appetite for enforcement. A lax
approach will mean that nothing will change. An overlyaggressive approach could frustrate free speech objectives,
implicate privacy concerns, and push the most problematic
spurious political advertising inuto unpaid forms of
communication . . . [The bill’s] definitions are vague and will
have to be narrowed through regulatory interpretation. The bill
will only have a marginal impact—the extent of which will
depend heavily on the will of the online platforms themselvers—
but impact at the edges can begin to build a culture of disclosure.
Goodman & Wajert, supra note 346.
348
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 10, at 216–26; Wu, supra note 14.
349
See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”).
350
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). In Alvarez, a plurality of the Court
struck down the Stolen Valor Act (which made false claims of the award of military
medals a crime). Id. at 730 (plurality opinion). The result was to protect under the
aegis of the First Amendment Alvarez’ bare-faced lies about having been awarded
the Congressional Medal of Honor. Id. at 714, 730.
351
Both the plurality and concurring opinions suggest that even though falsity alone
cannot be punished criminally, the government may regulate false speech when there
is some intent to cause “a legally cognizable harm.” Id. at 719; id. at 734 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see also Chen & Marceau, supra note 170, at 16 (“Alvarez, then, reflects a
turning point: a lie of little or no value and that arguably caused some harm was
nonetheless deemed to protect speech.”).
352
See, e.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014) (striking down
a Minnesota law making the intentional participation in “the preparation,
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scrutiny applies as the standard of review of all government
regulation of lies.353 Still, these doctrinal developments suggest
at a minimum that any attempts to regulate against “fake news”
would be drafted very narrowly and with great care. Query,
then, whether—as a practical matter—self-regulatory efforts by
platforms wouldn’t likely track the sort of regulation that a
mandatory approach sensitive to current First Amendment
doctrine would invoke.
The reality of U.S. constitutional constraints does not
mean, however, that the platforms’ self-regulatory efforts will
proceed without any fear of governmental regulation. This is
not only because of the likelihood that legislators will see
political advantage in proposing regulations regardless of what
courts will make of them, but because information
intermediaries like Facebook and Google are participants in a
global marketplace. To the extent that there are laws in nonU.S. jurisdictions that seek to curtail “fake news,” the
companies’ compliance approach will be taking place in the
shadow of—and will likely be responsive to—non-U.S.
regulation. Some countries have explored extensive regulation
of “fake news” on social media platforms. European
governments, for example, are putting some significant teeth
into these platform self-regulatory efforts.354
dissemination, or broadcast of paid political advertising or campaign material . . .
with respect to the effect of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to . . . promote
or defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or
communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false[]” is a
misdemeanor); Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1257 (Mass. 2015)
(striking down Massachusetts’ false political speech law); Rickert v. State Pub.
Disclosure Comm'n, 168 P.3d 826, 829–31 (Wash. 2007) (striking down
Washington's political false-statements law); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134
S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014) (striking down as unconstitutional Ohio’s false campaign
statements laws on the grounds that they “are content-based restrictions targeting
core political speech that are not narrowly tailored to serve the state's admittedly
compelling interest in conducting fair elections.”). Susan B. Anthony List v. Dreihaus,
which involved an Ohio law that criminalized certain speech in political campaigns,
went up to the Supreme Court on justiciability grounds, and the Court held
unanimously that the petitioners had alleged sufficiently grave injury for Article III
purposes. Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2347; see also Nat Stern, Judicial
Candidates’ Right to Lie, 77 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (noting that at least 18
states penalize false political speech and suggesting that states’ attempts to bar
falsehoods by judicial candidates “stand on tenuous footing and are probably
unconstitutional.”).
353
The decision was “fractured[,] . . . resulting in a legal framework that remains
uncertain.” Chen & Marceau, supra note 170, at 16; see also id. at 43.
354
Germany, for example, adopted an Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in
Social Networks. For an English translation of the Act, see An Act to Improve
Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks, BMJV,
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG
_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). Pursuant to this
Act, social networks could be fined up to 50 million Euros for failure to take down
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Still, domestically, the modern First Amendment would
likely stand in the way of particularly invasive content-based
regulation of “fake speech.”355 It is true that liberal and
progressive constitutional scholars have identified and criticized
the Roberts Court’s libertarian First Amendment.356 Recently,
prominent scholars have raised the question whether the
information glut enabled by the Internet and today’s radically
different modes of coercive control over political speech create
an environment that renders the traditionally identified core
focus of the First Amendment increasingly irrelevant.357 Such
unlawful material (apparently including fake news) within the prescribed statutory
period of 24 hours for “manifestly” unlawful content, and 7 days for other unlawful
content. Id.; see also Anya Schiffrin, How Europe Fights Fake News, COLUM. J. REV.
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/watchdog/europe-fights-fake-news-facebooktwitter-google.php. In the United Kingdom, the Committee on Standards in Public
Life, which advises the prime minister on ethics, recently released a report calling for
legislation to impose liability on social media platforms for hosting illegal content.
See Rajeev Syal, Make Facebook Liable For Content, Says Report On UK Election
Intimidation, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2017, 7:01 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/dec/13/make-facebook-liable-forcontent-says-report-on-uk-electionintimidation?utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=Media+briefi
ng+2016&utm_term=256396&subid=3924084&CMP=ema_546. French President
Emmanuel Macron has also sought legislation to fight online “fake news.” PascalEmmanuel Gobry, France’s ‘Fake News’ Law Won’t Work, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2018,
11:44 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-14/fake-newsfrance-s-proposed-law-won-t-work. That 11 members of the U.K. Parliament came
to Washington DC to “grill witnesses from U.S.-based technology companies as part
of an inquiry into “fake news” by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee”
surely sent notable signals to the heads of these companies (such as Google and
Facebook). See Evelyn Douek, U.K. Committee Grills Big Tech on Fake News,
LAWFARE (Feb. 13, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/uk-committeegrills-big-tech-fake-news (describing hearing).
355
Progressive scholars claim that modern First Amendment doctrine does not help,
and indeed could be used to evade, proper responses to the “fake news” crisis—
allowing the First Amendment to stand as a barrier to attempts to improve the health
of the information environment. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 14; see also Helen Norton,
The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73 (2015) (describing the limits
to legal challenges to government’s destructive speech); Norton, supra note 103.
356
See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016);
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L.
REV. 1915 (2016); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205 (2014); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment
Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199 (2015). For an early diagnosis of
“ideological drift” in First Amendment doctrine, see Balkin, supra note 25; see also
Wu, supra note 14 (questioning whether a First Amendment focused on government
censorship in an information-poor world is well-adapted to the digital context of
infoglut and weaponized cheap speech used as a tool of speech control). For an
attempt to unpack the meaning of the First Amendment Lochnerism charge, see
Wasserman, supra note 175. For an argument in support of information
libertarianism, see Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information
Libertarianism, 105 CAL. L. REV. 335 (2017).
357
See, e.g., Wu, supra note 14 (focusing on the scarcity not of speech but of attention,
and concerned about the skewing impacts of the “cheap speech” enabled by
technology enables). For an excellent critique of the consequences of “cheap
speech” on the Internet, see Hasen, supra note 10, at 202–16. Recently, Jack Balkin
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skeptics would find willing ears in progressive public
movements that seek to balance commitments to free speech
with other constitutional and human values. These scholars’
skepticism about the modern First Amendment’s speech
doctrine is joined by many citizens.358
While there is much appeal in these arguments, “caution
is in order”359—it is also important to note that the “fake news”
phenomenon is currently being used as an excuse or cover to
justify repressive speech initiatives by authoritarian leaders
around the world (including Donald Trump in the United
States). Speech management called for by “fake news” can take
(and has taken) many forms. Widespread global calls to
eliminate “fake news” have generated a spectrum of direct and
indirect speech control initiatives around the world.
Governments have used concerns about “fake news” to justify
direct crackdowns on speech.360 On the indirect front, speechsuppressing activity online has increased dramatically, with
troll armies, information flooding, and propaganda robots—

has demonstrated that in today’s Algorithmic Society, we face a pluralist model of
speech control, reflecting a struggle among states, information intermediaries and
speakers, and a regime of private governance—all of which stretch beyond the state
censorship focus of pre-digital First Amendment theory. See Balkin, supra note 25;
see also Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for Platform
Governance, 127 YALE L.J.F. 337 (2017).
358
Today, for example, large numbers of young people seem to reject an absolutist
approach to free speech protections, opting instead for views that balance interests in
free speech with concerns about the harms of such free speech. The current debate
over free speech on campus implicates these issues. See, e.g., Free Expression on
Campus: A Survey of U.S. College Students and U.S. Adults, GALLUP (2016),
https://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication_pdfs/FreeSpeech_c
ampus.pdf; see also Debating Free Speech on Campus, BILL OF RIGHTS INST.,
https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/lessonsplans/debating-free-speech-on-campus/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). On the issue of
hate speech, see Jacob Poushter, 40% of Millenials OK with Limiting Speech Offensive to
Minorities, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 20, 2015) http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/11/20/40-of-millennials-ok-with-limiting-speech-offensive-to-minorities/.
359
Hasen, supra note 10, at 216 (“First Amendment doctrine may serve as a bulwark
against censorship and oppression that could be enacted by the government in the
name of preventing ‘fake news.’”).
360
See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Fake News,’ Trump’s Obsession, Is Now a Cudgel for
Strongmen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017, 7:30 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/europe/trump-fake-newsdictators.html; see also William Gallo, Cambodia Threatens Media Outlets, Using Trump
as Justification, VOA (Feb 27, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodiathreatens-media-outlets-using-donald-trump-justification/3742602.html; CPJ
Chairman Says Trump Is Threat To Press Freedom, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS
(Oct. 13, 2016 12:30 PM), https://cpj.org/2016/10/cpj-chairman-says-trump-isthreat-to-press-freedom.php; Jason Schwartz, Trump’s ‘Fake News’ Mantra a Hit with
Despots, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2017 05:03 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/08/trump-fake-news-despots-287129.
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launched by both states and individuals—harassing and seeking
to silence speakers with whom they disagree.361
It is for these reasons that this Article recommends a
shift in the treatment not of free speech, but of the free press, and
an initiative to promote social media platforms’ recognition of
themselves as media companies with public interest
responsibilities.
B. Audience Empowerment—Information Literacy and Improving the
Effectiveness of Corrections
Those who have little confidence in platform selfregulation and doubt the viability of large scale regulatory
interventions in controlling fabricated news might argue that
the real backstop is the news consumer, and that people need to
be given the tools with which to assess information critically.
On this view, the principal answer to the “fake news” problem,
if any, lies with informed and empowered audiences.362 This
approach therefore emphasizes the desirability of media or
information literacy363 to fight “fake news.” Although there is
controversy over the precise meaning of media or information
literacy in application, the general idea is to provide the
audience with the tools to understand the frames, biases, and
inaccuracies in news reports, and to be able to evaluate the
likely truth of factual allegations. A casual search on Google
reveals dozens of new media literacy programs designed to
counteract the harms of “fake news.”364 And arguably no new
law would be required here, as virtually all states have media
literacy in one form or another in their education-oriented
legislation or rules.365 Recent polls show that the public has an
appetite for training on how to find online resources for
trustworthy information.366
The challenges to the notion of media literacy as the
solution to the “fake news” problem, however, all have to do
361

For a recent description of these effects, see Hasen, supra note 10, at 209–16; Wu,
supra note 14.
362
See, e.g., Faking News, supra note 44, at 70–75.
363
I use the terms “media literacy” and “information literacy” interchangeably here.
364
See Search Results for “Media Literacy Fake News”, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/search?q=media+literacy+fake+news&ie=utf-8&oe=utf8&client=firefox-b-1 (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
365
See, e.g., MEDIA LITERACY NOW, https://medialiteracynow.org/your-statelegislation/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (website of media literacy advocacy group
listing legislative developments).
366
See John B. Horrigan & John Gramlich, Many Americans, Especially Blacks and
Hispanics, Are Hungry for Help as They Sort Through Information, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/manyamericans-especially-blacks-and-hispanics-are-hungry-for-help-as-they-sort-throughinformation/.
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with the question of effectiveness in current circumstances.
How will we be able to design media literacy programs that will
work to debunk the “fake news” that is circulating virally on
the Internet? Empirical research has begun to explore that
question, although there is much yet to be studied and
consensus does not yet appear to have been achieved.367 Studies
are already exploring these issues, although more work needs to
be done.368
One obstacle is that, to the extent media literacy
programming is focused on young people in public schools,
existing media literacy programs arguably have not been
particularly effective.369 To the extent that universities are
developing media literacy programs, many different flowers are
growing without any easy way to compare and assess them.370
And these educationally grounded interventions are limited in
their audiences, and do not address voters as a whole.
There is an even more powerful objection to the
traditional type of media literacy approach, however—one that
is being revealed by studies in political science and cognitive

367

See, e.g., Lazer et al., supra note 17; see also Gordon Pennycook, Tyrone Cannon,
& David G. Rand, Implausibility and Illusory Truth: Prior Exposure Increases
Perceived Accuracy of Fake News but Has No Effect on Entirely Implausible
Statements (Dec. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958246; Gordon Pennycook
& David Rand, Who Falls for Fake News? The Roles of Analytic Thinking,
Motivated Reasoning, Political Ideology, and Bullshit Receptivity (Sept. 15, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023545; Verstraete,
Bambauer, & Bambauer, supra note 42;
368
See, e.g., Lazer et al., supra note 17 (calling for additional “study of social and
cognitive interventions that minimize the effects of misinformation on individuals
and communities”).
369
See, e.g., Renee Hobbs, Seven Great Debates in the Media Literacy Movement—Circa
2001, CTR. FOR MEDIA LITERACY, http://www.medialit.org/reading-room/sevengreat-debates-media-literacy-movement-circa-2001 (last visited Mar. 15, 2018); see
also Alarmed by Fake News, States Push Media Literacy in Schools, VOA (Dec. 30, 2017,
8:52 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/alarmed-fake-news-states-push-medialiteracy-schools/4186222.html (reporting bipartisan push by lawmakers to have
public school systems do more to teach media literacy skills). Query whether media
literacy should be considered a First Amendment issue and government
responsibility on a reoriented First Amendment model. See Rebecca Tushnet, Not
Waving but Drowning: Saving the Audience from the Floods (response to Wu), KNIGHT
FIRST AMEND. INST. (Fall 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/not-wavingdrowning-saving-audience-floods.
370
See, e.g., Kitson Jazynka, Colleges Turn ‘Fake News’ Epidemic Into a Teachable
Moment, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/colleges-turn-fake-newsepidemic-into-a-teachable-moment/2017/04/04/04114436-fd30-11e6-99b49e613afeb09f_story.html?utm_term=.dfb90c11b945; see also Michael Rosenwald,
Making Media Literacy Great Again, COLUM. J. REV. (Fall 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/media-literacy-trump-fake-news.php.

311

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

psychology.371 The typical reaction to correcting false
information is to show the falsity of the false information and
provide the true alternative instead. The difficulty is that studies
by political scientists have shown that instead of reversing
political misperceptions, simply correcting misinformation by
repeating the original false statements and offering corrective
truthful information does not seem to correct false beliefs
effectively.372 Indeed, some studies suggest that this kind of
corrective approach might even backfire to reinforce the false
beliefs.373
One of the possible reasons for this is that people are
subject to a variety of heuristics and cognitive biases374—such as
confirmation bias375 and repetition bias—and exposure to
accurate information “may not be enough” to counteract
371

See Strong, supra note 33 (arguing that empirical research has demonstrated “that
conventional means of responding to legal and political misconceptions (i.e.,
content-oriented speech aimed at those who are believed to have simply failed to
hear the relevant information) are not longer capable of fostering and promoting
rational discourse.”).
372
See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, The Roles of Information Deficits and
Identity Threat in the Prevalence of Misperceptions (Feb. 24, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), available at https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/opening-politicalmind.pdf [hereinafter Nyhan & Reifler, The Roles of Information Deficits]; see also
Strong, supra note 33, at 138; Edward Glaeser & Cass Sunstein, Does More Speech
Correct Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (2014); Lazer et al., supra note 17, at 6;
Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEH. 303 (2010) [hereinafter Nyhan & Reifler, When
Corrections Fail]; DJ Flynn, Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, The Nature and Origins of
Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics, 38 POL.
PSYCHOL. 127 (2017).
373
See, e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, When Corrections Fail, supra note 373. Nyhan and
Reifler’s first study suggested that attempts to correct the misperceptions of people
who are strongly committed to their viewpoints might in fact reinforce their false
beliefs. The more recent studies, however, suggest that the backfire effect may not be
as common as originally thought. See Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Fighting Fake
News: A Role for Computational Social Science in the Fight Against Digital Misinformation,
1 J. COMPUTATIONAL SOC. SCI. 147, 149 (2017).
374
See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013); Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124,
1125 (1974). See also David Z. Hambrick & Madeline Marquardt, Cognitive Ability
and Vulnerability to Fake News, SCI. AM. (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cognitive-ability-and-vulnerability-tofake-news/ (reporting on study that suggests some people scoring low on tests of
cognitive ability may be more vulnerable to misinformation).
375
Confirmation bias refers to people’s tendencies to filter out and ignore information
that conflicts with their preexisting beliefs while retaining information confirming
their beliefs. Strong, supra note 33 and sources cited therein. Many cognitive biases
have been identified, of which a number can apply in the context of evaluating fake
news. Confirmation bias is a type of anchoring bias (a human tendency to rely on
the first thing we learn about an event). See id. at 1128 (on how the ultimate
judgment is influenced by the anchor). For a listing of recognized cognitive biases,
see Jeff Desjardins, This Infographic Lists All The Cognitive Biases Humans Experience,
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/infographic-list-ofcognitive-biases-2017-9.
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people’s false beliefs.376 Familiarity- and fluency-biases in
people’s cognitive processing can lead misinformation to persist
even if the hearer believes the correction.377 Social science data
reveals that “belief echoes” based on false information can
affect people’s political attitudes even though they recognize the
falsity of the information.378 Furthermore, people often have a
“bias blind spot” (which makes them unaware of their own
biases even when they recognize those of others).379
Research shows that “source credibility profoundly
affects the social interpretation of information[,]”and that
people prefer to receive information that confirms the hearers’
existing views.380 On Facebook, people trust news they receive
from people they trust as credible, rather than examining the
sources of the news stories themselves.381 Social media users
tend to be less critical of stories they receive from sources they
perceive as credible or that confirm their prior views.382 They
tend to discount information that is inconsistent with their
beliefs or that comes from an opposition source.383 Some
evidence confirms Eli Pariser’s now-famous “filter bubbles”
and the fear that personalized news enables people to operate
within their own echo chambers. Studies show that when they
are not exposed to facts and ideas of people with whom they
disagree—when they are insulated within their echo
chambers—their views can also become more extreme.384 On
the other hand, still other recent studies suggest that concerns
about echo chambers may be overstated, that people in their
behavior have exposure to different sources even if their reports
indicate group-based filters,385 and that the more accurate
observation may be our vulnerability as human beings to
believing misinformation of all sorts.386 In the view of those
376

See Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 373, (manuscript at 2); see also Flynn, Nyhan, &
Reifler, supra note 373, at 138–39.
377
See Lazer et al., supra note 17; see also Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, supra note
368.
378
Emily Thorson & Stephan Stohler, Maladies in the Misinformation Marketplace, 16
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 442 (2018).
379
See Strong, supra note 33, at 140–41.
380
Lazer, et al., supra note 17, at 6.
381
See ‘Who Shared it?’: How Americans Decide What News to Trust on Social Media, AM..
PRESS INST. (Mar. 20, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/surveyresearch/trust-social-media/.
382
See Lazer et al., supra note 17, at 6.
383
See id.
384
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA (2017) (inter alia on how echo chambers breed extremism).
385
See Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, supra note 39.
386
See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Yasaku Horiuchi, Homegrown ‘Fake News’ is a Bigger
Problem Than Russian Propaganda. Here’s a Way to Make Falsehoods More Costly for
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who are persuaded by the power of these cognitive heuristics,
media literacy initiatives might well fail if they do not take into
account the powerful insights of cognitive psychology about
human behavior. The problem, of course, is that “it is not clear
how to best protect people from believing false claims.”387
Media literacy initiatives face the additional daunting
hurdles that technology can make falsity seem indistinguishable
from truth, and that sophistication in data mining and
psychometric analysis can end-run the audience’s ability to put
media literacy tools into effect before being swept along into
mistaken belief. Those wishing to influence how those
individuals behave (politically or otherwise) have increasingly
sophisticated AI machine tools to deploy in doing so. To the
extent that these appeals—to people’s emotions and their
psychological tendencies and weaknesses—are successful, they
are likely to end-run and undermine any attempts to achieve
media literacy through rational analytic processes. When the
“weaponized
AI
propaganda
machine”388
stealthily
manipulates people’s reactions without their even recognizing
the effect, media literacy projects directed to the rational mind
are unlikely to fare well. This suggests that information literacy
theories should take into account the powerful targeting effects
of data-driven and persistent AI communications of false
information.
These observations do not mean that information
literacy campaigns are useless and not to be explored. While
the lessons of cognitive psychology are powerful, it must be
remembered that not everyone is fungible, and that the
described biases are generalizations. Moreover, there are likely
to be ways to offer effective feedback to digital users that
particular stories are fake and that further sharing them would
have negative reputational effects on the sharers.389 For
example, social pressure can impact the acceptance of
information, and people are concerned with their reputations in
their circles. To the extent that they worry about the
embarrassment and reputational effects of being found to have
shared news thought to be fake by their peers, they may be

Politicians, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/10/23/homegrown-fake-news-is-a-bigger-problem-than-russianpropaganda-heres-a-way-to-make-falsehoods-more-costly-forpoliticians/?utm_term=.c4f60b523c0b.
387
Id.
388
See Anderson & Horvath, supra note 29.
389
See, e.g., Lazer et al., supra note 17.
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open to the use of “fact-checking tools on social media.”390
Moreover, to the extent that “fake news” is spread virally by
celebrities and media sources, it is possible to focus the
information literacy initiatives on helping those influencers
become more skeptical news sharers.391 Even if a small number
of corrections would not dislodge a false belief, there is
evidence that a large enough number of challenges can make
people doubt whether they have made a bad decision.392 There
is reason to believe that exposing people to fact checks can have
positive impacts over the long term.393 Similarly, summary factchecking—which “presents an overview of the fact-checking
ratings for a politician” (as opposed to focusing on the truth or
falsity of a single statement)—might be a useful tool.394 This is
apparently an increasingly popular type of fact-checking
format.395 A recent set of experiments suggests that study
participants who saw summary fact-check ratings “viewed the
legislators in question less favorably and rated their statements
as less accurate” than study participants who were shown factchecks of individual statements by politicians.396 This is notable
not only because it indicates some degree of effectiveness for
summary fact-check ratings (effectiveness on the demand side),
but also because the increasing adoption of the format might
deter some false statements by politicians (effectiveness on the
supply side).397 To the extent that “people fall for fake news
because they fail to think [and] not because they think in a
motivated or identity-protective way, . . . interventions that are

390

See id. at 5. Query, however, whether such tools will have long lasting effects on
beliefs.
391
See id. at 8.
392
See, e.g., David P. Redlawsk, Andrew J. W. Civettini, & Karen M. Emmerson,
The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever “Get It”?, 31 POL. PSYCHOL.
563, 589 (2010).
393
See, e.g., Jane Elizabeth & Alexios Mantzarlis, Surprise! Readers May Actually Pay
Attention to Fact-Checking, POYNTER (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://www.poynter.org/news/surprise-readers-may-actually-pay-attention-factchecking; see also Michael Barthel & Jeffrey Gottfried, Majority of U.S. Adults Think
News Media Should Not Add Interpretation to the Facts, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 18,
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/18/news-mediainterpretation-vs-facts/ (on public approval of fact-checking by news organizations).
394
See Nyhan & Horiuchi, supra note 387.
395
See id.
396
See id.; see also Brendan Nyhan et al., Counting the Pinocchios: The Effect of Summary
Fact-Checking Data on Perceived Accuracy and Favorability of Politicians, DARTMOUTH,
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/summary-fact-checking.pdf.
397
See Nyhan & Horiuchi, supra note 387 (“Summary fact-checking won’t persuade
everyone, of course. But if we can make politicians fear the political costs of a pattern
of false claims a little bit more, there may be less misinformation to report in the first
place.”).
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directed at making the public more thoughtful consumers of
news media may have promise.”398
There is also evidence that “the format in which
information
is delivered could substantially
affect
misperceptions” according to researchers in this area.399
Attempts to help people navigate their overwhelming
informational environment can be designed to be aware of and
responsive to what cognitive psychologists and behavioral
economists have discovered about how people learn, who and
how they trust, and how they change their minds. One positive
sign is that people may be more likely to believe that something
consistent with their worldview is in fact false if they are
advised of its falsity by “surprising validators”—people who
they would consider to be of like mind.400 Thus, for example,
Republicans would be more likely to believe that Hillary
Clinton was not involved in a sex trafficking ring if they heard
that it was “fake news” from a trusted Republican rather than
from a Democratically inclined news organization. Therefore,
some scholars suggest that more conservatives should be invited
into the discussion of political misinformation.401 So, building
trust among different constituencies, through finding common
goals and common ground, might help limit the cognitive
biases that inhibit information literacy at a time of pervasive
misinformation in public discourse.402 Finally, recent research
suggests that knowledge about the structure of the media
ecosystem and the “nuts and bolts of everyday journalism” can
help dispel misinformation and reduce belief in conspiracy
theories.403
398

Pennycook & Rand, supra note 368.
Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 373 (manuscript at 2); see also Strong, supra note 33, at
141.
400
Strong, supra note 34, at 141–42; See also Glaeser & Sunstein, supra note 353, at 67;
see also Glaeser & Sunstein, supra note 353, at at 91 (“Surprising validators have
special credibility to precisely the people who would otherwise be inclined to dismiss
them.”).
401
See Guess, Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 60 (on skew in fake news exposure during
presidential election contest).
402
See Strong, supra note 33 (discussing usefulness of empirical research in both social
and hard sciences to help address the “problems created by the proliferation of
alternative facts.”). Strong argues for a “robust interdisciplinary approach to ensure
the development of a process that is capable of addressing psychological,
neurological and social factors driving the alternative fact phenomenon,” and calls
for coordination among the legal community and other sectors of civil society as well
as the use of data from a wide range of disciplines to overcome the “the challenges of
a post-truth society.” Id. at 145. On the positive normative effects of speaking out
against government attempts to monopolize the narrative by sowing doubt, see
Norton, supra note 103.
403
See, e.g., Jackie Spinner, Study: Educating News Consumers About The Media Can Curb
Conspiracy Theory Appeal, COLUM. J. REV. (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/news-media-literacy-conspiracy399
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In any event, the remaining uncertainty in the social
science argues in favor of exploring a variety of corrective
mechanisms, without adoption of a single one-size-fits-all
combination. More empirical work needs to be done in this
area, including dealing with the fact that the possibility of AI
learning will lead “fake news” bots to evolve in the way they
operate.
With respect to audience empowerment, then, this
Article proposes that audience-focused solutions be responsive
to: 1) the type of “fake news” at issue; 2) the lessons to be
learned from cognitive psychology for effective media literacy;
3) reputational solutions allowing audiences to distinguish
among news organizations; and 4) structural and disclosurebased responses to the potentially manipulative uses of “fake
news” in coordination with big-data-grounded psychometric
targeting.404
Importantly, though, studies of what kind of
information literacy techniques are likely to be effective in
arming audiences against “fake news” must confront an
underlying question about legitimacy. To the extent that media
literacy tools are designed to end-run the effects of people’s
cognitive short-cuts, will they thereby themselves manipulate
the audience and replicate the manipulation problem posed by
the strategies of data-mining persuaders?405 Information literacy
design will not generate consensus without addressing that
issue.
IV. A COUNTERINTUITIVE OPTION? EMPOWERING THE PRESS
TO ENHANCE PUBLIC TRUST
The solutions discussed in Section III, supra—focusing
on technological fixes and audience information literacy—are
attempts to minimize the flow of fabricated content and to arm
news consumers with tools to assess information critically.
They do not address the use of the “fake news” charge as a tool
of delegitimation deployed in the service of criticism-deflecting
governance. A third piece to the puzzle, then, should address
theory.php; see generally Stephanie Craft, Seth Ashley & Adam Maksl, News Media
Literacy and Conspiracy Theory Endorsement, 2 COMM. & PUB. 388 (2017) (survey
finding that “greater knowledge about the news media predicted a lower likelihood
of conspiracy theory endorsement, even for conspiracy theories that aligned with
their political ideology”).
404
See supra notes 42, 371, 295-96, 327, and accompanying text.
405
Questions about the ethical dimensions of behavioral law and economics’
“nudge”-based regulatory approaches have faced these questions as well. See Cass
Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. REG. 413 (2015).
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how to reverse the decline in the public’s trust in the institution
of the press. 406
There seems to be agreement that “fake news” has found
fruitful soil precisely because of such a decline in public trust in
what should be authoritative institutions. When the
mainstream press is trusted less than “friends” on Facebook to
curate one’s exposure to news, and when party affiliation drives
belief, unverified and fabricated news can flourish. Thus, the
conversation has turned to exploring ways of increasing public
trust. This Article takes the position that giving the press broad
freedom to unearth news and disseminate it without fear,
joined with some changes in press behavior, could be a central
element in a broad trust-building strategy. This Article suggests,
therefore, that an affirmative commitment to enhanced
protection for press activities should join technological
solutions and information literacy in order to respond to the
crisis of “fake news.” This way forward is revealed by the
limitations in the proposed responses to “fake news” described
in Section III above.407
A. Press Preferences
The crisis of “fake news” should serve as a clear
justification for the adoption of expansive protections for the
institutions that could combat “fake news”—protections not
directly about “fake news” as such, but designed to scaffold the
institutions that can positively affect public and political
discourse. The epidemic of “fake news,” and the rise of the
weaponized AI-aided propaganda machine, are wake-up calls
to why the law should more clearly help press-workers and
journalistic institutions to perform their job as watchdogs.
Thus, this Article asserts that the “fake news” crisis is a perfect
justification for press preferences,408 especially in connection
406

See Swift, supra note 113.
For example, if media literacy initiatives face uphill battles because of human
cognitive tendencies (and their manipulability through modern automated
propaganda), then perhaps we should focus less on individuals and more on
institutions. Similarly, to the extent that the current legal landscape does not offer
rich resolutions to fake news, then perhaps the answer is to look at what tools the law
might offer to affect fake news indirectly through focusing on legal rules beyond
“fake news” as such.
408
Some scholars are already engaged in the work of promoting a more robust
reading of the Press Clause. See, e.g., Sonja West, Awakening the Press Clause, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1953 (2011). This Article argues that “fake news”—of all the types
described in the taxonomy above—provides a modern explanation and justification
in support of such readings. The Article does not specifically argue that the
institutional protections for the press it recommends are implicit in the Press Clause.
It simply claims that—whether as a matter of constitutional principle, legislation,
regulation, or common law interpretation—the institutional press should receive
407
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with newsgathering broadly conceived.409 Explicit recognition
of a preferred constitutional and social status for the press
would lead to enhancing journalistic tools to reveal and report
in order to accomplish the press’s constitutional watchdog
function. This is obviously not the only path to invigorate trust
in the press; it is simply the one explored in this Article.410
certain kinds of newsgathering protections (and not be limited to the constitutional
protections associated with publication). The main point is less doctrinal than
attitudinal—the recognition of the press as a constitutionally protected institution
would justify protections as to which there is no clear consensus today.
409
See Elizabeth Jensen, Looking to the Future: Restoring Public Trust in the Media, NPR
(May 15, 2017 2:06 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2017/05/15/528158488/looking-to-thefuture-restoring-public-trust-in-the-media.
410
For example, many have argued that the only way to really increase the public’s
trust in the press is to eliminate the advertising-support model of press funding in
favor of subscription models. This Article does not take a position on such
suggestions, preferring to first address a less foundational set of reforms.
News organizations and those who believe in a press renaissance in today’s
fake news climate have begun to explore various tools and methods to enhance
modern journalism and enhance public trust. For example, Wikipedia founder
Jimmy Wales recently unveiled WikiTribune, a news service providing free,
donation-supported factual, “evidence-based journalism” with articles sourced by
professional and volunteer journalists. See WIKITRIBUNE,
https://www.wikitribune.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2018); see also Elizabeth Jensen,
Looking to the Future: Restoring Public Trust in the Media, NPR (May 15, 2017 2:06
PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2017/05/15/528158488/lookingto-the-future-restoring-public-trust-in-the-media. Universities are exploring what it
takes for news organizations to win public trust, including adoption of best practices
for journalism. Jensen, supra (discussing Santa Clara University’s The Trust Project.);
see also Lazer et al., supra note 17 (on academics collaborating with journalists to
“make the truth ‘louder.’”). One recent report designed to distill the proceedings of a
high-level conference on fake news recommends closer collaboration between
researchers and the media, pursuant to which journalists would have access to
curated data for news stories, “cheap and reliable” sources of information, lists of
experts, and help with statistical analysis and relevant background information.
Lazer et al., supra note 17, at 10. The Knight Foundation has recently granted
several million dollars in support to a variety of projects seeking to rebuild trust in
journalism, and has established the Knight Commission on Trust, Media and
Democracy, to study the erosion of trust in institutions such as the press. Paul
Fletcher, Knight Foundation Makes Grants Of $2.5M to Projects Seeking to Rebuild Trust in
Journalism, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulfletcher/2017/09/30/knight-foundation-makesgrants-of-2-5m-to-projects-seeking-to-rebuild-trust-in-journalism/#33b98abe3273.
Many of the projects supported by the Knight Foundation involve various ways to
enhance verification. These are only the tip of the iceberg. Substantive improvement
in press coverage is also suggested as another way of enhancing public trust. On that
score, some emphasize a reengagement with local and regional coverage by the
press. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 10, at 202, 230; see also Mark Little, Here Comes
Somebody: Journalism and the Trust Economy, NIEMANREPORTS (Apr. 3, 2017),
http://niemanreports.org/articles/here-comes-somebody-journalism-and-the-trusteconomy/ (arguing for personalized news feed that does not make the reader feel like
a commodity and is offered by journalists, rather than ad-supported social media).
This Article adds to those suggestions an experiment with allowing the
press to use the best tools available—without fear of extensive legal concerns—in the
exercise of genuine, public interested accountability journalism. Under this
approach, the crisis of “fake news” and the President’s attempt to delegitimize the
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Offering the press better legal protection to engage in
newsgathering and resist censorship would be a useful adjunct
in the project of rebuilding the public’s trust in the “real” news.
At a minimum, those protections—formal and informal—that
have been eroded should be restored and made more certain.411
The details remain to be determined, though the following are
some possibilities. In broad brush, the press should have greater
protections in connection with its newsgathering activities
because access to information becomes increasingly necessary
when politicians and government officials attempt to use a
variety of techniques to avoid public interest scrutiny though
accountability journalism.412 The law should give the press
more access to the information it needs to cover the news in
depth and accurately, including through enhancing FOIA and
state sunshine laws.413 One important protection for the press
would be a clear commitment to immunity from prosecution
for such aggressive newsgathering techniques when they are
undertaken for purposes of accountability journalism.414 The
government should explicitly reject the possibility of
prosecuting journalists under the Espionage Act for refusing to
name their sources and for publishing national security
information they did not themselves obtain illegally. Another
possibility would be a broad scope for existing reporter’s
privileges.415 Courts should be sensitive to the potentially
skewing impact of third party litigation funding of defamation
or privacy actions and should return to a more deferential
interpretation of newsworthiness than is currently in vogue
today.416 Furthermore, the “fake news” phenomenon could be
addressed if the press had better and more consistent access to
institutional press are to be seen as invitations for the press to embrace its watchdog
role with vigor. If constraints on journalists’ ability to tell the truth without fear or
favor are reduced, then perhaps they will do so.
411
See generally supra Section II.
412
Newsgathering activities include, inter alia, dealing with sources reporters cannot
name and with individuals, groups or organizations engaged in leaking; undertaking
documentary and data investigations; and engaging in subterfuge, lying, and
undercover reporting.
413
See generally David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 835 (2017) (discussing public access to court records); see also Erin
C. Carroll, Protecting the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Preference the
Press, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 193, 195 (2016) (arguing that the nature of the preferences
given the press should change and expand, including “[p]roviding faster and better
access to information about government activity”).
414
See supra Section II.
415
For such an argument, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the
Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515 (2007).
416
For a contrary argument in the context of assessing newsworthiness in litigation
against the press, see Erin C. Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and
Privacy in the Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO. L.J. 69 (2017).
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documents and information that it could use to fact check and
tell counter-stories. On the informal front, the President should
not communicate inflammatory anti-press rhetoric unleashing
violence and harassment against the press. More indirect
changes might also be useful. For example, to the extent that
net neutrality rules enhance local journalism,417 their recent
rollback by the FCC418 should be reconsidered. News
organizations should be granted exemptions from antitrust rules
prohibiting joint activity when they seek to negotiate
collectively with the platforms.419
Why is recognition of a preferred role for journalists
important today? Don’t they already have sufficient legal
protections to do their jobs? Since they can wield the threat of
publication if crossed, don’t they have powerful extra-legal
recourse if thwarted? Perhaps most importantly, haven’t they
forfeited any legitimate claim to special treatment by their own
behavior? Do we really trust that entities accused of
partisanship to use press privileges wisely in the public interest?
Is the recommendation here simply “arming the criminal”?
After all, the modern press is criticized by both right and left.
Media watchers diagnose and bemoan sensationalism, bias,
false objectivity, limited sourcing, and “he-said-she-said”
journalism.420 Why take away any accountability by giving
journalists permission to become even worse, particularly in
light of the economic pressures on news organizations?421 In
417

See, e.g., Matthew Ingram, The Media Today: The Loss of Net Neutrality Threatens
Local Journalism, COLUM. J. REV. (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/net-neutrality-local-news.php.
418
See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Repeals Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repealvote.html?_r=0.
419
See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, News Outlets to Seek Bargaining Rights Against Google and
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/business/media/google-facebook-newsmedia-alliance.html; see also NEWS MEDIA ALL.,
https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2018); see also Bell &
Owen, supra note 147 (on how “[t]he rebundling of publishing power is arguably
responsible for a mass defunding of journalistic institutions”).
420
See, e.g., Edelson, supra note 102 (arguing that protections and prestige should only
be granted to journalists “whose work actually advances First Amendment values”
by vindicating the “values of truth and democratic competence”).
This is not even mentioning the shocking revelations of sexual
improprieties at the highest levels of print and electronic news organizations. See,
e.g., Ellen Gabler et al., NBC Receives at Least 2 New Complaints About Matt Lauer, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/business/media/nbc-matt-lauer.html; see
also Alexandria Neason, What We Found When We Asked Newsrooms About Sexual
Harassment, COLUM. J. REV. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/sexualharassment-newsrooms-misconduct.php.
421
What about the press’ own “fake” news? Those who distrust the institutional
press will ask whether it makes sense to further empower the “fake news”—the
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addition, today’s press is less of a unitary institution than a
variety of very different kinds of players, some of which—like
the right wing/alt-right mediasphere—in fact amplify President
Trump’s attack on the mainstream press. More broadly, how
can we justify a preferred place for journalism when technology
has changed the informational ecosystem so much that we can
no longer even define who should count as a journalist? And
what would a preferred position mean in operation? What
additional rights should the press have beyond what is
permitted to all speakers? What is likely to serve as a viable
constraint on news organizations’ abuse of additional press
privileges? There is, of course, no guarantee that any press
privileges will not be abused. Still, there are reasons to believe
that the vast majority of journalists and press institutions would
take their roles seriously.
B. Revised Press Practices422
Journalists doubtless already realize that achieving
increased public trust is practically an existential requirement.
Admittedly, though, public trust is hard to come by in light of
the news media’s self-inflicted wounds.423 For this perhapscounter-intuitive experiment to work, the press as a whole must
develop and adhere to professional journalistic norms. They
must not allow partisanship to trump their professional
obligations.424 News organizations must recognize that if they
purveyors of ideological and biased information? They will claim that it is precisely
because the mainstream press is untrustworthy and biased that the fake news crisis
was able to snowball. This argument is common not only as deployed by politicians
like President Trump, but also in the right-wing mediasphere. Progressives as well
criticize the mainstream media, inter alia for their “he said, she said” type of
coverage—“treating both sides of the argument equally [even] when one is
demonstrably false.” Edelson, supra note 102 (labeling this the “balance trap”).
422
One of the major impediments to improved press performance (particularly in
terms of investigative reporting) and increased constitutional salience (inter alia
through litigation) is obviously financial constraints. A variety of proposals for
funding accountability journalism have been proposed. See Carroll, supra note 414,
at 219–22 (describing several). This Article does not address the funding issue and
takes no position on the matter.
423
Jones & Sun, supra note 6, at 30. Even the venerable Gray Lady has “shifted from
a ‘paper of record model’ to a crowd-sourced conversational model,” reducing its
copy editor staff, eliminating its public editor position, and opening the door to
opinionated headlines. See Paul Horwitz, Breaking the News, COMMONWEAL (Nov. 5,
2017), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/breaking-news-1.
424
Recently, for example, in a “fake news” sting, a woman apparently working for
right wing activist group Project Veritas, attempted to entrap the Washington Post
into publishing her false claim that she had obtained an abortion at 15 after thenSenate candidate Roy Moore had impregnated her. See, e.g., Callum Borchers, A
Botched Sting with a Phony Roy Moore ‘Accuser’ Was Supposed to Discredit the Media. Like
Similar Schemes, it Did the Opposite., WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/11/27/a-botched-stingwith-a-phony-roy-moore-accuser-was-supposed-to-discredit-the-media-like-similar-
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are given additional protections for their newsgathering
activities, they will further lose the public’s trust if they misuse
their new protections. They must commit to engaging in serious
journalism and investigative work enabled by the enhanced
press protections recommended here. They must recognize that
consumer expectations for brand sites require them to build
trust on a number of fronts.425 Professionalism, expertise,
transparency, and a commitment to disinterestedness and
listening would go a long way to enhancing trust for all but
those most wedded to conspiracy theories.426 Journalists and
news organizations must also see beyond their individual
interests and build on their identities collectively as “the press.”
It is time for journalists to recognize that if they continue to see
themselves as a snarling pack of competitive individual
reporters and outlets fighting over scraps in a free-for-all
information marketplace, they will all face existential dangers.
Being targeted by the highest governmental actors should itself
be enough to make the press see itself as such—as an
accountability-seeking institution with a role deep in the
structure of the Constitution.
Political scientists’ empirical studies suggest that
mainstream news organizations must work to “avoid being
drawn into alignment with either of the parties.”427 To the
extent that there is ideological or party-based asymmetry in
people’s susceptibility to “fake news,” solutions should be
schemes-it-did-the-opposite/?utm_term=.ae8acab37c1. Instead of discrediting the
press, as the sting was supposed to do, it was subjected to rigorous vetting and
ignored. Id. (describing other such examples directed to other media organizations
as well). For a less positive view of the Washington Post (and mainstream press as a
whole), see Greenwald, supra note 151.
425
Rande Price, Trust As A Proxy for Brand Value, DIGITAL CONTENT NEXT (Dec. 6,
2017), https://digitalcontentnext.org/blog/2017/12/06/dcns-new-research-trustproxy-brand-value/.
426
See Horwitz, supra note 424; Margaret Sullivan, Polls Show Americans Distrust the
Media. But Talk to Them and It’s a Very Different Story., WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/polls-show-americansdistrust-the-media-but-talk-to-them-and-its-a-very-differentstory/2017/12/27/ed9bbabe-ce3b-11e7-81bcc55a220c8cbe_story.html?utm_term=.b917cb578ba1.
427
Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, supra note 39; see also Barthel & Gottfried, supra note
394. This is particularly critical at a time of increasing “partyism.” See generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (describing party-based hostility).
Such party-neutrality is of course, difficult to recommend for explicitly
partisan news outlets—those that define themselves as conservative or liberal. As to
those, what might be helpful is transparency as to point of view. See Carrie BrownSmith, Transparency Finally Takes Off, NEIMANLAB,
http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/12/transparency-finally-takes-off/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2018); see also Mathew Ingram, Glenn Greenwald vs. the NYT’s Bill Keller on
Objectivity and the Future of Journalism, GIGAOM (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:47 AM),
https://gigaom.com/2013/10/28/glenn-greenwald-vs-the-nyts-bill-keller-onobjectivity-and-the-future-of-journalism/.
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tailored in response. In that spirit, press outlets should seriously
consider eliminating the op-ed page. Especially in light of the
fact that newspaper content is unbundled when accessed on
social media, the organizational structure of the traditional
newspaper—with its clear delineation between the news and
the op-ed pages—is no longer available to help readers
distinguish the news organizations’ own factual reporting from
its service as platform for opinion. News organizations might
also consider focusing more on substantive news reporting and
debunking fabricated news, and less on every White House
insult to journalists. This is not to minimize the danger posed
by the attempt to delegitimize the press as an institution.
Rather, it is to suggest that the press should not itself become
Trump’s anti-press megaphone.
Changes in operations are also likely to be needed. For
example, because research suggests that it is local involvement
that enhances trust428 and that corruption in local and regional
governments flourishes without local media as watchdogs,429
news organizations should revive commitments to the coverage
of local and regional news and the statehouse.430 In addition,
increasing the transparency of the press’s own documents,
processes, and editorial work would likely help assure
audiences of journalists’ good faith.431 Would this entail
development of best practices for leaks and anonymous
sourcing? Clearly, news organizations must try to get the story
right the first time,432 identify errors quickly, resolve them, and
publicize their correcting processes. The development of
additional trusted fact-checking outfits would also likely be
helpful. Attention must be paid also to whether the needle
could be moved on public trust by a public education campaign
distinguishing between social media platforms and news
organizations. These are just a few possibilities. Attention is
now turning to the issue of building public trust, although
428

See, e.g., supra note 409 and accompanying text; see also Shereta Williams, In the
Age of Fake News, Local Media Scores Greater Trust, MEDIAPOST,
http://www.videa.tv/news/age-fake-news-local-media-scores-greater-trust/ (last
visited Feb. 8, 2018).
429
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 10, at 209–10.
430
See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 411; Lazer et al., supra note 18, at 10.
431
See also Faking News, supra note 44, at 60–63 (on building credibility through
enhanced transparency); Raney Aronson-Rath, Transparency is the Antidote to Fake
News, NIEMANLAB (Dec. 2017), http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/12/transparencyis-the-antidote-to-fake-news/.
432
For a list of such recommendations, see Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler,
Misinformation and Fact-Checking: Research Findings from Social Science, NEW AM.
FOUND. 1, 1 (Feb. 2012),
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/Misinformation_and_Fact-checking.pdf.
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empirical assessments of the various projects are not yet
complete.433
The very fact that the President of the United States has
commenced a public war against the press (while himself
publishing lies and overstatements) is likely to awaken in
journalists the recognition that their role is empowering the
public in a democracy, and not merely entertaining an
audience. At a minimum, this kind of situation invites the
development of product-differentiating branding strategies. To
the extent that some news outlets will not take the opportunity
to retake political journalism, the market for information
presents opportunities for product differentiation.434 News
organizations can develop reputations for truthful reporting and
effective fact-checking. They can continue to partner with
independent fact-checking organizations. They can create
incentives for collaboration within the press and among
publishers and news organizations. To the extent that
economics will drive increased collaboration, journalist and
news organization reputations for accuracy and veracity could
well play important roles in cooperative ventures.435 There is
433

See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 411.
One recent suggestion of that sort is the possibility of developing a
nongovernmental, voluntary accreditation system to help people distinguish between
reliable information and “fake news.” See Anna Gonzales & David Schulz, Helping
Truth With Its Boots: Accrediation as an Antidote to Fake News, 127 YALE L.J.F. 315
(2017). While initially attractive, such a proposal raises a number of questions. For
example, it assumes without question that the existing accreditation systems that
exist in other fields, such as university accreditation, in fact work to achieve their
aims of ensuring quality. Moreover, as the proposal would focus “on the conduct
and standards used to produce a story, rather than the accuracy of a given report,” id.
at 323, it could invite the camel’s nose into the tent to a potentially problematic
degree.
435
Admittedly, branding-focused trust strategies are not a panacea and finances still
pose a high hurdle to improved press functions. It is likely that strategic attacks will
be made against any collaborative verification initiatives. Fact-checking
organizations have already been subjected to criticism for being ideological and
having political agendas. See, e.g., id. Perhaps more problematically, news
organizations today have increasingly ceded their control over their content to the
platforms. See Bell & Owen, supra note 147. It is unclear at this point how many
news publishers will be able to develop real brands, given how people now receive
their news online. Facebook’s incorporation of news publishers is both dangerous to
the publishers’ independent brands, and it also succeeds in starving the news
publishers of the money they would need to engage in expensive accountability
journalism in the public interest. Id. Here, however, the ability to negotiate with the
platforms as a cohesive group would doubtless enhance the bargaining position of
the news organizations and publishers. See supra text accompanying note 401
(discussing news organizations’ attempts to obtain antitrust exemptions from
Congress).
Other novel alternatives—such as the development of a journalism
accreditation scheme pursuant to which accredited newspapers could reap the
reputational benefits of being accredited—may be even more problematic. See
Gonzales & Schultz, supra. But accreditation schemes are more attractive in the
434
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reason to hope that the combination of the three-pronged
recommendations made here could be helpful.
Admittedly, it is true that the activist right-wing
mediasphere will still present challenges to the mainstream
institutional press. But “fake news” can become the wedge to
separate the traditional conservative press from the rising altright and alt-lite436 media. A united front against media
disseminators of false information can emerge when
mainstream conservative news outlets come to recognize that
their professional norms give them much more in common with
even liberal professional news media than with pseudo-populist
Breitbart-like alt-right “news” outlets.437
CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of “fake news” has become the central
rallying cry both of Trumpists who chide the mainstream press
for their unsympathetic coverage of President Trump’s
Administration and for liberals who worry that fabricated
political content perhaps has, and definitely could, influence
American elections. President Trump has used the charge of
“fake news” to attempt to defang and delegitimize the
mainstream media. There is a palpable fear that “fake news” in
all its meanings is cheapening American democracy and
political self-determination. This Article takes the position that
even though “fake news” is socially, politically, and
economically a highly disruptive development, it represents an
occasion for collaborative commitments to truth on the part of
information intermediaries, consumers, and a newly
empowered press.
Recent studies suggest that there is little consensus on
the question of whether there are likely to be solutions to the
abstract than in operation. See discussion, supra note 416. In any event, it would be
difficult to convince courts holding a libertarian interpretation of the First
Amendment (such as the current Supreme Court) that accreditation is not a close
cousin to licensing, notwithstanding the recommendation that the accrediting
agencies would nominally be private and not governmental entities. Cf. Jonathan
Friendly, National News Council Will Dissolve, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/23/us/national-news-council-will-dissolve.html
(reporting that “[t]The National News Council, established in 1973 with the
announced aim of increasing public trust in journalism by assessing complaints about
the work of major news organizations, voted yesterday to dissolve itself. The group
attributed its demise to ‘a general lack of news media acceptance of the concept of a
news council.’”); Campbell, supra note 333, at 747 (on news councils).
436
See, e.g., Bridges, supra note 50.
437
See Conor Friedersdorf, Can Conservative Journalism Survive?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept.
19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/canconservative-journalism-survive/539181/.
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“fake news” problem.438 Responses to the dissemination of
fabricated news content have focused on regulation, platform
self-regulation, and information literacy for the audience. But
there are questions about how viable such responses are likely
to be. As part of their claim that the First Amendment has gone
over to the dark side, progressive critics argue that the difficulty
of regulating “fake news” under current First Amendment
doctrine demonstrates that the First Amendment is obsolete.
While some types and degrees of platform self-regulation are
likely to help reduce the amount of “fake news,” the platforms’
economic structure creates some counter-forces that lead to
questions about self-regulatory effectiveness in the final
analysis. And while information literacy initiatives are naturally
attractive—and require nothing from either the government or
the disseminators of “fake news”—the question of how to make
them truly effective has not yet been answered. What we know
is that people’s cognitive biases will often lead them to continue
to hold on to their beliefs even after they have been shown to
rest on falsity. What to do about that is still shrouded in
mystery.
Still, as the adage goes, the perfect is the enemy of the
good. Much headway is likely to be made by a combination of
platform self-regulation and information literacy advocacy.
Platform self-regulation is likely to continue if there is customer
pressure, and it is likely to be somewhat effective so long as the
platforms recognize the process as an iterative one that must
evolve in response to sophisticated attempts to game the
developing rules. When “fake news” begins to be seen as a
problem that afflicts markets and commerce as well as the
political world, then corporations can become partners with
platforms in exploring ways to discipline the effects of
disinformation. Commercial participants in the information
marketplace are developing multiple technological ways to
address “fake news.” Whether or not mandatory disclosure
obligations applicable to political ads on the Internet would
pass constitutional muster, such rules can be voluntarily
adopted to enhance current technological “fixes” to “fake
news.” Similarly, information literacy initiatives are likely to be
increasingly effective the more they take account of the lessons
taught by psychologists and political scientists. They just need
to avoid the legitimacy trap themselves—by which they could
438

Anderson & Rainie, supra note 21. This report asserted that 51% of the experts it
polled were pessimistic on the question, while 49% were more optimistic (although
no one thought “fake news” could be eliminated rather than reduced). The attitudes
apparently depended largely on whether the experts were optimistic about human
nature and technology. See id.
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be criticized for using manipulative techniques to combat
manipulation.
Nevertheless, these sorts of developments, while
laudable and likely to reduce the flow of “fake news,” are not
sufficient to rebuild public trust in the press. They do not
directly address the underlying threat to democracy posed by
the consistent delegitimation of the press by the president, other
governmental figures, and nakedly ideological segments of the
so-called press itself. Authoritarianism and corruption can grow
unchecked in contexts where an independent press is not there
to watch, discover, and reveal. Periodic information dumps by
leakers and shadowy entities like Wikileaks cannot make up for
the loss of professional accountability journalism. Leaving the
public sphere to mediation solely by Facebook, Google, and
Twitter is a dangerous strategy. Therefore, the Article argues,
we need to take the perhaps counter-intuitive step of
empowering the press both doctrinally and with respect to its
customs and practices. The first step is the reversal of the
ground that has already been lost in terms of press protection,
both formal and informal. The second step is a more sustained
inquiry into expanding press protections, both legislatively and
judicially. The last step is the changes that the press would have
to undertake in order to regain public trust. None of this is an
easy case, nor are the consequences of legally empowering the
press likely to be unalloyed benefits. The principal reason to
advocate for this, however, is that the alternative is likely to be
far worse.

